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ABSTRACT
Government Enforcement of Morality
A Critical Analysis of the Devlin-Hart Controversy
(December 1975)
Peter August Bittlinger, B.S., Canisius College
M.A., Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Felix E. Oppenheim
Is it justifiable to use the criminal law to pro-
hibit and to punish conduct merely because it is generally
thought to be morally wrong? The recent controversy between
Patrick Devlin and H. L. A. Hart has been waged over this
normative question. This study critically analyzes their
arguments which are themselves comprised of complex combina-
tions of normative views, factual assumptions, and philoso-
phical theories. I approach these diverse elements system-
atically by treating them independently. A three-fold
classification of theory-types is employed.
First, I deal with Devlin's and Hart's normative
theories, i.e., their generalizations about the desirable
extent and limits of' penal legislation and of individual
liberty. Devlin is an advocate of legal moralism, the view
that certain kinds of conduct should be criminalized simply
because they violate public morality, and of legal paternal-
ism, the view that the law should protect persons from the
harmful consequences of their own actions. He offers
vi
several reasons, all of which I criticize, for holding these
views. Hart, on the other hand, opposes legal moral!sm—but
only with respect to the consensual sexual practices of
adults in private; he justifies a limited form of legal mor-
alism for the sake of protecting moral and religious senti-
ments from offensive public activities, and he adopts a
limited (and confused) form of legal paternalism. I agree
with Hart, against Devlin, that penal sanctions for "mere
immorality" are unjustifiable, but I criticize his views on
public offense and paternalism.
Second, I examine the factual assumptions underlying
these normative theories, i.e., Devlin's and Hart's empiri-
cal generalizations about political society and human
nature. Devlin's assumptions appear unfounded. Although
some of Hart's fare little better, I agree with him, against
Devlin, that neither society's survival nor the individual's
well-being requires a governmental policy of legal moralism.
Third, I analyze Devlin's and Hart's positions on
the philosophical question whether certain intrinsic moral
principles can be shown to be objectively true independently
of anyone's subjective value commitments. Devlin explicitly
propounds the value-cognitivistic view that the moral judg-
ments of a given social community are objectively valid; his
reasons belong to the naturalistic and intuitionistic meta-
ethical types. I agree with Hart's implicitly value-
noncognitivistic view which denies that ultimate moral prin-
vii
ciples can be objectively validated.
Finally, I review the present state of the contro-
versy by analyzing recent views on the issues of public
offense, paternalism, and so-called 'victimless crimes 1
.
Against both Devlin and Hart (and some others), I agree with
Michael Bayles and Hugo Bedau that public activities should
not be criminalized for their mere offensiveness to others,
and that the penal code is an inappropriate means to pre-
venting self- harm. I also agree with Bedau that the concept
of 'victimless crimes' is both unnecessary to and sometimes
incapable of justifying proposals to decriminalize certain
activities. With Bayles and Bedau, I defend J. S. Mill's
harm to others principle as a criterion of justifiable
criminal legislation.
viii
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XXVIII
Oh who is that young sinner with the handcuffs on his
wrists?
And what has he been after that they groan and shake their
fists?
And wherefore is he wearing such a conscience-stricken air?
Oh they're taking him to prison for the colour of his hair.
•Tis a shame to human nature, such a head of hair as his;
In the good old time 'twas hanging for the colour that it is;
Though hanging isn't bad enough and flaying would be fair
For the nameless and abominable colour of his hair.
Oh a deal of pains he's taken and a pretty price he's paid
To hide his poll or dye it of a mentionable shade;
But they've pulled the beggar's hat off for the world to see
and stare,
And they're haling him to justice for the colour of his hair.
Now 'tis oakum for his fingers and the treadmill for his
feet
And the quarry-gang on Portland in the cold and in the heat,
And between his spells of labour in the time he has to spare
He can curse the God that made him for the colour of his
hair.
A. E. Housman
1CHAPTER I
THE DEVLIN-HART CONTROVERSY
What part should the fact that most members of a
given public think an activity to be "immoral" play in the
decision whether to make it a criminal offense? If the pro-
hibited practice is strenuously condemned by public opinion,
should this fact be regarded as conclusive of the issue
whether a particular crime ought to be retained? Does the
fact that some criminal laws punish certain practices for
their "immorality" preclude moral criticism of those stat-
utes?
Such questions go back at least as far as Sopho-
cles' s Antigone , and thus are as old as the history of poli-
tical thought itself. The desirable relationship between
public morality and positive law is a perennial political
issue which was last ventilated in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury controversy between John Stuart Mill and James
i
Fitzjames Stephen. Today this issue is once again the
subject of public discussion and scholarly interest.
For nearly twenty years a well-known controversy
about the desirability of enforcing by means of criminal
1John Stuart Mill, On Liberty , ed. Currin V.
Shields, Library of Liberal Arts (New York: Liberal Arts
Press, 1956); and James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equal-
ity, Fraternity , 2nd ed. (London: Smith Elgard & Co . , 187^)
•
2legislation the conventional moral standards of society has
been conducted in the Anglo-American countries. Presently
this debate shows no sign either of abating or of being
resolved. The principal antagonists in the controversy are
Patrick Devlin, retired Justice of England's highest court,
and H. L. A. Hart, former Professor of Jurisprudence at
Oxford.
Devlin states the case for legal moralism, the view
that certain kinds of conduct ought to be prohibited and
punished by the law simply because they are "immoral"
according to the prevailing moral norms of a given society.
For Devlin, the "immorality" of an act is a sufficient
reason for its legal proscription, even when the act is
performed in private and apparently harms no one in parti-
cular, not even the actor himself. He thinks that "immoral"
practices are capable of injuring society, and that the
law's tolerance of activities which are considered morally
wrong can lead to society's "disintegration." Devlin holds,
therefore, that it is morally right, and even obligatory,
for the government to "preserve" society by means of morals
legislation.
On the other hand, Hart's view is that the law
should never prohibit and punish conduct merely because it
is thought to be morally wrong by an important segment of
society. For Hart, the "immorality" of a practice is never
a sufficient reason for the enactment of legislation pro-
3scribing it. Rather, other conditions must be present in
order to justify the use of the criminal law. Among these
criteria, says Hart, are the harm to others and even to the
actor himself which an activity can cause.
A. History of the Controversy
In September 1957, the Wolfenden Committee made its
report to the English Parliament recommending that homo-
sexual practices in private between consenting adults should
no longer be a crime. Among its reasons the Committee gave
"the importance which society and the law ought to give to
individual freedom of choice and action in matters of
private morality":
Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society,
acting through the agency of law, to equate the sphere
of crime with that of sin, there must remain a realm of
private morality and immorality which is, in brief and
crude terms, not the law's business. To say this is
not to condone or encourage private immorality. 2
Legislative action on the Committee's recommendation was
unfavorable for the next ten years; in I967 Parliament voted
to decriminalize private homosexual practices between con-
senting adults.
In 1958 Devlin was invited by the British Academy to
deliver the second Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence, and
he took as his topic a defense of the Wolfenden Report which
2Great Britain, Parliament, Report of the Committee
on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution ("The Wolfenden
Report"), Cmnd. 2^7, 1957, para. 61.
had stirred much public discussion and controversy. Devlin
himself favored the recommended reform and had given testi-
mony to that effect before the Wolfenden Committee. His
initial reaction to the Report was therefore one of
" compl et e appro val "
:
As to the subject-matter of my lecture, what I hadin mmd_to do was to take other examples of privateimmorality and to show how they were affected by the
criminal law and to consider what amendments would be
necessary to make the law conform with the statement
of principle in the Report.
3
However, Devlin's reading of Mill's On Liberty in prepara-
tion for the lecture compelled him to rethink his attitude
toward the desirable relationship between law and morals in
general and the Wolfenden Report in particular: "But study
destroyed instead of confirming the simple faith in which I
had begun my task; and the Maccabaean Lecture ... is a
statement of the reasons which persuaded me that I was
wrong.
Devlin's Maccabaean Lecture, "The Enforcement of
Morals," was delivered on March 18, 1959- I"ts interest lay
primarily in its rejection of the Wolfenden Committee's
principle distinguishing public from private morality and
its advocacy of criminal legislation against conduct (such
as homosexuality and abortion) which is popularly regarded
-^Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965), "Preface," pp. vi-vii.
kIbid.
,
p. vii
.
as morally wrong regardless of other considerations (such as
the consequences of the conduct itself). Contrary to the
Committee, Devlin held that it is "wrong in principle" to
require "special circumstances to be shown to justify the
intervention of the law."-^
Critical response to the lecture came quickly, and
Hart's reactions stood out against the rest. His first
attack on Devlin's views was broadcast over radio and first
published in the Listener of July 30, 1959. In "Immorality
and Treason," Hart argued, contrary to Devlin, that there is
a meaningful distinction between public and private moral-
ity, and that there are several criteria (including the
probable consequences of a practice) which must be met in
order to justify legal impingements on individual liberty. 6
His "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," first published
in The Oxford Lawyer in 1961, held that it is an abuse of
the criminal law to use it merely to enforce the convention-
al moral standards of a given community. Here Hart marshal-
led a series of objections to a governmental policy of legal
moralism.
'
With the notable exception of Eugene Rostow's
5Ibid., p. 11.
6
H. L. A. Hart, "Immorality and Treason," in The Law
as Literature, ed. Louis Blom-Cooper (London: The Bodley
Head, 1961), pp. 220-27.
7
r H. L. A. Hart, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal
Law," The Lawyer 8, nos. 2 & 3 (I965): ^7-51.
g
article, the bulk of critical commentary was unfavorable to
Devlin's views. He continued, nevertheless, to propound
them in four lectures. 9 Of these, the Owen J. Roberts
Lecture, "Law, Democracy and Morality," given at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania on September 28, 1961, was a signifi-
cant supplement to the Maccabaean Lecture. Whereas in the
latter Devlin sometimes appeared to hold that only Christian
moral principles should be legally enforced, in the former
he explicitly advocated a theory of moral populism, the view
that the intensely felt moral convictions of the majority
should be enacted into criminal statutes. Here, too, Devlin
replied for the first time to some of the views of his
... 10
critics
.
In I963 Hart formulated his most systematic state-
ment on the question of legal moralism in a series of Harry
Camp Lectures presented at Stanford University, published
that year under the title Law, Liberty, and Morality . Hart
took the view that John Stuart Mill's harm to others prin-
ciple ought to be the test applied to the question whether
"immoral" sexual practices can justifiably be interdicted by
the criminal law. In the absence of demonstrated harm, Hart
Eugene V. Rostow, "The Enforcement of Morals," The
Cambridge Law Journal (November I960), pp. 1 7^-98.
9Three of these lectures are relatively insignifi-
cant with respect to the issue of legal moralism; they are
Chs. II, III, and IV in Devlin, pp. 26-85.
10Ch. V in Ibid., pp. 86-101.
held, the law should not interfere with, and is unjustified
in intervening in, the private sexual behavior of oonsenting
11
adults
.
During the following year Devlin answered with three
lectures which dealt more with criticizing Hart's book than
with developing his own views. In "Morals and Contemporary
Social Reality," Devlin claimed that Hart's position is not
that of Mill, is not stated clearly, is revealed only acci-
dentally in discussing Mill's harm to others principle, and
is in need of revision if it is to mean anything to contem-
porary social reality. 12 The Ernst Freund Lecture, "Mill on
Liberty in Morals," criticized the normative views of both
Mill and his ,, disciples"-viz., Hart' and the Wolfenden Com-
13
mittee. The last lecture, "Law and Morality," was a
rather sketchy review of the chief arguments contained in
the previous two lectures. 1 ^ Excepting the last, all the
lectures were published in I965 as a book, The Enforcement
of Morals
,
with a "Preface" and new footnotes which qualify
some of the arguments in the original addresses.
While Devlin's contributions to the controversy
11
H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (London:
Oxford University Press, 1963)
.
l2
Devlin, Ch. VII, pp. 124-39.
13Ibid., Ch. VI, pp. 102-23.
14Patrick Devlin, "Law and Morality," Manitoba Law
School Journal 1, no. 3 (1964-65): 243-54.
8ended with his book, Hart added two articles which dealt
more with empirical problems than with normative issues.
One of the Lionel Cohen Lectures, "The Enforcement of Moral-
ity," given at the University of Jerusalem in 1964, first
reviewed the salient issues of the controversy and then
analyzed the recent law reform movements in England. 15
Hart's last piece criticized in detail Devlin's "disintegra-
tion thesis," the claim that society will disintegrate if
conventional moral standards are not legally enforced. 16
In neither one did Hart attempt to answer Devlin's criti-
cisms of Mill's or his own normative principles.
The Devlin-Hart controversy did not end with the
retirement of the protagonists from the central arena.
Others have continued the debate on legal moralism to the
present time. A book-length commentary on the controversy,
from a point of view favorable to Devlin's position, appear-
1
7
ed in I967. An anthology of critical articles and court
1 Pi
cases was published in 1971. In recent years the contri-
1 *)
^H. L. A. Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law
(Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1964), pp. 31-54.
i 6
H. L. A. Hart, "Social Solidarity and the Enforce-
ment of Morality," The University of Chicago Law Review 35
(Autumn I967): 1-13.
17
'Basil Mitchell, Law, Morality, and Religion in a
Secular Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
18Richard A. Wasserstrom, ed., Morality and the Law
(Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1971).
9butions of philosophers, lawyers, and social scientists have
centered on the issues of government paternalism and preser-
vation of public decency by means of the criminal law.
B. Plan of Analysis
The purpose of this study is to provide a critical
analysis of the arguments which comprise the Devlin-Hart
controversy. These arguments are themselves made up of
complex combinations of normative views, factual assumptions,
and philosophical theories. I intend to approach these
diverse elements systematically by treating them indepen-
dently. Thus, a threefold classification of theory-types
will be employed.
Chapters II and III will deal, respectively, with
Devlin 1 s and Hart's normative theories, i.e., their general-
izations about the desirable extent and limits of criminal
legislation and individual liberty.
Chapter IV will examine the factual assumptions
underlying the normative views of the protagonists. The
subjects of analysis will therefore be Devlin's and Hart's
empirical generalizations about human nature and political
society.
A philosophical issue of metaethics will be treated
in Chapter V. There I will analyze Devlin's and Hart's
positions on the question whether certain intrinsic moral
judgments can be shown to be objectively true independently
10
of personal value commitments.
Finally, in Chapter VI I will conclude with a
summary and criticism of recent works on the issues of legal
paternalism, legal prevention of public indecency, and so-
called victimless crimes.
11
CHAPTER II
NORMATIVE THEORIES--I
Normative theories of politics are concerned with
the standards of right political conduct. The two basic
questions of political ethics are: 'What political actions
are morally right?* and 'What outcomes of political actions
are intrinsically good? 1 The central theme of the Devlin-
Hart controversy is a special case of such questions.
Specifically, the debate raises the issue of whether
the criminal law should be used to enforce a society's con-
ventional moral standards. In their- replies Devlin and Hart
develop theories concerning the desirable scope of indivi-
dual freedom and the desirable limits of governmental power.
The purpose of this chapter and of the next is to provide a
critical analysis of these theories.
As a preliminary to such an analysis I will first
distinguish between several general types of normative
theory, and then answer those critics who reject the view
that the debate's central issue is one of normative ethics.
A. Theories of Political Ethics
There have been, traditionally, two views concerning
the criteria of moral rightness: teleological theories and
deontological theories. According to the criteria of deon-
tological ethics, conduct is morally right when it conforms
m12
to certain principles cf duty or rules of obligation. But
since governmental policies and acts of legislation are
usually justified in terms of their probable consequences,
deontological theories (which ignore consequences in the
moral assessment of action) are seldom invoked in political
Philosophy. The issues of the Devlin-Hart controversy, with
their concern for the effects of criminal legislation o,
both individuals and society, are therefore best viewed i:
the context of teleological theory.
According to the criteria of teleological ethics,
conduct is morally right when its results or outcomes are
better (by whatever valuational standards) than those of
alternative actions open to the actor. Therefore, one ought
to do that which will have the best consequences or do the
most good.
But good consequences for whom? Egoism claims that
it is morally right, or at least permissible, for an actor
to pursue only his own interest. Altruism requires, on the
other hand, that the actor forego his own interest and pro-
mote only the interests of others. Universalism prescribes
that an actor take into account both his own interest and
the interests of everyone who- may be affected by his conduct.
As we shall see, both Devlin and Hart advocate universal
standards in their consequence theories.
What kind of consequences are good, and should there-
fore be promoted? Utilitarianism, in the broad sense, re-
13
quires that some welfare goal be advanced for an action to
be morally right. Such an action may be done for the sake
of deriving any kind of utility (happiness or pleasure)
either for oneself or for others. These welfare considera-
tions are contrasted with actions performed for some non-
utilitarian goal, i.e., any end which conflicts with welfare.
Examples of some goals which may be incompatible with
welfare are justice, national liberation, and upholding the
"true faith." Although liberty and equality are often con-
sidered means to welfare, they too may conflict with utili-
tarian goals when taken as ends in themselves. We shall see
that Hart advocates both utilitarian and nonutilitarian
goals, but that it is questionable whether Devlin advocates
the promotion of welfare goals and hence whether his theory
is utilitarian even in the broad sense.
Utilitarianism, in the narrow sense, is a special
kind of consequence theory which combines welfare goals with
universalism. Thus, like Jeremy Bentham's dictum that one
ought to promote "the greatest happiness of the greatest
number," utilitarianism, narrowly construed, requires that
the results of right conduct advance the well-being of as
many as possible, and preferably of everyone. We shall see
that at least one of Hart's normative theories is utilitar-
ian in this sense.
14
B. The Controversy a Normative One
The issues which divide Devlin and Hart are primar-
ily normative ones. However, there are a few critics who
deny this. For example, Yves Caron says that "Lord Devlin
and Professor Hart, and a few of their followers, do not
even speak the same language," and that therefore "their
debate is in fact a non-debate, for they hardly speak from
the same standpoint." But this is precisely what gives the
debate its interest: Devlin and Hart address themselves to
the same ethical problem from separate perspectives. Indeed,
this difference in points of view is what makes a contro-
versy between them possible. Differing standpoints can
"speak" to a common normative question and hence do not pre-
clude a meaningful exchange of views--a conclusion which is
implicit in Caron 1 s own lengthy gloss on the controversy.
On the other hand, there are some commentators who
claim that Devlin and Hart speak from identical standpoints.
For instance, Jeffrie Murphy asserts that the debate raises
no "moral issues" because he thinks both antagonists are
utilitarians. For Murphy, the debate "has been carried on
in a completely utilitarian framework" in which the partici-
pants "play the dubious game of 'more utilitarian than
thou 1 ." In particular, Devlin supposedly "attempts to
defend legal moralism on purely utilitarian grounds, having
1Yves Caron, "The Legal Enforcement of Morals and
the So-Called Hart-Devlin Controversy," McGill Law Journal
15, no. 1 (1969): 21, 45.
15
no recourse to deontological or intuitionistic considera-
tions," while Hart appeals to identical grounds in justify-
ing his opposition to legal moralism. 2 From Murphy's point
of view, then, because Devlin and Hart are united in a
shared "utilitarian" ethic their real differences occur only
with respect to questions of fact.
I think Murphy is mistaken for these reasons. First,
his argument implies that deontological principles are the
only alternatives to any given utilitarian ethic. This is
not the case, for we have seen that utilitarianism--even in
the broadest sense--is only one type of consequence theory,
opposed not only to deontological but also to nonwelfare
teleological moral principles. Second, the argument also
implies that "intuitionistic considerations" can play no
role in either utilitarian or general teleological theories.
But, as we shall see, both Devlin and Hart rely on such con-
siderations whenever they foresake factual evidence that
certain conduct causes harm or injury to society in general
or to specific individuals in particular. Contrary to
Murphy, the analysis will show that Hart is not a "pure"
utilitarian and that it is doubtful whether Devlin is a
utilitarian at all.
Richard Hare also styles the debate as "one between
utilitarians," although he differs from Murphy in saying:
2Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Another Look at Legal Moralism,"
Ethics 77 (October 1966): 50-51-
16
'The punishment of wickedness and vice 1 (merelv hpo.no.
S°H- reqUireS it} 13 not advocated by a y r to**these discussions, and both Professor Hart and LordDevlin seem to make their criterion for the righ?nessof legislation the good of the people in societv tLv
^good^ ab° Ut What iS neces^r? in order^^ichiSvJ
Here it is suggested that Devlin and Hart are utilitarians
who disagree merely over how to achieve universal welfare
goals or well-being for everyone.
Contrary to Hare, I will show that Devlin does favor
"the punishment of wickedness and vice" simply because
certain activities are generally considered "immoral"—but
not "because justice requires it."^ Furthermore, it is not
true that Devlin and Hart advocate the same goal, "the good
of the people," but differ only over means. Devlin favors
the realization of transpersonal ends rather than individual
welfare while Hart subscribes to welfare goals in at least
one of his theories. Therefore, as we shall see, there is a
significant theoretical difference between Devlin and Hart
over the "good" which penal legislation should achieve.
Bernard Crick holds that "the real point at issue"
between Devlin and Hart is "how changing judicial rules of
3^R. M. Hare, review of Law, Morality, and Religion
in a Secular Society
,
by Basil Mitchell , in Philosophy V3
(October 1968): 379.
h
Therefore I disagree with another's suggestion that
the Devlin-Hart controversy is essentially "a debate about
justice" (A. R. Blackshield, "The Hart-Devlin Controversy in
1965," Sydney Law Review 5 [October I967]: ^52). Arguments
from justice are advanced only by Hart, but are actually
peripheral to the central issue of the controversy, as we
shall see.
17
interpretation give more (or less) tolerance to old laws in
new circumstances.^ This is an empirical question- and,
though an interesting subject for political science, it does
not occupy a significant place even among the factual assump-
tions of the controversy. Henry Aiken, too, alleges that
Devlin and Hart hold substantially similar normative views
as to the desirability of legal moralism, but that their
differences concern only "matters of fact and of meaning." 6
However, critical analysis of Devlin and Hart's differences
of "meaning" reveals that their chief disagreements are over
a normative issue. It is a moral question regarding the
desirability of government enforcing positive morality by
means of the criminal law.
As Hart has counseled, the central issue of the
debate over legal moralism is both of morality and about
morality. Specifically, Hart says that "our question is one
of critical morality about the legal enforcement of positive
morality," where by 'positive morality' Hart means "the mor-
ality actually accepted and shared by a given social group,"
and where by 'critical morality' he means "the general moral
principles used in the criticism of actual social institu-
^Bernard Crick, Political Theory and Practice (New
York: Basic Books, 1973). pp. 77-78.
6Henry David Aiken, "There Oughta Be a Law," New
York Review , 11 November I965, p. 17.
18
tions including positive morality." 7 Critical morality ans-
wers the question whether and to what extent the criminal
law ought to incorporate positive morality. In Hart's words,
"It is the question whether the enforcement of morality is
morally justified; so morality enters into the question in
two ways." Or, rather, there are two different concepts of
morality: first, general principles of evaluation (critical
morality), and second, generalizations about what in fact a
given social group regards as morally right and wrong (posi-
tive morality)
.
The importance of Hart's distinction between criti-
cal and positive morality lies in the difference between
normative judgments and empirical statements. The recommen-
dations of critical morality express judgments concerning
the moral rightness or wrongness of conduct, e.g., the desi-
rability or undesirability of certain kinds of criminal
legislation. All moral principles are "critical" in the
sense that they are criteria by which individual actions and
governmental policies are judged morally right or wrong.
The function of critical morality is to appeal to general
moral principles when justifying normative judgments such as
'x is immoral 1 or valuational judgments such as 'y is evil 1 .
7H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (London:
Oxford University Press, I963), p. 20. One critic finds the
distinction "puzzling" (Richard Brandt, review of Law, Lib-
erty, and Morality
,
by H. L. A. Hart, in The Philosophical
Review 73 I April 196k]: 273-74-).
8Ibid., p. 17.
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On the other hand, the statements of positive morality are
reports about the actual moral judgments of a given social
community. That x is immoral according to the moral stan-
dards of some society is a factual assertion, e.g., 'In
society A, x is immoral 1 ; it means that most persons in
society A morally disapprove of x.^
Close attention to this useful distinction has been
lacking on the part of some commentators on the Devlin-Hart
controversy. As a result, some believe that the opponents
of legal moralism either deny that morality has anything to
do with the law or affirm that the law ought to be severed
10from morality. On the contrary, both the advocacy of and
opposition to legal moralism are normative views, i.e., con-
flicting replies to a question of critical morality. Both
the legal moralist and his opponent evaluate the moral right
ness of criminal laws (among other things) by virtue of the
different moral principles each respectively espouses. Henc
Q
'Therefore I cannot agree with the recent proposal
that Hart's distinction be interpreted as a difference
between "critical" and "conventional" roles of moral prin-
ciples (Max Atkinson, "Interpreting Retributive Claims,"
Ethics 8-5 [October 19?4]: 80-81). Atkinson's distinction
does not correspond to Hart's and hence cannot be used in
its place; rather, it might be viewed as a distinction be-
tween 'active' and 'passive' 'moral principles.
10See, e.g., Shirley Robin Letwin, "Morality & Law,"
Encounter ^3 (November 197*0: 35-^3; A. R. Louch, "Sins and
Crimes," Philosophy ^3 (January 1968): 38-39, ^7-^9; and
J. R. Lucas, The Principles of Politics (Oxford: The Claren-
don Press, I966), pp. 345-^-8. A recent critique of Louch
corroborates my view: Robert L. Schwager, "'Sins and Crimes'
Philosophy 50 (January 1975): 88-93-
20
both Devlin's commitment to the preservation of society's
positive morality and Hart's commitments to individual lib-
erty and the prevention of suffering are commitments to just
such principles of critical morality. 11
C. Devlin's Normative Theories
Devlin's advocacy of legal moralism emerges from his
responses to the question: "To what extent, if at all,
should the criminal law of England concern itself v/ith the
enforcement of morals and punish sin or immorality as
12
such?" First, Devlin replies that "the enforcement of
morals" by means of the criminal law of England is morally
justifiable because it is morally right in any society that
the penal code punish "sin or immorality as such." Thus, he
espouses the moral principle that conduct which is contrary
to a given society's positive morality ought to be legally
punishable
.
Second, Devlin also replies that the criminal law
should enforce positive morality only to the extent neces-
sary to insure society's "preservation from disintegration":
But if society has the right to make a judgement {[con-
cerning the rightness or wrongness of certain practices]
and has it on the basis that a recognized morality is as
necessary to society as, say, a recognized government,
then society may use the law to preserve morality in the
same way as it uses it to safeguard anything else that
USee Hart, p. 82.
1 2
Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965), P« 2.
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is essentia^ to its existence. If therefore the firstproposition is securely established with all its impli-cations, society has a prima facie right to legislate
against immorality as such. 13
.sm
Ostensibly, then, Devlin's justification of legal morali:
rests on a means-end relationship between a society's posi-
tive morality and its "continued existence." Indeed, Devlin
claims that legal proscriptions of "immorality as such" are
justifiable precisely because each society's existence and
survival depend on its positive morality, whose moral stan-
dards must be legally enforced in the absence of voluntary
compliance
.
Devlin's exposition of the theory advocating legal
moralism as a means to society's survival reveals that he
actually considers the enforcement of morals desirable for
the sake of preserving traditional social institutions and
positive morality itself, as we shall see. He also offers
other reasons justifying criminal punishments for "immoral-
ity": one is moral populism, the view that in a democracy it
is morally right that the moral beliefs of the majority be
enforced by the criminal law; another is the claim that the
positive morality of each society is objectively morally
right, hence worthy of legal enforcement.
^Ibid., p. 11. But cf. Blackshield (p. ^8, n. 66)
who thinks— for no apparently good reason— that Devlin
rejects the view that "sin or immorality as such" may justi-
fiably be punished by the law. Julius Stone ( Social Dimen-
sions of Law and Justice [Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1966 j, p. 377, esp. n. ^63) also takes this strange
view.
22
So, then, Devlin deploys several theories supporting
his advocacy of legal moralism. The analysis which follows
will consider each in turn, beginning with the theory
derived from society's preservation.
1. Preservation of society
. Devlin's case for the legal
enforcement of positive morality on this view is that its
maintenance is necessary to prevent the disintegration of
society:
Societies disintegrate from within more frequently than
they are broken up by external pressures. There is
disintegration when no common morality is observed and
history shows that the loosening of moral bonds is
often the first stage of disintegration, so that
society is justified in taking the same steps to pre-
serve its moral code as it does to preserve its govern-
ment and other essential institutions . 1^
Devlin holds that there is in principle no realm of
conduct which should be immune from legal control and pun-
ishment: "Any immorality is capable of affecting society
injuriously and in effect to a greater or lesser extent it
usually does; this is what gives the law its locus standi .
It cannot be shut out."
1
^ Devlin means that the law should
not be "shut out" of the realm of even private "immoral"
conduct because he believes such activity affects society in
a harmful way. Society's survival is, then, the intrinsic
value (or, in Hart's terms, the general principle of Devlin's
^Ibid., p. 13-
1
^Ibid., p. 15. See also J. N. D. Anderson, Moral-
ity, Law and Grace (London: Tyndale Press, 1972), p. 72.
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critical morality) which justifies government enforcement of
positive morality and the theoretically unlimitable legal
restrictions on individual freedom that enforcement requires.
Hence Devlin holds that society has a moral right to pre-
serve itself and should possess the unlimited legal right to
enforce the positive morality necessary to its existence. 16
Devlin also claims that it is impossible both in
theory and in practice to draw a distinction between public
and private morality:
I do not think that one can sensibly talk of a public
and private morality any more than one can of a public
or private highway. Morality is a sphere in which
there is a public interest and a private interest,
often in conflict, and the problem is to reconcile the
two .17
Despite this talk of reconciliation, Devlin actually consi-
16
Eugene V. Rostow ("The Enforcement of Morals," The
Cambridge Law Journal [November i960], p. 195) disagrees
with this interpretation of Devlin's theory because of his
"Hohfeldian" equation of 'right 1 and 'power': if 'right*
means 'power', then it cannot be denied that government, if
it is in fact the authoritative decision maker, has "the
right" to enforce positive morality. Hence, Rostow says,
Devlin should not be criticized for espousing a view which
(at least on Rostow' s interpretation) he does not hold.
However, Rostow does not distinguish between 'moral right'
and 'legal right' (or 'power'). Therefore he fails to see
that the exercise of governmental power may legitimately be
passed under the scrutiny of critical morality. Certain
uses of power may be legally right yet not morally right.
This is precisely the issue over which the controversy is
waged: Does government have a moral right to possess the
legal right to enforce positive morality?
^Devlin, p. 16. In my view, Devlin's concession
that there can be both a public and a private interest con-
tradicts his claim that it is impossible to distinguish
between public and private morality .
2k
ders the public interest in the maintenance of common moral
beliefs to be paramount. The "private interest," it appears,
counts for very little in his scales, for all "immoral" con-
duct, even that of consenting adults in private, constitutes
an occasion of harm both to the moral consensus and to
society's existence. 18
Thus, Devlin apparently thinks that merely by being
thought "immoral" by many members of a given social commun-
ity certain activities become affected with a public inter-
est. By assuming that "any immorality is capable of affect-
ing society injuriously" he implies that there is a public
interest in suppressing "immoral" practices by means of
penal legislation—because there is an undisputed public
interest in preserving society* s existence. Hence legal
impingements on individual freedom are morally permissible
and even desirable whenever they result in consequences con-
ducive to the preservation of society.
Some think that in basing his theory on this argu-
ment "Devlin is adopting a utilitarian justification--!
. e
.
because the consequences of immorality are harmful society
has the right to intervene." 7 "Devlin ... is a sort of
utilitarian, giving to a commonly accepted morality the
18Fred M. Fro hock, Normative Political Theory
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 197*0, p. 88.
1
^F. W. M. McElrea, "The Legal Enforcement of Non-
Utilitarian Morality," Otago Law Review 1 (July I967): 214,
n. 51.
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instrumental value of helping to preserve society." 20
"Devlin's theory, as I understand it, is really a form of
utilitarianism or, more exactly, an application of the
public harm principle." 21 "Thus Devlin has seen that a con-
sistent utilitarianism must agree with his position that in
any serious conflict between the good of society and indivi-
dual freedom, it is individual freedom that must give way." 22
Even Hart has suggested that Devlin's theory "is a utilitar-
ian one
. . . ; it is Utilitarianism without benefit, of
facts." 23
It is true that, like a utilitarian, Devlin places
individual liberty in an inferior position relative to "the
good of society." In his words, "Freedom is not a good in
itself. We believe it to be good because out of freedom
there comes more good than bad. . . . But no good can come
from a man doing what he acknowledges to be evil. . . .
Freedom to do what you know to be bad is worthless."
20
D. D. Raphael, review of Law, Liberty, and Moral-
ity
,
by H. L. A. Hart, in Mind
,
n.s., 75 (October 1966):
308.
21Joel Feinberg, "'Harmless Immoralities' and Offen-
sive Nuisances," in Issues in Law and Morality , ed. Norman
S. Care and Thomas K. Trelogan (Cleveland: The Press of Case
Western Reserve University, 1973) > P« 90.
22Vincent C. Punzo, "Morality and the Law: The
Search for Privacy in Community," Saint Louis University Lav;
Journal 18 (Winter 1973): 180.
23Hart, p. 55.
2
^Devlin, p. 108.
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That is, freedom to do what most people consider to be mor-
ally wrong cannot result in a greater good for either the
society or the individual actor; hence it is always undesi-
rable. Devlin allows that "there must be toleration of the
maximum individual freedom that is consistent with the inte-
grity of society." 25 But given that he thinks "immoral"
conduct incompatible with society's "integrity," this means
that only freedom to do what is considered morally right in
the given society should be tolerated by the law. 26
However, as Hart attests, utilitarians "are commit-
ted at least to the general critical principle that the use
of legal coercion by any society calls for justification as
something prima facie objectionable to be tolerated only for
the sake of some countervailing good." 27 Because legal
coercion entails moral wrongs (e.g., deprivation of freedom
and frustration of desire) which contravene the welfare of
the individual actor, utilitarianism--even in the broadest
sense of the term--requires that such wrongs be justified as
means to the attainment of some competing yet more desirable
welfare goal. For instance, it might be shown that conduct
contrary to the standards of a given society's positive mor-
ality produces palpable injury to the interest either of
-\Lbid.
, p. 16.
C. L. Ten, "Crime and Immorality," The Modern Law
Review 32 (November 1969): 656.
2
?Hart, p. 20.
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some persons or of all members of the social collectivity.
Then it might plausibly be argued that legal coercion is
required to protect such interests and to promote the wel-
fare of that society's members. But, apart from a vague
allusion to the lessons of history ("history shows that the
loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage of disin-
tegration"), Devlin makes no attempt to marshall the factual
evidence required to substantiate the claim that legal mor-
alism is necessary to prevent the alleged harm of social
.
dissolution.
Not only is Devlin's so-called utilitarian theory
"without benefit of facts," but, more important, it also
lacks conceptual clarity. First, whether Devlin values the
preservation of society as a means to the general welfare of
its citizens is questionable. He does pay lip service to
utilitarianism by holding that "an established morality is
as necessary as good government to the welfare of society . 1,28
As we shall see, Devlin has in mind only the moral good of
society. He also denies that "the criminal law exists for
the protection of individuals," for " the true principle is
that the law exists for the protection of society." 2^ But
Devlin, p. 13 (emphasis added).
29 / \
'Ibid.
,
p. 22 (emphasis added). Peter Winch
(review of The Enforcement of Morals, by Patrick Devlin, in
The Sociological Review
,
n.s., 13 1 July I965]: 213-1*0
writes: "Astoundingly, he [Devlin] states this principle in
the very passage in which he has pointed out Wolfenden's
'error of jurisprudence* in searching for some single prin-
ciple .
"
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will that be a protection of the members of society and
their interests, or of particular social institutions which
are valued, not for the benefits they may provide, but for
the conservative reason of preserving tradition? As we
shall see, the latter is the more likely meaning, m that
case Devlin would be in the position of justifying legal
coercion and deprivation of liberty for the sake of trans-
personal and nonutilitarian goals.
Second, when Devlin allows that in certain circum-
stances "practical limitations" may stay the law in enforc-
ing positive morality, even then the four limitations which
he enumerates are so ill-defined as to provide no guidelines
whatsoever as to how and in what cases the law should be
30limited. Here especially Devlin could have argued that
sometimes the welfare of both individual persons and society
can be advanced by limiting the criminal law's interference
with certain activities despite their being popularly regard-
ed as morally wrong. But his continual stress on the impor-
tance of society's survival and his disavowal of the value
of freedom to do that which is generally considered "immoral"
prevent him from making this utilitarian argument.
Third, Fred Frohock has shown that some of Devlin's
most important conceptual difficulties stem from the confla-
tion of two quite different characteristics of an activity:
30Ibid., pp. 15-24, passim.
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(1) its being contrary to society's positive morality, and
(2) its effect on society's survival prospects. Devlin
assumes that the latter is implied by the former: ••immoral-
conduct always threatens society's existence. This over-
looks the possibility of conflict between society's positive
morality and its survival requisites. For example, a given
society may accept birth control practices as morally right,
or at least permissible, and have its existence endangered
because birth rates are lower than death rates. Also, a
society which morally condemns abortion and contraception
may well legalize and encourage both practices in the face
of a severe overpopulation problem. An "immoral" activity
may therefore constitute a survival requisite, and a prac-
tice which is not morally condemned may constitute a survi-
val threat.
According to Frederick Carney, since Devlin
... is willing to legislate the positive morality as
such of society upon its members
. . . his basic test
does not (as with Hart) center on actual harm to persons
either^ directly or indirectly. Rather it hinges on the
determination of whether some norm or ideal is an actual
part of the society's positive morality. If it is, it~«
is eligible for penal legislation to enforce it, . .
If this is (as I believe) a correct interpretation, then
Devlin's theory derived from society's preservation cannot
be considered utilitarian, for the "harm" which he wishes to
-^Frohock, pp. 90-92.
32J Frederick S. Carney, "Religion and the Legislation
of Morals," Soundings 51 (Winter 1968): kk2.
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prevent through morals legislation is not the kind which is
capable of contravening anyone's (or even society's) welfare
goals. The "harm" which he imputes to "immoral" conduct
derives, not from the consequences of the activity, but from
the fact that it is regarded as morally wrong. In society A,
x may be considered "immoral" while in society B, x may be
considered morally permissible or even "virtuous." Devlin's
criteria require him to treat x as harmful (both to the
actor and to the social collectivity) in society A but not
in society B. Thus, homosexuality in England and the United
States "must" cause harm to the homosexual himself and to
the moral beliefs of society, while in ancient Sparta it had
neither of these effects. As C. L. Ten points out, if drunk-
enness, drug taking, prostitution, and homosexuality really
are harmful to anyone, "they are so quite independently of
whether they violate the shared morality of society," for
"it is perfectly possible that the debaucheries of one
society would form part of the shared morality of another
33
society. " JJ
Fourth, Devlin characterizes the good consequences
of legal moralism for society in terms of its "cohesion,"
"integrity," "continued existence," and "preservation."
Without a more precise description of what is being recommen-
ded, most critics agree with Hart that these ultimate goals
-^C. L. Ten, "Enforcing a Shared Morality," Ethics
82 (July 1972): 323.
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are ambiguous. What, for instance, does it mean to say that
a society is being preserved or protected from disintegra-
tion? What empirical indicators enable us to determine
whether a society possesses integrity or cohesion? Indeed,
how can one determine whether and to what extent deviant
behavior or even overt violence brings about society's dis-
solution? For example, does civil war destroy society? Has
revolution disintegrated the society of France, Russia,
Spain, China, Vietnam, Cambodia? How great and what kind of
change is necessary to say that a society has ceased to
exist?
Because it is difficult to understand what is being
asserted when Devlin holds that a society either succeeds or
fails in preserving itself it follows that it is impossible
to determine whether or not he advocates welfare goals;
hence it is impossible as well to classify this view as
either utilitarian or not. Devlin's later lectures afforded
opportunities for clarifying and refining his basic concepts
in order to meet the objections voiced by the several
critics .of the Maccabaean Lecture. Unfortunately, however,
he has declined to specify any empirical referents by which
to describe the kinds of outcomes which would constitute the
realization of his goals. "The kind of threat to survival
Devlin envisages is as difficult to specify conceptually as
it is to identify empirically.
^Frohock, p. 93.
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Most critics (including Hart) concede that Devlin's
disintegration thesis rests on a "factual claim," but I
argue that it does not, because factual claims are empirical
hypotheses which state relationships between descriptively
defined concepts. Is the proposition »x (any specific class
of "immoral" conduct) is harmful to society* an empirical
statement? Not in Devlin's theory, for there the concept of
•harm* is given no unambiguous empirical referent.
More generally, I agree with these criticisms of
most (including Devlin* s) attributions of "harm":
Calling conduct he wishes to prohibit "harmful" is
the lawmaker's pet gambit; attaching the label seems to
discharge the onus of justification. An aura of legi-
timacy surrounds rules designed to prevent harm. And
yet, while there is agreement that harm, in the abstract,
may justify legal coercion, disputes arise over whether
specific human conduct is harmful. That this is so
should not be surprising. "Harm" is a normative word
suffering the fate of normative words generally—the
notorious dearth of unanimity over when the word pro-
perly applies. Thus, it is simply useless to assert
that behavior is harmful without more. Specifically,
what interest or interests of what person or persons has
been interfered with as a consequence of that behavior?35
Devlin fails to specify what interests of assignable indivi-
duals are interfered with as a consequence of "immoral" con-
duct; moreover, as we have seen, he does not even specify
what interest of nonassignable individuals (i.e., the public
interest) is apt to be affected adversely by such activity.
-^Robert N. Harris, Jr., "Private Consensual Adult
Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforce-
ment of Morality," UCLA Law Review lk (January I967): 58I
(emphasis added).
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Prom what Devlin has given us, there is no empirical hypo-
thesis by whioh to test the so-called factual claim of the
disintegration thesis. Indeed, there is no factual claim
deserving of the name.
Ernest Nagel points out that, like "much talk about
societies," Devlin's theory is based on an organic model
which compares human communities to living organisms, "and
there is a point to the analogy": some social processes,
such as maintenance of food supplies and education of the
young, are likened to biological vital functions, such as
assimilation of food and respiration. "But the analogy is
misleading if it leads us to assume that a society can die
or flourish in the same sense that a biological organism
does." With the "possible exception" of the extreme case,
such as the permanent dispersal of a population or the death
of all its members including progeny (e.g., genocide),
"there appears to be no general agreement on the activities
that define what it is for a society to be destroyed, rather
than to be undergoing some alteration in its modes of organ-
izing human conduct." Thus, without adequate explanations
of what is to be understood by either the "preservation" or
the "disintegration" of a social order (as distinct from the
persistence or collapse of, say, its form of government) it
is impossible, according to Nagel, "to distinguish between
the supposition that a social order has been destroyed and
the supposition that there has been only a change in some
3^
pervasive pattern of institutionalized behavior." 36
Nagel suggests, then, that Devlin's legal moralisra
has as its ultimate goal the preservation, not of every
society's existence in general, but of each society's pecu-
liar "modes of organizing human conduct" in particular.
Thus, the legal proscription of "immoral" conduct is justi-
fied as a means to preventing, or at least inhibiting, alter-
ations in a given society's actual institutions. But if
this is what preserving society's "existence" means, then
Devlin's theory is reduced to a conservative ethic which
opposes change in the particular "pervasive pattern of insti-
tutionalized behavior" of a given society. That Devlin's
view is, after all, one of moral conservatism is suggested
by his discussion of social institutions which, he says,
both are and should be protected by the criminal law as a
matter of moral principle.
2. Preservation of essential institutions . Devlin's examples
of law "enforcing a moral principle" reveal his concern for
resisting change in each society's "essential institutions":
Christian morality in the Western nations and both marriage
(be it monogamous or otherwise) and government in every
society.
(a) Christian morality. In the Maccabaean Lecture,
J Ernest Nagel, "The Enforcement of Morals," Human-
ist 28 (May-June 1968): 24.
35
Devlin emphasized that the morality which the law should
enforce (at least in England, but also in most other Western
countries) is Christian morality-the absolute and eternal
morality of divine revelation: "I suppose that moral stan-
dards do not shift; so far as they come from divine revela-
tion they do not, and I am willing to assume that the moral
judgements made by a society always remain good for that
society." Thus, in England the moral standards of the
Christian religion "always remain good for that society."
Indeed, "for the purpose of the limited entry which the law
makes into the field of morals, there is no practical dif-
ference
.
. .
between Christian morals and those which every
right-minded member of society is expected to hold." Yet
the nature of positive morality is such that "without the
support of the churches the moral order, which has its
origins in and takes its strength from Christian beliefs,
would collapse," taking with it both society and the law. 37
Even one of Devlin's supporters thinks this asser-
tion "raises issues of difficulty, reaching far beyond the
scope of his paper." 38 Devlin makes an assertion of fact
without attempting to show that any given society's positive
morality (let alone that of England) is dependent on the
37
-"Devlin, pp. 18, 23. See also Basil Mitchell, Law,
Morality, and Religion in a Secular Society (London: Oxford
University Press, 1967), pp. 103-18.
38Rostow, p. 182.
36
religious teachings of an organized church. He implies,
nevertheless, that should the law not enforce religious moral
rules the churches would not support the secular laws which
39remain. Jy
Consider Devlin's statement of the argument:
A man who concedes that morality is necessary to
society must support the use of those instruments without
which morality cannot be maintained. The two instruments
are those of teaching, which is doctrine, and of enforce-
ment, which is the law. If morals could be taught simply
on the basis that they are necessary to society, there
would be no special need for religion; it could be left
as a purely personal affair. But morality cannot be
taught that way. Loyalty is not taught that way either.
No society has vet solved the problem of how to teach
morality without religion
. So the law must base itself
on Christian morals and to the limit of its ability en-
force them
,
not simply because they are the morals of
most of us, nor simply because they are the morals which
are taught by the established Church--on these points the
law recognizes the right to dissent--but for the compel-
ling reason that without the help of Christian teaching
the law will failT2^
One wonders what Devlin may think of Rome under the Antonines
or Russia under the Soviets: Does he regard the Stoics and
the Communists as being without capacity to teach morality?
Does atheism or agnosticism generally preclude the possibil-
ity of inculcating secular moral values? Is any morality
possible only if predicated on religious doctrine? Surely
there are many principles of -morality which can be taught
-^Glanville Williams, "Authoritarian Morals and the
Criminal Law," Criminal Law Review (March I966), pp. 141-42.
Devlin, p. 25 (emphasis added). Hart does not
attempt to answer this argument. See the effective refuta-
tion in Graham Hughes, "Morals and the Criminal Law," The
Yale Law Journal 71 (March I962): 681.
(and learned) without religion. But even if they could not,
it would not follow either that the law should enforce any
given religious morality or that the law could not success-
fully be enforced without the support of religious teaching.
While it is not inconsistent to advocate that a society
accept freedom of religious thought and practice but reject
freedom to engage in activities which are morally condemned,
it is inconsistent to say that a society which accepts free-
dom of religious thought and practice should limit freedom
on purely religious grounds.
(b) Marriage
. Concerning this "essential" institu-
tion, Devlin says:
Whether a man should be allowed to take more than one
wife is something about which every society has to make
up its mind one way or the other. In England we
believe in the Christian idea of marriage and therefore
adopt monogamy as a moral principle. Consequently the
Christian institution of marriage has become the basis
of family life and so part of the structure of our
society. It is there not because it is Christian. It
has got there because it is Christian, but it remains
there because it is built into the house in which we
live and could not be removed without bringing it down.
Thus, Devlin thinks the removal of Christian marriage (i.e.
monogamy) would "bring down" or "destroy" his society--or,
rather, alter that society in a fundamental way such that h
would no longer recognize it as typically English.
According to Basil Mitchell, Devlin's most capable
defender,
Ibid., p. 9»
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insists nevertheleqq that -t-h Q i becure society,
the ramifications, of the institution of Lrriage" its
5ni
a
*ions , to ^ e insti^tions of parenthood and propertyfor example, which are so complex that
. . . there is no'question of our trying to replace Christian marriage byMuslim marriage. It is obyious that a great deal of oursexual morality is intimately bound up wi?h the institu-tion of monogamous marriage, so that if Lord Devlin isright m holding that the law has a proper concern withmonogamy, it is at least plausible to suggest that itcannot wholly disinterest itself in sexufl morality"^
But then the law's "proper concern" with sexual relations
would be institutionalizing marriage in general rather than
any given form of marriage (monogamy, bigamy, polyandry,
polygamy) in particular. Even if marriage is essential to
any society's existence— i . e
, ,
legal arrangements providing
for parenthood, legitimacy of progeny, family property rights,
inheritance, etc., being required in any social community--
it does not follow that monogamy or any other particular form
of marriage is essential to a given society's continued
existence
.
Mitchell points out that the minimum essentials of a
public morality cannot be confined to that set of rules with-
out which no society could survive: some institutions must be
regulated in a way which is common for all members of one
society, although the way in which they are regulated might
be quite different from the mode of regulation in some other
itchell, pp. 25-26. See also Anderson, p.
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society.^ This his opponents could easily grant, though
'
they would still consider justification for a single set of
regulatory rules to be necessary. Does social continuity
require that all members of the same society conform to the
same code of sexual conduct? Some, perhaps a majority in
the Anglo-American countries, sincerely accept Christian
moral standards; but it does not follow that others should
have to accept and to live by the same standards for the
sake of social cohesion.^
We are therefore left with the conclusion that an
"essential" institution is merely one which happens to be a
major part of a given society's life, or that it is essen-
tial because it exists in that society. This being so, the
failure of the law to protect such an institution would not
necessarily result in harm to those who live within it.
Neither Devlin nor Mitchell has established that giving up
monogamy is productive of harm; all they have established is
that it would result in a significant change in England's
way of life and positive morality. Although it may be true
that the "protection of individuals from harm is not a pur-
pose which can be realized independently of the protection
of the institutions under which they live, ^ it is not true
^Ibid., pp. 35-37.
C. L. Ten, "Religious Morality and the Law," Aus-
tralasian Journal of Philosophy ^7 (August 1969): 1 69-73 » and
Idem, "Enforcing a Shared Morality," pp. 327-28.
itchell, p. 68.
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that all the institutions under which they live must be
legally protected in order to prevent injury to individuals.
The category of 'essential institutions* does not help us to
determine which institutions need legal protection for this
46
reason.
It turns out, then, that both Devlin's and Mitchell's
ultimate goal is the preservation, not of "society," but of
existing social institutions such as monogamy. Thus, accord-
ing to Mitchell,
. . . Devlin is right in holding that the law may take
the line that monogamy as an institution is essential to
our society and be justified in taking it. This does
not mean that monogamy is essential to any society--
obviously it is not. Nor does it mean that the law can
never, or ought never, to alter on this point. It means
simply that at any given period the law on marriage must
be definite and that change, if it comes, must come
slowly and must result in a law which, though different,
is equally definite. ^7
If this is the case, then monogamy is not "essential" at
all— either to any society or only to England— for both
Devlin and Mitchell admit that change from monogamy to other
forms of marriage may come someday, although it ought to
"come slowly." But this, too, is a view of moral conserva-
tism.
^6Carney, pp. 440-41.
^Mitchell, p. 30. This argument is of the same kind
as Letwin's view (pp. 40-43) that each society's characteris-
tic "standards of civility" may justifiably be legally enfor-
ced. See also Ronald Atkinson, Sexual Morality (London:
Hutchinson, 1965)1 P*
(c) Government. In his theory of social disintegra-
tion Devlin treats sexual "immorality" (especially homosex-
uality) as if it were as harmful to society as direct
attacks on the state. Even private "immoral" practices are
seen by him to be just as potentially injurious to society
as acts of public sedition against the legitimate govern-
ment; therefore such conduct should be just as punishable by
the criminal law:
.
The suppression of vice is as much the law's business asthe suppression of subversive activities; it is no more
possible to define a sphere of private morality than it
is to define one of private subversive activity. It is
wrong to talk of private morality or of the law not
being concerned with immorality as such or to try to set
rigid bounds to the part which the law may play in the
suppression of vice. There are no theoretical limits to
the^ power of the State to legislate against treason and
sedition, and likewise I think there can be no theoreti-
cal limits to legislation against immorality. 48
Hart rightly takes issue with this thesis, saying
that the analogy with treason is "absurd" because
... it is grotesque ... to think of the homosexual
behaviour of two adults in private as in any way like
treason or sedition either in intention or effect. We
can make it seem like treason only if we assume that
deviation from a general moral code is bound to affect
that code, and to lead not merely to its modification
but .to its destruction. The analogy could begin to be
plausible only if it was clear that offending against
this item of morality was likely to jeopardize the
whole structure. ^9
ho
Devlin, pp. 13-14; see also pp. 33, 112. Although
he is uneasy with the treason analogy, Rostow (pp. 183 > 191)
defends it.
L. A. Hart, "Immorality and Treason," in The
Law as Literature , ed. Louis Blom-Cooper (London: The Bodley
Head, 1961), p. 225-
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Even if sexual practices which deviate from positive moral-
ity were tolerated by the law and would in fact change con-
ventional moral attitudes in a permissive direction, we
would scarcely be led to say that the society in question
was being destroyed or even subverted. Rather, Hart says
"we should compare such a development not to the violent
overthrow of government but to a peaceful constitutional
change in its form, consistent not only with the preserva-
tion of society but with its advance."^ 0
The treason analogy may be more illuminating than
Devlin probably intended, for successful rebellions do not
typically "destroy" societies; rather, they change the dis-
tribution of political power within those societies. "Much
of our anti-rebel legislation is designed to preserve not
the existence of the society but the particular system of
government."^ Hence we cannot be convinced by this analogy
that the legal enforcement of positive morality is meant to
achieve anything more than the continued observance of the
particular moral precepts (such as preservation of the exist
ing government) to which Devlin is committed. It is, in
other words, another argument favoring moral conservatism.
* Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , p. 52. See also
Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 39.
^T. G. Ison, "The Enforcement of Morals," Univer-
sity of British Columbia Law Review 3 (March I967): 2?3«
^3
This discussion illustrates how Devlin's examples of
law enforcing a moral principle often confuse the point of
his original theory derived from the preservation of society.
There the point was that there is a public interest in
legally proscribing conduct generally thought to be "immoral"
because such activity is presumed to be harmful in some un-
defined way. Brian Barry has shown that this earlier argu-
ment is different from that considered here— viz., that
certain social institutions are desirable because they exist,
and that they ought to be protected from alteration by the
criminal law because they are traditional, hence presumably
"good for people":
But what Devlin has to show is that even where there is
no institution such as marriage at stake there is a
public interest in suppressing immorality because there
is a public interest in maintaining a like-thinking
community. Or to put it another way, he has to show
that over and above particular institutions there is
the institution of 'public morality' which is as worthy
of protection on grounds of public interest as the
institution of the state. As far as I can see Devlin
offers no evidence for this beyond his repeated asser-
tion of it, and it seems to me a good deal more plaus-
ible to suggest that the Mill-Wolfenden criteria offer
a guide to the matters about which the members of a
community can safely agree to differ without threaten- -
ing the dissolution of the community as a going concern. D
Thus, Devlin's original theory is marred by a con-
fusing use of examples (which change that theory to one of
preserving existing institutions) as well as by the lack of
factual evidence and descriptively defined goals. The plaus-
^ 2Brian Barry, Political Argument (New York: Humani-
ties Press, 1965). P. 310-
(ft
ibility of his assertion of the value of social institutions
depends, of course, on the general theory deployed in its
support. Edmund Burke valued established institutions
because they developed as the result of the adaptation of
men to the diverse conditions of their lives. But this
evolutionary defense of tradition and custom is unavailable
to the legal moralist, for he desires to use legal coercion
to maintain the institutional and moral status quo by arti-
ficially arresting the developmental process which, Burke
held, gives social institutions their value. 53 As we have
seen, Devlin's general theory is less than adequate because
of conceptual and evidentiary weaknesses. But what of posi-
tive morality itself-which Barry says Devlin must show to
be worthy of legal protection on grounds of public interest?
3j Preservation of positive morality. We have seen that
Devlin, Mitchell, and Hart (and, apparently, Barry as well)
regard the public morality of a given community as a social
institution, and that Devlin and Mitchell disagree with Hart
and Barry over the question whether that "institution"
should be legally enforced. Now, it is questionable whether
positive morality is an institution in the same sense as the
state and marriage and the family are social institutions.
A positive morality consists of the variable moral beliefs
and convictions of a given public—which are surely differ-
53
^Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
, pp. 7^-?5.
^5
ent from organized patterns of social behavior. Be that as
it may, Devlin and Mitchell argue that consensual moral
beliefs ought to be enforced by the criminal law because
they are "essential" to the maintenance of a like-thinking
community and, hence, to the preservation of society.
Consider Devlin's statement of what he means by
1 society'
:
What makes a society of any sort is community of ideas,
not only political ideas but also ideas about the wayits members should behave and govern their lives; theselatter ideas are its morals. . . . [s]ociety means a
community of ideas ;• without shared ideas on politics,
morals, and ethics no society can exist. 5^
In effect, Devlin redefines 'society' so that its survival
depends on the conformity both of private conduct and of
personal moral convictions to its positive morality, and
then he "slides into the usual meaning of the word to per-
suade us that the collapse of society would be very alarm-
55ing."-^ Given this idiosyncratic meaning of 'society',
however, a given society's survival is by_ definition depen-
dent on the preservation of a specific and shared moral
code, i.e., the positive morality peculiar to it.
Hart's criticism goes to the heart of this theory:
The short point is that if we mean by "society ceasing
to exist" not "disintegration" nor "the drifting apart"
of its members but a radical change in its common moral-
^Devlin, pp. 9-10; see also p. 89.
^Alan Ryan, John Stuart Mill (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1970), p. 247. See also Glenn Negley, Political
Authority and Moral Judgment (Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 1965). P- 64.
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ity, then the case for using the law to preserve moral-ity must. rest not on any disintegration thesis but onsome variant of the claim that when groups of men havedeveloped a common form of life rich enough to includea common morality, this is something which ought to blpreserved. One very obvious form of this claim is theconservative thesis that the majority have a right inthese circumstances to defend their existing moral
environment from change. But this is no longer an
empirical claim. 56 6
It appears, then, that Devlin must abandon the theories
advocating legal moralism as a necessary means to preserving
society and its fundamental institutions in favor of a
theory advocating legal moralism either for its own sake or
as a means to preserving positive morality itself—if there
is indeed a difference between the two.^
Accordingly, Devlin holds that it is popular moral
beliefs or "ideas about morals and ethics" that matter. But
these beliefs are "harmed," he says, by "gross immoralities"
and "excessive vice"; hence society's positive morality must
be reinforced by state promotion of virtue.
(a) Gross immorality . In this argument Devlin
avails himself of the traditional but discredited distinc-
tion between "natural" and "unnatural" sexual practices. He
says that the "grosser forms of vice" and "unnatural vice"
H. L. A. Hart, "Social Solidarity and the Enforce-
ment of Morality," The University of Chicago Law Review 35
(Autumn I967): 4.
^See R . A. Samek, "The Enforcement of Morals: A
Basic Re-Examination in Its Historical Setting," The Cana-
dian Bar Review 49 (May 1971): 215-
^7
(e.g., homosexuality and buggery) both physically weaken
those who practice them and threaten the moral beliefs of
those who learn of the existence of such unorthodox sexual
practices. But the "harm" which Devlin wishes to prevent is
not so much the alleged injuries to the actor as the change
in the moral beliefs of the many. On the other hand, "nat-
ural vice" (e.g., fornication, adultery, and prostitution)
is also capable of causing harm—but only when its practice
is either "excessive" or sufficiently offensive to others.
Devlin leaves little doubt that it is "unnatural"
sexual behavior which is always both physically debilitating
to the actor and destructive of society's faith in its moral
convictions. Therefore, homosexuals should certainly be
punished by the law, but not necessarily fornicators, adul-
terers, and prostitutes. And why not the latter as well?
Because these "natural" practices are so "common" that law
enforcement would be "impracticable."^8 Apparently Devlin
does not see that the very fact that these activities are so
common might indicate that they do not offend against posi-
tive morality.
For Hart this argument simply means that if conduct
is generally considered "grossly immoral" there is no fur-
ther question whether its punishment by law is desirable.
The "immorality" of "unnatural" sexual activities is alone
5 Devlin, pp. 111-14, 116; see also pp. 17-18, 22.
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sufficient to justify making them crimes because Devlin pre-
sumes them (again by definition) to constitute occasions of
grave offense to the moral beliefs of most other people. 59
Apparently he also presumes them to be easier to detect and
punish— despite their being less ,, common M—because the
impracticability of enforcement argument (which he uses to
absolve adulterers and fornicators from penal penalties) is
brushed aside when it comes to homosexuals. But "it must
surely be an embarrassment to any theory which assigns to
the law a large place in the 'protection' of the institution
of marriage that fornication and adultery are not crimes." 60
(b) Promotion of virtue
. Because Devlin presumes
common beliefs about moral right and wrong to be seriously
challenged by even the mere knowledge that acts of "gross
immorality" are being committed by some, he proposes that
legal moralism be adopted to buttress the moral orthodoxy
through government promotion of citizen virtue. Legal per-
missiveness, says Devlin, encourages sexual "immorality";
therefore government ought to take an active role in foster-
ing "virtuous" ways of living through a policy of moral-
5%art, "Immorality and Treason," p. 225. Cf.
Rostow, pp. 189-90» See also Robert S. Summers, review of
Law, Liberty, and Morality
,
by H. L. A. Hart, in New York
University Law Review 38 (December 1963): 1210.
6
°Barry, p. 31°» J* F. Wolfenden (review of Law,
Liberty, and Morality
,
by H. L. A. Hart, in The Spectator ,
5 July 1963, p. 19) also argues that adultery, more than
homosexuality, damages marital and familial stability.
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paternalism, for "the purpose of the law is to conserve the
moral welfare of the State." 61 Thus, Devlin holds that,
aside from preserving either society or its existing insti-
tutions, legal moralism is necessary to protect the moral
consensus from being undermined and altered. 62 Accordingly,
he enjoins the state to become moral tutor to the citizen:
"[Devlin] seems sometimes to be arguing
. . . that society
has a right to punish conduct of which its members strongly
disapprove ... on the ground that the state has a role to
play as moral tutor and the criminal law is its proper
tutorial technique." 6 ^
This argument may be viewed as a separate and inde-
pendent theory which values a virtuous citizenry as the
ultimate goal of their government's paternalism. It seems
to me that such a view was a sub-theme of the Maccabaean
Lecture, although since then Devlin emphatically denied that
64
such was his intent or meaning. Nevertheless, while the
63
'Devlin, p. 89 (emphasis added).
62Ibid., pp. 120, 135-37.
6
-^Ronald Dworkin, "Lord Devlin and the Enforcement
of Morals," The Yale Law Journal 75 (May I966): 988. An
American proponent of this view is Walter Berns, Freedom,
Virtue and the Fifth Amendment (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1957). A brief critique of both Berns and
Devlin may be found in Judith N. Shklar, Legalism (Cambridge
Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 90-92.
6
^Devlin, p. 89. George Anastaplo ("Law and Moral-
ity: On Lord Devlin, Plato's Meno, and Jacob Klein," Wiscon-
sin Law Review [Winter I967], pp. 241-43) thinks Devlin does
not go far enough in advocating legal promotion of virtue.
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issue was still moot Hart attacked the suggestion that gov-
ernment promotion of virtue by means of the criminal law is
desirable, pointing out that legally enforced morality is
"morally worthless" because abstinence from "sin" which is
motivated by fear of detection and punishment is not condu-
cive to fostering moral virtue.^
There is another interpretation, however. Unlike
the classical theorists (e.g., Plato and Aristotle) who
would have government enforce some abstract standard of
virtue in order to make citizens "better" or more "perfect,"
Devlin characterizes his standards of moral paternalism in
terms of the conventional virtues upheld by the positive
morality of any given society. (On this principle, then, he
must hold that the law should not punish homosexuality where
positive morality considers it "virtuous," e.g., in ancient
Greece.) For Devlin, the virtues which the law should
foster through enforcement are the moral ideals of a given
public* s shared morality. Of course, this amounts to the
assertion that government ought to enforce the moral ideals
of the majority. This view is therefore best understood as
a special case of moral populism.
^H. L. A. Hart, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal
Law," The Lawyer 8, no. 2 (I965): 50* Some have criticized
Hart for failing to see that a legally enforced morality can
be morally worthwhile, e.g., by resulting in fewer anti-
social acts. See Mitchell, p. 72} McElrea, p. 210; Maurice
Cowling, The Nature and Limits of Political Science (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963)> p. 20; and H. J.
McCloskey, "Some Arguments for a Liberal Society," Philos-
ophy ^3 (October 1968): 335-37-
51
(c) Moral populism. This theory and Devlin's adher-
ence to it become apparent when his argument moves to the
question of determining the morality which ought to be
enforced. That is, the theory emerges from Devlin's recom-
mendations of methods by which to ascertain the moral judg-
ments on which the legislature should act. These recommen-
dations make it clear that Devlin has abandoned his earlier
view that the moral standards to be enforced are those of
divine revelation or of Christian religious teachings. It
turns out that he favors the secular doctrine of moral popu-
lism:
[0]nly those canons of good and evil which still are
generally obeyed should be taken as the basis of the
.
secular law. The law must be taken from present and
not from past morality and cannot be justified simply
on the basis that it accords with Christian doctrine. 66
What present-day moral principles should be legally enforced?
[A] moral principle, if it is to be given the force of
law, should be one which twelve men and women drawn at
random from the community can be expected not only to
approve but to take so seriously that they regard a
breach of it as fit for punishment . 67
Thus, Devlin holds that the criminal law should correspond
to the conventional morality of the majority, and moral
populism is the critical principle which justifies the penal
sanction. Hence a given society's government ought to use
the criminal law to enforce positive morality because the
^Devlin, p. 62.
6?Ibid., p. 90.
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majority has a moral right to the prevalence of its strongly
held moral convictions. 68
Devlin's discussion of Shaw's case 69 serves to illus-
trate this theory. Shaw, the publisher of a directory of
prostitutes (The Ladies Dirsptnrvl
, was convicted of three
criminal offenses: obscenity, living off the immoral earn-
ings of prostitution, and conspiring to corrupt public
morals. On appeals the defense argued that conspiracy to
corrupt public morals was not a statutory offense. But by a
majority of four to one the House of Lords held that there
was such an offense at common law and that the accused was
rightly found guilty of it. Of course, Devlin personally
approved of this result: "With this cardinal enunciation of
principle the courts rejected the teaching of John Stuart
Mill and proclaimed themselves keepers of the nation's
morals." The decision in Shaw's case is therefore per-
fectly in line with Devlin's advocacy of moral populism
because "it makes the jury a constitutional organ for deter-
68Dworkin (pp. 992-1002) provides a detailed analy-
sis and critical commentary. But cf. Case Hoogendoorn, "On
the Legal Enforcement of Morals," The Christian Lawyer ^
(Winter 1972): 11-17; and Rolf E. Sartorius, "The Enforce-
ment of Morality," The Yale Law Journal 81 (April I972):
893-98.
69^Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecution, 2 A.E.R.
kk6 (1961), A.C. 220 (1962).
70
' Devlin, pp. 88-89. Recently Devlin ("Law in a
Restless Society," New Law Journal
, 25 January 1973» p. 87)
reversed himself, saying he regrets the Shaw decision for
having put a "political" issue "out of politics into the
hands of the judiciary."
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mining what amounts to immorality and when the law should be
enforced.
Devlin allows that having a jury decide what conduct
the law should penalize creates problems: it reduces the
element of "reasonable certainty" in the law and requires
the jury to perform "the function of legislator." 72 Never-
theless, he answers that if its results are found undesir-
able the jury may be overridden in the legislative branch:
"If Parliament dislikes the fruits of the judicial process,
it can say so; frequently in the past it has altered the law
declared by the courts. Devlin does not report the
frequency with which Parliament alters the law declared by
the courts with respect to sexual offenses. Shaw's case was
not overturned, and one would expect that most others—if
not all—have been left standing. In the United States the
state legislatures and the Congress seem even more reluctant
to enact reforms of penal statutes, let alone to reverse
common law judicial decisions regarding sexual offenses.
For Devlin, then, the translation of community
morals into criminal law is an intrinsic good. This view
rests on Devlin's notion of the nature of morality: all mor-
ality is equivalent to positive morality, for all morality
?1Ibid., p. 91.
72Ibid., pp. 98-99.
73Ibid.
, p. 99.
5^
is determined by the "feelings" of the "reasonable" and
"right-minded" man. If such feelings about "immoral" con-
duct are widely held and are strong enough—if the "collec-
tive judgement of society" expresses "a real feeling of
reprobation" determined by the threshold criteria of "intol-
erance, indignation, and disgust "--then the criminal law is
justified in bringing such activity within its scope.^
Thus, Devlin appears to say that the greater someone's
intolerance, the greater his right to have legal effect
75given to it.'-" This emphasis is present throughout his
lectures, and is reiterated in his 1965 "Preface": "If there
is not that intensity of feeling . , . the collective judge-
ment should not be given the force of law."^
Devlin is aware of the relativistic implications of
this view, for he says that every society's "integrity,"
i.e., the cohesion of its individual members, depends on the
strength and not the "truth" of its shared moral beliefs:
I have said that a sense of right and wrong is necessary
for the life of a community. It is not necessary that
their appreciation of right and wrong, tested in the
^Ibid., pp. -16-18, 78, 90-95- In my view, then,
Colin Tapper (review of The Enforcement of Morals , by
Patrick Devlin, in The Modern Law Review 29 1 March I966]:
2l4) errs in thinking that when Devlin spoke of ordinary men
"feeling intolerant, indignant and disgusted he really meant
these feelings to be directed not at practices . . . but at
bad laws, and that they were to be expressed not by convic-
tions but by aquittals."
75Williams, p. 136.
"^Devlin, p. ix.
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light of one set or another of those abstract proposi-tions about which men forever dispute, should be correct.
ZZ i + u
er?' only one s°ciety at most could survive.What the lawmaker has to ascertain is not the truebelief but the common belief. 77
"What is important," according to Devlin, "is not the qual-
ity of the creed but the strength of the belief in it. The
enemy of society is not error but indifference." 78 There-
fore the common moral beliefs of a given public are entitled
to legal enforcement merely because they happen to enjoy
popular support.
It is understandable that Devlin's defenders should
shrink from this doctrine. For example, in a striking pas-
sage on Devlin's moral populism, Mitchell writes:
So his critics, it seems, are right after all. What
is morality, for the purpose of the law, is to be deter-
mined by counting heads, and inquiry into the reason-
ableness of the morality so determined is superfluous.
We are committed to the view that the positive morality
of a given society is beyond criticism. Apartheid must
be accepted in South Africa, genocide in Nazi Germany.
If the test is survival, any surviving society, however
unjust, has automatically passed the test. 79
But, "mercifully" says Mitchell, "Devlin is not consistent.
For there are a number of considerations which militate
8 0
against this interpretation." It is clear, though, that
Mitchell's discussion of these mitigating "considerations"
^Ibid., p. 9k.
78Ibid., p. 114.
"^Mitchell, p. 42.
Ibid.
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is an attempt to escape the unacceptable implications of
Devlin's normative view, for he is unable to cite any con-
trary view which would support his charge of inconsistency.
Mitchell's attempted exculpation of Devlin's moral
populism merely asserts that "there appears to be no neces-
sary connexion between the claim that the law may be used to
enforce morality and moral conservatism," and concludes that
"Devlin need not be indifferent to the character of the mor-
O -1
ality to be enforced." Of course Devlin "need not be in-
different," but his personal moral beliefs are not incompa-
tible with his view that the law ought to enforce the major-
ity's moral beliefs; and, although there may be no "neces-
sary" connection between legal moralism and moral conserva-
tism, the latter is a sub-type of the former which (Mitchell
admits) Devlin patently propounds—in the guise of moral
populism. I agree with C. L. Ten's view that, if the Nazis
and the South African whites had abandoned their theories of
racial superiority and appealed instead to the necessity of
maintaining the distinctively fundamental institutions of
their respective societies, "then they would merely have
8 2invoked the very principle Mitchell is defending."
Devlin apparently meant this argument to be taken
within the context of his original theory which derived from
8lIbid., pp. ^5-^7-
82
Ten, "Enforcing a Shared Morality," p. 327.
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the principle of society's preservation. Indeed, it first
came to light in a discussion of "practical limitations" on
the obligation of government to enforce positive morality:
"Nothing should he punished by the law that does not lie
beyond the limits of tolerance. It is not nearly enough to
say that a majority dislike a practice; there must be a real
feeling of reprobation.
"
8
^ Thus, before the law may justi-
fiably interfere with an activity "there must be a deliber-
ate judgement that the practice is injurious to society":
There is, for example, a general abhorrence of homosex-
uality. We should ask ourselves in the first instance
whether, looking at it calmly and dispassionately, we
regard it as a vice so abominable that its mere pres-
ence is an offence. If that is the genuine feeling of
the society in which we live, I .do not see how society
can be denied the right to eradicate it. 8^
In defense of this view Rostow argues--contrary to
Devlin, I think— that the presence of these intense feelings
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for justifying
laws proscribing homosexuality. D I agree, rather, with
Ten's view that Devlin's arguments for moral populism
. . . already make clear that he believes that there are
occasions when the law rightly suppresses immorality as
such. In these cases the fact that an action is gener-
ally regarded as immoral is apparently sufficient to
outweigh all the other factors he mentions. It would be
interesting to know when he thinks that such a situation
is reached, but whereas his Maccabaean Lecture seems to
oblige on this point, Rostow' s interpretation of his
^Devlin, pp. 16-17.
8
^Ibid., p. 17. See also Anderson, p. 77-
8
^Rostow, p. 180.
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views leaves the question unsettled. Until this pointis settled one suspects that though Lord Devlin talks of
weighing different factors, his scales are not altogeth-
er fair. For if mere immorality can be a sufficient
reason for invoking the criminal law, one wants to know
when other principles may be brought to the scales and
still have a chance of tipping them in favour of toler-
ation. 0b
I conclude, contrary to Devlin's defenders, 87 that the norm-
ative view discussed here is distinct from the earlier
theories derived from the preservation of society and its
"essential" institutions, for it at least permits and may
even obligate the government to enact criminal legislation
proscribing conduct which, by "deliberate judgement" of the
majority, is regarded as sufficiently "immoral."
Viewed this way Devlin appears a populistic democrat
who would admit few, if any, constitutional limitations on
the influence of majoritarian preferences regarding the
88framing of criminal statutes. We have already seen that
Devlin thinks that neither in principle nor in practice can
limits be placed on the right of government to suppress
activities which are considered morally wrong; but here it
is instructive to see what he believes about popularly
Ten, "Crime and Immorality," p. 663. See also
Ryan, pp. 2^7-^8. Cf. Stone,' pp. 377-79-
8 ?Mitchell, p. 50. See also Christopher Cherry,
review of Law, Morality, and Religion in a Secular Society ,
by Basil Mitchell, in Philosophical Books 9 (May I968); 16.
88See Sartorius, pp. 891-92. But cf. Edward H.
Levi, "The Collective Morality of a Maturing Society," Wash-
ington and Lee Law Review 30 (Fall 1973): ^25-26.
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influenced legislation in democracies:
What they [ordinary men] believe may be quite wrong: butit is quite contemporary and quite real. So in a demo-
cracy the existing laws contain the best and most com-prehensive statement of contemporary social reality.They are not a perfect statement. There is always some
unrepealed junk that nobody will make the effort to get
rid of .09 &
Why Devlin does. not consider morals legislation to be inclu-
ded among the "unrepealed junk" should by now be clear. No
wonder that critics charge that this view "reads like an
abjuration of the notion that reasoning or thinking has much
to do with morality." 90 This is what is meant by the claim
that moral populism is "irrational": it rejects the rele-
vance of reason, educated opinion, and critical morality in
favor of popular feelings, superstitions, and religiously
91based moral beliefs. 7 Therefore, Richard Wollheim con-
cludes that Devlin entertains "a totally irrational concep-
tion of morals" which serves to illustrate "a paradox that
is recurrent in the history of morals"— viz., that the quest
for moral objectivity leads to a dependence on "arbitrary
and unreliable" subjectivity, this time in the guise of the
92
ordinary man's feelings.
681.
89Devlin, p. 126.
9
°Hart, "Immorality and Treason," p. 222.
9l
See, e.g., Dworkin, pp. 1000-02; and Hughes, p.
9 Richard Wollheim, "Crime, Sin, and Mr. Justice
Devlin," Encounter 28 (November 1959): 39 • See also Norman
St. John-Stevas, Life, Death and the Law (Cleveland: World
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Id) Democracy and l egal moralism . Moral populism
raises another issue which has met with some undeserved cri-
ticism from those who oppose legal moralism. Devlin argues
that democratic principles imply a legal as well as a moral
right of the majority to enlist the support of the criminal
law for its moral preferences. For instance, although
Devlin warns that "the law-maker's task, even in a democracy
is not the drab one of counting heads or of synthesizing
answers to moral questions given in a Gallup poll," he never
theless asserts that "there can be no objection to morality
being a matter for the popular vote."^ Devlin explains:
It is a commonplace that in our sort of society matters
of
^
great moment are settled in accordance with the
opinion of the ordinary citizen who acts no more and no
less rationally in matters of policy than in matters of
morals. Such is the consequence of democracy and
universal suffrage. 9^
Hence in a democracy, "in the end the will of the people
must prevail. " 7J
Some of Devlin's critics object to this view. For
example, Ten writes:
Devlin's theory of democracy implies that it is
undemocratic for legislators to enact unpopular laws.
Publishing Company, I96I), pp. ^2-^3 • Later Devlin ("Pre-
face," p. viii) excluded "irrational beliefs" (i.e., discon-
firmed ones) from his formulation of moral populism, but he
allowed the criteria of "intolerance, indignation, and dis-
gust" to stand unaltered.
^Devlin, pp . 93-9^.
^Ibid., p. 91. 95Ibid., p. 92.
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But
J-
f
„
t
l
le criterion of whether a government is "demo-
cratic
^
is the extent to which it satisfies the will ofthe majority of the people, then dictatorships with
mass support, but no free elections, would be quitedemocratic. 9
o
Clearly, Ten has Devlin's "theory of democracy" backwards.
Devlin does not attempt to establish a "criterion" for demo-
cracy, and hence is not guilty of implying that popularly
supported autocracies are "democratic." Rather, he means
that when there is a government which meets democratic cri-
teria (such as free elections and universal suffrage) it
follows that the opportunities for popular influence on its
policies and legislation will be expanded and enhanced.
Thus, the principles of democratic government imply that
more often than not legislation is likely to conform to pop-
ular wishes—not that it is undemocratic for a legislature
to enact unpopular laws, but that it is less likely to.
To take another example, Glanville Williams says
that in holding that "the moral standards to be enforced by
the law must be the opinions of the mass of ordinary people"
Devlin is inviting us "to deduce moral intolerance from
democracy." But, according to Williams, this "mistakes the
meaning of democracy as that term is understood in this
country. ... We do not, in ordinary legal matters, resolve
questions in the way we think the uninstructed populace
would resolve them." Although Williams concedes that "the
96Ten, "Enforcing a Shared Morality," p. 329.
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wrong-headed herd may be able to force its will by the use
of the vote," he thinks that this is no reason for conclud-
ing that democratic principles imply moral populism. 97 How-
ever, the "ordinary" understanding of •democracy 1 is that of
an indirect, representative, and limited form of government,
whereas the populistic democracy of Devlin's theory is
(contrary to fact— fortunately! ) direct, plebiscitary, and
unlimited. While no particular governmental policy can be
deduced from either kind of democratic principles, Devlin's
notion of democracy would certainly encourage a policy of
moral populism.
As we shall see (Ch. Ill, D, 2, d), Hart, too, holds
that Devlin's treatment of moral populism and democracy
rests on a "confusion" and a "misunderstanding" of democra-
tic principles. But Devlin is guilty of no inconsistency in
advocating both democracy and the legal enforcement of posi-
tive morality. If no exceptions to democratic principles
are made, the legal prohibition of, say, homosexuality has
to be tested in the same manner as any other statute—Is
this a law which the majority (of citizens? voters? legis-
lators?) prefers?--and there is no basis on democratic prin-
98
ciples for treating it any differently. Opponents of
legal moralism must therefore also oppose populistic demo-
97Williams, p. 137.
98See Ison, p. 271.
63
cracy to the extent that it permits ;he majesty to impose
its moral views on minorities.
k. Oblectivg validity
,
of positive r.—alitv . Klin's norma-
tive theories imply a further reason for legs! m0ralism:
each society's positive morality is ^bjectiT=ly m0rally
right, hence worthy of legal enforcement. justifica-
tion of legal moralism rests, therefore, on - . e ciaim that
the consensual and shared moral cod- of a given social com-
munity is the "true" morality. The question Aether certain
basic moral principles are objectively valid . 9iongs to
metaothics; therefore discussion of Devlin 1 - views on this
subject will be deferred until Chapter V.
li Summary. We have seen that Devlin's original theory
advocating legal moralism for the sa£e of prei 9rving society
must be abandoned on account of serious conceptual and evi-
dential deficiencies. Once this is done, it "r,o CC.me s appar-
ent that Devlin's advocacy of legal -oralism r ests 0n con-
servative .arguments : the legal enforcement of positive moral-
ity is desirable because it is necessary to preserve exist-
ing institutions (e.g., monogamous marriage the govern-
ment) and positive morality itself, and becauso in a demo-
cracy the majority is entitled to tho enactment 0 f iaws con-
forming to its moral beliefs. But oven this view must
assume that legal enforcement can in fact pres^rVe existing
moral convictions from change— a highly tenuou-^ assumption,
6k
as we shall see in Chapter IV.
Devlin arrives at these normative conclusions by
making a chain of assumptions: legal moralism implies the
preservation of positive morality, which in turn implies the
preservation from change of society's "essential" institu-
tions and society itself. Hence society's "continued exis-
tence" means the presence of a shared positive morality;
society's "preservation" means the prevention of change to
its positive morality; and the maintenance of an unaltered
positive morality means the criminal punishment of "immoral-
ity as such." Thus, Hart contends that Devlin's theory
. . .
appears to move from the acceptable proposition
that some shared morality is essential to the existence
of any society to the unacceptable proposition that a
society is identical with its morality ... so that a
change in its morality is tantamount to the destruction
of a society.
. . . |_I ]t is only on this absurd cri-
terion of what it is for the same society to continue
to exist that it could be asserted without evidence
that any deviation from a society's shared morality
threatens its existence. 99
Accordingly, Devlin's theory means that preservation from
change of positive morality, whatever its content might be,
is an intrinsic value. This justifies its legal enforcement
and removes it beyond the purview of moral scrutiny.
In the face of these criticisms, Devlin backslides
from this view and denies that it is a faithful interpreta-
tion of his theory:
^Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , pp. 51-52. See
also Samek, p. 215
•
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I do not assert that any deviation from a society's
shared morality threatens its existence any more than
I assert that any subversive activity threatens its
existence. I assert that they are both activities
which are capable in their nature of threatening the
existence of society so that neither can be put beyond
the law. 100
Yet two paragraphs later he writes: "The proposition I make
in the text is that if . . . you cannot have a society
without morality, the law can be used to enforce morality as
something that is essential to society." But this amounts
to precisely the same thing as the conservative arguments,
for Devlin adds nothing by way of conceptual clarification
and factual evidence to establish the credibility of his
original theory.
Similarly, Mitchell holds that, while Devlin "is not
entirely clear" about justifying legal moralism as a means
to maintaining the integrity of society, "part of his mean-
ing, at least, is that society has a right to protect the
institutions that are judged essential to it and the moral-
101ity associated with these institutions . " Rostow, too,
says that the "essence" of Devlin's theory is that "the cri-
minal law should express, and must express, some of the
strong positions of a society's common public morality. It
can appropriately change only when the community's law-
i
makers are persuaded that the common morality has changed."
100Devlin, p. 13, in a footnote added in 19^5 •
10lMitchell, p. 72 (emphasis added).
102Rostow, p. 188. For the view that the law should
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However, Devlin does not openly acknowledge his conservatism.
It is plain, though, that he thinks traditional institutions
and popular moral beliefs ought to be preserved from altera-
tion, and that criminal legislation—despite the fact that
it entails grave harms and deprivation of liberty— is the
appropriate means to securing these goals. In his words:
"Only the criminal law can be used to enforce moral stan-
103dards." J Apparently Devlin's personal moral standard is:
Compliance with positive morality is morally right—because
positive morality is itself morally right.
shape and alter (as well as reflect) society's "moral sense"
see Morris Ginsberg, "The Enforcement of Morals," British
Journal of Sociology 12 (March I96I): 66-68; and Idem, On
Justice in Society (Baltimore, Md. : Penguin Books, 196577
103Devlin, p. 52.
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CHAPTER III
NORMATIVE THEORIES--II
Pi Hart's Normative Theories
Like Devlin, Hart addresses himself to the question
whether legal moralism is justifiable: "Is the fact that
certain conduct is by common standards immoral sufficient to
justify making that conduct punishable by law? Is it moral-
ly permissible to enforce morality as such? Ought immoral-
ity as such to be a crime?" x Hart's replies show that he is
unqualifiedly opposed to the legal punishment of "immorality
as such." He argues in general that conduct should never be
made criminal merely because it is generally considered
"immoral." Rather, penal legislation may justifiably be
enacted only for the sake of consequences other than "pre-
serving" positive morality, e.g., preventing harm to others.
More particularly, Hart opposes the advocacy of
legal moralism for the sake of goals which he considers
vaguely defined and unrealizable. For Hart, Devlin's theory
advocating legal moralism in order to prevent society's
disintegration is "confused and confusing" because its
plausibility depends on an interpretation which equates the
existence or preservation of a given society with the pre-
H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (London:
Oxford University Press, 1963)1 P» 4-
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vention of changes in its positive morality. Moreover, Hart
doubts whether a given society's continued existence is
realizable through the legal enforcement of its positive
morality. But even if it were true that without such
enforcement the society would "disintegrate" and "cease to
exist," Hart would still oppose legal moralism because, he
says, such a society may not deserve to exist.
Hart rests his normative view on John Stuart Mill's
"famous sentence" from Chapter I of On Liberty : "That the
only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised
over any member of a civilised community against his will is
to prevent harm to others." Some of the purposes of power
which Mill intended to exclude from this principle are the
promotion of the individual's own welfare and the protection
of his morals: The individual's "own good, either physical
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully
be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for
him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in
the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even
right." 2
While Hart himself thinks that "there may be grounds
justifying the legal coercion of the individual other than
the prevention of harm to others," he nevertheless asserts
that Mill's single principle is adequate to support argu-
Quoted by Hart, p.
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merits opposing legal moralism. On the "narrower issue" con-
cerning legal restrictions of sexual conduct, Hart says,
"Mill seems to me to be right." Hence Hart suggests that
the controversy over legal moralism is best conceived in
relation to practices which deviate from conventional sexual
morality: "I shall consider this dispute mainly in relation
to the special topic of sexual morality where it seems prima
facie plausible that there are actions immoral by accepted
standards and yet not harmful to others. "^
Apparently, then, Hart thinks that there are grounds
for presuming the private sexual conduct of consenting
adults to be harmless to others and therefore beyond the
rightful control of the criminal law. He is therefore in
fundamental disagreement with Devlin over the harmfulness of
sexual acts which contravene a given society's positive mor-
ality. Hart grants to the legal moralist the factual
assumption that certain kinds of sexual activity (e.g.,
homosexuality) are considered "immoral" in Western societies
hence he does not dispute Devlin's claim that homosexuality
violates England's positive morality. But, unlike Devlin,
Hart holds that the private sexual practices of consenting
adults constitute matters of "private morality" in which
society has no interest and over which the law should have
no control—precisely because he presumes such conduct to be
3
-'Hart, p. 5; see also his "Preface," p. v.
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incapable of producing appreciable injury to others.
Hart avers that he is concerned with showing
... what precisely is wrong in mid-twentieth century
with, e.g., the idea of legally enforced chastity andgenerally with the use of the criminal law to stopfreely consenting adults engaging privately in sexualpractices, which are commonly spoken of and (moredoubtfully) thought of as "immoral".^
This thesis draws heavily upon Mill's single principle
regarding harm to others. Yet there are several instances
where Hart appeals to other principles in answering the
arguments of Devlin and his supporters. On these occasions,
according to Hart, the application of Mill's principle alone
is not adequate. Thus, even with respect to the "special
topic of sexual morality" Hart applies more than one criter-
ion and therefore poses several theories in opposition to
Devlin's legal moralism. The following analysis will consi-
der each theory in turn, beginning with that which is
strictly utilitarian.
1. Utilitarian theory . Foremost among the reasons why Hart
opposes the legal enforcement of positive morality is his
intrinsic valuation of promoting human happiness--the major
principle in the classical utilitarian tradition of Jeremy
Bentham and John Stuart Mill J Put another way, Hart argues
that it is morally right, if not obligatory, for governments
to enact laws, first, to alleviate rather than to exacerbate
H. L. A. Hart, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal
Law," The Lawyer 8, no. 2 (I965): ^7-
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human misery and suffering, and second, to assure economical
and efficient law enforcement against those forms of undesi-
rable conduct which the law can practically and effectively
control
.
ja.) Prevention of misery and suffering;
.
Among the
most important and desirable functions of the positive law
in any society, according to Hart, are the reduction of
misery and the prevention of avoidable suffering. Like
Bentham, Hart holds that criminal legislation produces con-
sequences (coercion and punishment) which are painful, hence
prima facie objectionable, to be tolerated only for the sake
of some countervailing greater good. Punishment of the
offender involves deprivation of liberty of movement or of
property or of association with family and friends, or the
infliction of physical pain or even death. Coercion of
others involves further restrictions on freedom wherein
human desires are frustrated by the fear of punishment which
the law threatens to apply to offenders. These consequences
of the penal code can lead to extensive unhappiness which
must be justified
•
It follows, then, that a governmental policy of
legal moralism is both unnecessarily and unjustifiably
^Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
, pp. 20-22, 57-60.
See also Robert S. Summers, review of Law, Liberty, and
Morality
,
by H. L. A. Hart, in New York University Law
Review 38 (December I963): 1202-03.
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repressive and cruel. For Hart, the legal proscription of
conduct for no reason other than its alleged "immorality"
results in law-created evils without compensating benefits. 6
Specifically, the criminal statutes against deviant sexual
conduct recommended by Devlin "create misery in quite
special ways and in a special degree," for they repress and
frustrate strong impulses which are "recurrent and insis-
tent." Legal suppression of sexual drives "affects the
development or balance of the individual's emotional life,
o
happiness, and personality." It is necessary, then, to
justify such legal unfreedoms by showing that they are
instrumental in bringing about goods greater than the evils
they cause.
What good consequences are there to set off against
the suffering created by morals legislation as a justifica-
tion for enacting it? Contrary to Devlin, Hart thinks that
there is none, for no one has ever "attempted to show that
the misery caused is balanced by the avoidance of greater
o
misery or the production of greater happiness. " y Hart
^Hart, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," p.
^Ibid.
,
p. ^-8. See also H. L. A. Hart, "Immorality
and Treason," in The Law as Literature, ed. Louis Blom-
Cooper (London: The Bodley Head, 196TJ", p. 226.
8Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , p. 22.
^Hart, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," p.
^9-
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doubts that any consequence theory can justify legal moral-
ism. For one thing, he thinks that laws proscribing "immor-
ality as such" are incapable of utilitarian justification:
It is surely not possible to regard the disappointment
or indignation of those who wish for a legally enforced
morality if not gratified, as misery, comparable to
that which the laws inflict. Indeed, it .is very doubt-ful whether they suffer anything which could be called
misery at ^ all. Nor, where such laws do exist, can the
satisfaction of those who want them be ranked as happi-
ness which could outweigh the misery caused. 10
For another thing, he thinks Devlin's teleological theory
derived from society's preservation to be just as vulnerable
to criticism:
Why
. . . should we assume that it is a good thing that
every society should continue to exist? Why should a
society whose principal occupation is torturing a
racial [or a sexual] minority continue to exist? Unless
we think that it should exist however great the misery
it causes, surely the argument that certain laws are
required to preserve the society is not per se suffi-
cient to justify the misery they cause. li
Concerning any society whose survival is in fact dependent
on a policy of legal moralism, Hart says that "it is argu-
able that what Lord Devlin terms the 'disintegration' of
such a society would be morally better than its continued
ii 12
existence, and steps ought not to be taken to preserve it."
Contrary to Devlin, then, Hart holds that "preserv-
ing society" is not sufficiently valuable to offset the
Ibid.
11
Ibid., p. 51
•
12Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , p. 19
.
7^
negative utility of legal punishments for deviant sexual con-
duct. In so far as no greater happiness is produced and no
greater misery is avoided by a policy of legal moralism, but
rather just the opposite, Hart concludes that morals legis-
lation should be opposed for utilitarian reasons, among
others. Indeed, because attempts by the penal law to con-
trol private sexual behavior always have evil effects, Hart
suggests that moral guidelines for such conduct ought to be
supplied through nonlegal agencies, e.g., by educators,
moralists, religious teachers, and social workers. 1 ^
Hence Hart's view is that all adult persons have a
prima facie moral right to satisfy their sexual desires and
impulses as a means to the goal of happiness, and that they
should also have the correlative legal right to sexual
expression and gratification— so long as such conduct is
consensual and private. Conversely, no one (not even the
majority in a democracy, as we shall see) has a moral right
to realize by means of the criminal law the fulfillment of
ideals regarding how others should conduct their lives
unless justified by the promotion of greater happiness or
the avoidance of greater misery. For Hart, then, the legal
prohibition and punishment of conduct merely because it
3Ibid., pp. 75-81; and H. L. A. Hart, The Morality
of the Criminal Law (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1964), P-
32. See also Vincent C. Punzo, "Morality and the Law: The
Search for Privacy in Community," Saint Louis University
Law Journal 18 (Winter 1973): 19^.
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contravenes positive morality is always undesirable and un-
justifiable.
( b) Efficiency and practicality of enforcement
.
Hart's utilitarian theory also questions the desirability of
legal moralism from the standpoints of practicality and
efficiency. For Hart, it is desirable that law enforcement
agencies be used economically because of their limited
supply and abilities, and only in those situations where
they can be effective in either deterring or punishing un-
desirable conduct. But, says Hart, Devlin's legal moralism
would lead to uneconomical and impractical allocations of
society's limited criminal law enforcement resources.
First, because any society's law enforcement and
judicial resources are scarce, the attempt to detect and to
punish sexual deviants "will be a bad use of existing
resources, so long as thieves and murderers remain un-
caught." Since certain "universal values" (e.g., life,
liberty, property, and safety from deliberately inflicted
injury) must be secured by the law for any society to exist,
Devlin's recommendation that the government outlaw "the.
grosser forms of vice" would divert limited enforcement
resources from their chief purposes of detecting and of
either preventing or punishing conduct which directly
threatens the persistence of orderly social relations--viz
.
,
Hart, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," p.
48.
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murder, assault, theft, and fraud. 1 -5
This objection to legal moralism calls into question
Devlin's sense of priorities: Is it more important to punish
"immorality" than to devote enforcement efforts exclusively
and fully to the control of violent crimes? Devlin implies
that it is equally important for the law to attempt to do
both, for he holds that sexual "immorality" is just as
potentially harmful to society as sedition and treason. But
Hart assumes that we cannot have everything we want, crime
prevention included. Herbert Packer implicitly corroborates
Hart's view:
Every hour of police, prosecutorial, judicial, and
correctional time that is spent on marginal uses of the
criminal sanction is an hour lost to the prevention of
serious crime. Conversely, every trivial, imaginary,
or otherwise dubious crime that is removed from the
list of criminal offenses represents the freeing of
substantial resources to deal more effectively with the
high-priority needs of the criminal justice system. 1°
In a time of rising levels in the rate of violent
crimes, when only one in five of such crimes is solved, it
would appear foolhardy for anyone to expect legal agencies
%art, Law, Liberty, and Morality , pp. 70-71. See
also H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: The Clarendon
Press, 1961), pp. 189-95-
1 f\
Herbert L. Packer,
'
The Limits of the Criminal
Sanction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp.
259-60. The same point is made by Nigel Walker, "Morality
and the Criminal Law," The Howard Journal 11, no. 3 (196*0:
217-18; Sanford H. Kadish, "The Crisis of Overcriminaliza-
tion," The Annals 37^ (November I967): 159-62; and Louis B.
Schwartz, "Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code,"
Columbia Law Review 63 (April I963): 669.
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to place homosexuality and prostitution with assault and
armed robbery in the same category of enforcement priority.
Informed opinion contradicts Devlin's supposition that
"immorality as such" is either harmful at all or sufficient-
ly harmful to justify use of the criminal law to suppress it.
Hence I agree with Joel Feinberg's judgment that "the essen-
tially utilitarian argument based on the need for prudent
allocation of our social energies in fighting crime may, by
itself, be a conclusive argument against the use of the cri-
minal sanction to prevent private (and therefore inoffensive)
conduct whose harmfulness is indirect and speculative at
most." 17
Second, Hart thinks that legal control of sexual
conduct is impractical because of the private nature of its
usual manifestations. It follows that
. . . concealment is relatively so easy that only a
negligible proportion of offenders against laws pro-
scribing such behaviour are ever likely to be detected
or deterred by the law's threats, or by actual punish-
ment. This situation could only be changed if the
punishment were made immensely more severe than would
in fact be tolerated, and even that might have very
little effect. 18
'Joel Feinberg, '"Harmless Immoralities' and Offen-
sive Nuisances," in Issues in Law and Morality , ed. Norman
S. Care and Thomas K. Trelogan (Cleveland: The Press of Case
Western Reserve University, 1973), P» 89.
18
Hart, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," p.
48. Summers (p. 1204). seems to be of two minds about this
point: first he says that "this argument alone cannot be
very weighty" (citing the example of secret incest), and
then he holds, in agreement with Hart, that if "the criminal
law simply cannot be effectively used . . . then the effort
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This objection to legal moralism claims that laws proscrib-
ing certain sexual acts cannot effectively be enforced, just
as those against taking illicit drugs usually cannot. The
truth of this is in itself sufficient to convince Lon Fuller
(Hart's opponent on other issues in the philosophy of law)
that Devlin's legal moralism is undesirable. I am inclined
to agree with Fuller that, "without having to reach agree-
ment on the substantive moral issues involved" in the
enforcement of morals controversy, this objection to Devlin's
views is fatal to his whole position. Rather than consti-
tuting only one among many arguments against making private
consensual sexual practices by adults criminal because
"immoral," Hart should have used it as the primary reason
for opposing legal moralism.
The arguments outlined here are, I think, more than
sufficient to refute Devlin's normative views. With respect
to crimes against persons or property, even though the cost
of enforcement is high, the gravity of the offenses justifies
the criminal sanction. But concerning so-called "crimes
against morality," where enforcement is both extremely costly
ought to be abandoned" for the sake of preventing cynicism
of the public toward law enforcement and the legal process.
1
^Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 196^), pp. 132-33- See also Yves
Caron, "The Legal Enforcement of Morals and the So-Called
Hart-Devlin Controversy," McGill Law Journal 15 » no. 1
(I969): 3^-35; and Richard Taylor, "Law and Morality," New
York University Law Review ^3 (October I968): 637-^0.
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and ineffective, and where the putative harmfulness is ques-
tionable, there appears to be no justification for the law's
concern with curbing them and punishing their perpetrators.
When the costs are high and the yield negligible, the penal
law should not be used. If it is, more evil than good will
result: the welfare of many individuals and of the social
collectivity will be lessened.
Devlin has not attacked Hart's utilitarian theory,
nor has he submitted a rejoinder which meets and refutes its
objections to legal moralism. Indeed, at one point Devlin
grants that the misery and suffering created by legal coer-
cion and criminal punishment must be taken into account when
20deciding whether to outlaw "immoral" practices. But
regarding the exorbitant cost and impracticality of enforc-
ing such statutes, Devlin has nothing to say. To other
legal moralists Hart's utilitarian theory would appear to be
just as impervious to attack, for none of them has raised
any objection to it. In my view, then, the legal moralists
have lost the debate by default.
2. Nonutilitarian principles . Legal moralism is also unde-
sirable, according to Hart, for reasons other than its nega-
tive utility: it would lead to unequal legal treatment of
sexual offenders, decrease the consistency and predictabil-
ity of the law itself, unjustifiably restrict the intrinsic
20Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965). p. H7«
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value of individual freedom, and permit democratic majori-
ties to dictate how all shall live their private lives.
(a) Equality of legal treatment . For Hart, it is
desirable that administration of the criminal law result in
equal treatment of similar offenders: those who commit
similar offenses ought to be similarly punished. Hence this
is a consideration of justice, not of utility. But, Hart
says, legal attempts to enforce positive morality with
respect to sexual conduct are unjustifiable because, besides
the misery and suffering they create, they also tend to
result in "gross inequalities."
First, Hart claims that the difficulty and impracti-
cality of successful law enforcement with respect to sexual
offenses are so great that "it must be a mere matter of
chance that enables evidence to be obtained in some cases
21
and not in others equally 'bad'." Since only "a negligi-
ble proportion of offenders" are likely to be either detect-
ed or deterred in their private sexual practices, applica-
tions of the law will be capricious and therefore unequal.
Like drug users, sexual deviants who are detected would be
unjustly treated by the processes of criminal justice.
Second, because of widespread disagreement over the
moral gravity of sexual deviance and the punishment it
deserves, "there will be wide variations in the actual pun-
2lHart, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," p.
48.
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ishments meted out in similar cases." 22 Since Hart claims
that contemporary sexual morals are determined by "variable
tastes and conventions,"^ he thinks it highly unlikely that
penalties for similar sexual offenses will themselves be
similar. Thus, another objection against legal moralism is
that it is likely to result in unequal treatment of similar
cases by the law.
2i|
This objection seems to me a good deal weaker than
the utilitarian theory. Its deficiency lies, not in its
.factual assumptions (which are no doubt accurate), but in
its implication that unequal legal treatment of offenders is
peculiarly characteristic of sexual offenses of this kind,
but not of criminal offenses in general. Is it, however,
not safe to assume that a rather large proportion of scoff-
laws are neither deterred nor detected and punished? Park-
ing and speeding auto violations abound; but more important,
according to the FBI only 20 per cent of "serious crimes"
which are reported are also brought to adjudication. It
could be, in Hart's words, "a mere matter of chance that
enables evidence to be obtained" in these cases as well. Is
22
* Ibid.
23Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
, p. 73.
2*4-
Hart's view that the law should treat like cases
alike has recently been criticized as "trivial" because the
law does not usually operate that way. See Kenneth I.
Winston, "On Treating Like Cases Alike," California Law
Review 62 (January 197*0: 1-39; and Idem, "Justice and Rules
A Criticism," Logique et Analyse 1*4- (March-June 1971): I77-
82.
82
it not also true that legal penalties for similar nonsexual
offenses may vary? Sentencing behavior of trial judges
shows that judicial discretion is exercised not only in
determining which laws apply to a given offense but also in
punishing defendants found guilty of the same crime. In any
event, it is surely less than obvious that legal moralism
differs significantly from the administration of criminal
justice generally in its propensity to result in "gross
inequalities .
"
Hart also offers a corollary to this view: "[Prin-
ciples of justice or fairness between different offenders
require morally distinguishable offences to be treated dif-
ferently and morally similar offences to be treated alike.
"
2^
This means that "the law should reflect the principle of
justice that morally disparate cases should not be punished
with the same severity unless there is some overriding moral
reason for departing from this principle." Thus, Hart
holds that the moral gradation of legal punishments is
justified on grounds of fairness: the severity of punishment
should fit the "immorality" of the crime.
Hart explains that the question 'How severely should
we punish different offenses?' is distinct from and indepen-
dent of the question 'What kind of conduct may justifiably
2%art, Law, Liberty, and Morality , p. 37.
Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law , p. 51.
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be punished?* Answers to the former should conform to the
'
principle of justice by weighting criminal punishments
according to the comparative moral gravity of the offense.
Clearly, this is a moral criterion. On the other hand,
replies to the latter should adhere to the principle of
utility by criminalizing only those activities which are
shown to be sufficiently harmful. Contrary to the legal
moralist, Hart says that "we cannot infer from principles
applied in deciding the severity of punishment what the aims
of the system of punishment are or what sorts of conduct may
justifiably be punished." Thus, Hart holds that, while only
injurious activities should be punished, it is morally right
"to mark moral differences between different offenders" by
adjusting "the severity of punishment to the moral gravity
of offences." But, he says, this does not imply either that
it is morally right to punish activities which are not harm-
ful or that "punishment merely for immorality is justified." 2 '7
Devlin thinks that Hart's two questions are not
independent:
They are a division, made for the sake of convenience,
of the single question which is: 'What justifies the
sentence of punishment?' The justification must be
found in the law and there cannot be a law which is not
concerned with a man's morals and yet which permits him
to be punished for his immorality .28
2
^Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
, pp. 36-38. See
also Idem, The Morality of the Criminal Law
, pp. 53-5^-
28Devlin, p. 130.
8^
Of course, Devlin has no quarrel with the reasons Hart gives
"for allowing moral considerations to enter into the assess-
ment of punishment," for he, too, favors this view. But he
thinks that these considerations force Hart to withdraw
"from the firm line that the law is not concerned with mor-
ality as such." Thus, to Devlin "it seems .
' . . to be an
emasculation of Mill's doctrine to say that it is to apply
only to the making of the law and not to the administration
of it." 29
Devlin's criticism is justified if Hart intends that
the moral gradation of punishments be determined by the
positive morality of a given society rather than by an
utilitarian assessment (like that given by Bentham) of the
various punishments necessary to deter different crimes.
There are some indications that Hart means the latter. Thus,
C. L. Ten argues, in support of Hart, that legal punishments
should both fit the relative seriousness of the crime and
take into account the extenuating and aggravating conditions
which reduce or increase criminal guilt (mens rea); on this
view, moral considerations influence the punishments meted
out both by
. . . permitting mitigating conditions, like the pres-
ence of provocation, to reduce the punishment for a
particular offence, and in seeing that offences like
murder and armed robbery, which are generally regarded
as morally graver, receive a more severe punishment
Ibid., p. 131. See also Caron, p. 32.
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On the other hand, if Hart's principle means that "morally
graver" crimes ought to be more severely punished than those
which are "less grave," how are we to account for his claim
that "there are many reasons why we might wish the legal
gradation of the seriousness of crimes, expressed in its
scale of punishments, not to conflict with common estimates
of their comparative wickedness"? "One reason," besides
that of justice or fairness, Hart holds, "is that such a
conflict is undesirable on simple utilitarian grounds: it
might either confuse moral judgments or bring the law into
disrepute, or both." 31 But this is not the utilitarian
justification offered by Bentham; nor, as Devlin points out,
is it applicable merely to legal punishments alone: one of
the arguments against repeal of the statute proscribing
homosexuality is that "moral judgements might be confused
and the law brought into disrepute because people would see
moral wickedness going unpunished." 32 Since Hart denies
that "immorality as such" should be criminally punished, he
is inconsistent in allowing "common estimates of their com-
parative wickedness" to determine the degree of punishment
30
^ C. L. Ten, "Crime and Immorality," The Modern Law
Review 32 (November I969): 659.
31
Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
, pp. 36-37-
32Devlin, p. 131.
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inflicted on criminal offenders. Surely this view contra-
dicts both his utilitarian theory and his view that justice
requires equal legal treatment of offenders convicted of the
same crime.
Devlin holds that it also constitutes "an abuse of
power"
:
It is a doctrine firmly embedded in English law that
SSKtl^SS 1S .Sjven ^r one purpose, whether"
lose fh«? f.
JU
h
ge
' ^
St n0t be used for another pur-
essenti^ L ?h 36 f P°Wer: and its Prevention is
+
6
h
S e? lal t? +
t
^
e existence of a free society. Undert e law as it is now administered it would be an abuse
^33^ PUniSh f°r immorali *y that is outsiSe the
But this charge is ambiguous. If it means that Hart wishes
to punish activities which are not legally prohibited, then
Devlin is plainly wrong. However, if it means that Hart
wants to inflict degrees of punishment which are not speci-
fied by law, then there is no clear-cut answer, for Hart
does not explicitly advocate that estimates of a crime's
moral gravity be incorporated within the scale of punish-
ments provided by statute.
Hart would therefore agree with Devlin's view that a
criminal offender may justifiably be punished according to
the wickedness of his crime:
It sometimes happens that an act which is a breach of
the criminal law is also a breach of that part of the
moral law that is not included in the criminal. Thus
a course of deception might include an adultery. A
judge may proportion his sentence according to the
Ibid., p. 129.
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degree of immorality involved in the, act itself but notaccording to extraneous immorality. 3^
In the example given, Hart would not increase the punishment
on account of the adultery but would proportion it according
to the moral gravity of the deception. This is not what
Devlin calls "an abuse of power" (i.e., punishment for
"extraneous immorality" or "immorality that is outside the
law"); rather, both Devlin and Hart agree that it is a
justifiable use of power to grade punishments according to
the "immorality" of the crime itself.
This view is different from the utilitarian justifi-
cation of grading legal punishments. For instance, Hart
could have argued that crimes causing greater harm ought to
be more severely punished, assuming that the harsher the
penalty the more likely that fear of punishment will succeed
in deterring the potential criminal. Today, however, crimi-
nologists contend that it is not so much the severity as the
likelihood of punishment that has deterrent value. This is
supportive of Hart's utilitarian theory regarding efficiency
of law enforcement: as the probability of detection and pun-
ishment-increases, would-be offenders will be deterred.
(b) Le^al consistency and predictability . According
to Hart, "certainty" in the criminal law is, like equality
of treatment, another of its desirable qualities. That is,
Ibid., pp. 129-30.
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both the content and the administration of the law ought to
be consistent and predictable in order to insure equal
(hence just) treatment. Since, as we have seen, Hart
believes conventional sexual morality to be subject to the
influence of "variable tastes," he thinks that such moral
views change too frequently for the law faithfully to incor-
porate and consistently to enforce them. Therefore the
legal enforcement of positive morality--especially with
respect to sexual practices—is undesirable because it would
lead to inconsistent and. unpredictable applications of the
law.
This objection to legal moralism emerges from Hart's
discussion of common law determinations of "moral crimes" as
ex post facto laws. In particular, Hart attacks the
decision in Shaw's ca.seJJ for attempting to enforce conven-
tional moral views regarding sex-related conduct. In Shaw's
case, as we have seen (Ch. II, C, 3» c), the House of Lords
resurrected the ancient common law doctrine of conspiracy to
corrupt public morals. While Devlin approves of this
because it supports his view of moral populism, Hart objects
because it would lead both to legal uncertainty and to the
lessening of public respect for the law.
Hart's opposition to the Shaw decision is based on
his claim that the principle of "legality" is necessary to
-^Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecution, 2 A.E.R.
446 (1961), A.C. 220 (1962).
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insure uniform and reasonably certain applications of the
law to particular offenses:
The particular value which they [Lords] sacrificed isthe principle of legality which requires criminal
offences to be as precisely defined as possible, soxnat it can be known with reasonable certainty before-hand what acts are criminal and what are not. As aresult of Shaw's case, virtually any cooperative con-duct is criminal if a jury consider it ex post facto
2 ^?
Ve
^
een immoral
-
... So while Mill^olIlTTive
shuddered at the law laid down in Shaw's case as auth-
orising gross invasions of individual liberty, Bentham
would have been horrified at its disregard of thelegal values of certainty and its extension of what he
called "ex post facto law. "36
For Hart, then, but not for Devlin, the principle of legal-
ity is a value with which the criminal law should be imbued.
On this point I agree fully with Hart (and with Lon
Fuller ) that the criminal law ought to be clear and
precise in its content and regular in its application.
Should this require translation of common law offenses into
statutory ones, so much the better. At least the element of
uncertainty (or surprise) would thereby be removed from the
law. It would avoid as well the unseemly and irregular
occurrence of criminal convictions being upheld on appeals
for reasons other than those for which defendants were orig-
Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
, p. 12. See also
J. E. Hall Williams, "The Ladies Directory and Criminal Con-
spiracy," The Modern Law Review 2k (November I96I): 631 ; and
Glanville Williams, "Conspiring to Corrupt," Listener
, 2k
August I96I, p. 275. For a pro-Devlin commentary, see A. L.
Goodhart, "The Shaw Case: The Law and Public Morals," Law
.Quarterly Review 77 (October I96I): 560.
37
^'Fuller, passim.
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inally accused and found guilty, as was done by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the case of Ralph Ginzburg. 38
(c) Intrinsic valuation of freedom . We have seen
that Hart values freedom extrinsically
,
i.e., as a means to
the utilitarian goals of welfare and happiness. He finds
legal moralism undesirable because legal unfreedom (coercion
and punishment) creates rather than alleviates human misery
and suffering. At least with respect to private sexual con-
duct, then, Hart values individual liberty as the means
necessary to the satisfaction and gratification of human
desires, to the development of emotionally stable personal-
ities, and to the achievement of happiness.
Hart values freedom intrinsically as well, i.e., as
desirable for its own sake. For instance, he speaks of
"human misery and the restriction of freedom," "human
suffering and the loss of freedom" as intrinsic evils. 3^
He asserts that "free choice may be held a value in itself
llQ
with which it is prima facie wrong to interfere." It
seems, then, that for Hart both liberty and welfare are
38Ginzburg v. U.S., 354 U.S. 413 (1966). Ginzburg
was convicted of offending against federal postal-obscenity
laws, but on appeal his conviction was upheld by the Supreme
Court because (inter alia) he had offended against the
common law prohibition of "pandering," a crime of which he
was not accused at trial.
3%art, Law, Liberty, and Morality , pp. 82-83
(emphasis added).
^°Ibid., p. 21; see also pp. 46-4?.
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intrinsic values. Hence, whereas Devlin values liberty only
as a means to doing what is morally right, Hart, like Mill,
values freedom both extrinsically and intrinsically. Not
only is liberty good because it is conducive to happiness,
but it is also a good in itself. Thus, Hart opposes legal
moralism for its unjustifiable interference with the intrin-
sic value of individual freedom as well as for its negative
utility, inequality, and uncertainty. Hence this is a non-
utilitarian consideration.
(d) Limited democracy and libertarianism
. Hart's
intrinsic commitment to liberty becomes apparent in his
criticism of Devlin's moral populism:
[l]t is fatally easy to confuse the democratic principle
that power should be in the hands of the majority with
the utterly different claim that the majority, with
power in their hands, need respect no limits. Certainly
there is a special risk in a democracy that the majority
may dictate how all shall live. . . . But loyalty to
democratic principles does not require us to maximize
this risk: yet this is what we shall do if we mount the
man in the street on the top of the Clapham omnibus and
tell him that if only he feels sick enough about what
other people do in private to demand its suppression by
law no theoretical criticism can be made of his demand. ^1
Hart claims that "this is a misunderstanding of democracy
which still menaces individual liberty," and which rests on
a "confusion":
The central mistake is a failure to distinguish the
acceptable principle that political power is best en-
trusted to the majority from the unacceptable claim that
what the majority do with that power is beyond criticism
Hart, "Immorality and Treason," pp. 226-27.
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and must never be resisted. No one can be a democrat
who does not accept the first of these, but no democrat
need accept the second. ^2
The conclusion follows that "though a democrat is committed
to the belief that democracy is better than other forms of
government, he is not committed to the belief that it is
perfect or infallible or never to be resisted."^ Thus,
Hart advocates democracy in the sense of the majority prin-
ciple in general, but does not hold that the legislature is
bound to comply with the majority's views on restricting
freedom. This implies that democracy requires limitations
on the majority principle by means of, say, a bill of rights.
I do not agree fully for these reasons: Hart's cri-
tique of Devlin's views on democracy and moral populism is
perfectly acceptable to the libertarian but not to somebody
who (like Devlin) advocates democracy in the sense of un-
limited majority rule. True, "belief" in democracy entails
acceptance of certain legal protections for both minorities
and the majority: the rights of political freedom and poli-
tical equality, and the majority principle implied by the
latter. But as a political concept 'democracy' does not
entail other social but nonpolitical rights (e.g., respect-
ing economic and sexual activity). Yet, contrary to
Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , p. 79.
^Ibid., p. 80.
^See Felix E. Oppenheim, "Democracy—Characteristics
Included and Excluded," The Monist 55 (January 1971): 29-50.
But 'democracy' is often defined as including a bill of rights
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Devlin, Hart says that even the majority should not be able
to limit freedom of private sexual activity. Hence some-
thing more than democratic principles is necessary to
justify limiting the criminal law with respect to the non-
political conduct which Hart desires to protect. A prin-
ciple of libertarianism which extends beyond the democratic
protections of political freedom is necessary when Hart
seeks to protect private sexual "immorality" from legal
prohibitions and punishments. 'Democracy 1 simply cannot do
the work of a normative theory of libertarianism in provid-
ing the rationale for protecting nonpolitical social
freedoms
.
In effect, then, Hart makes 'democracy 1 stand for a
general theory advocating minimal legal control over
citizens' lives, for he says:
Whatever other arguments there may be for the enforce-
ment of morality, no one should think even when popular
morality is supported by an "overwhelming majority" or
marked by widespread "intolerance, indignation, and
disgust" that loyalty to democratic -principles requires
him to admit that its imposition on a minority is
justified . ^5
'
But on "democratic principles" alone such an "imposition"
is justified. Outside of legal immunities for basic politi-
cal liberties and equalities the majority "need respect no
limits." Indeed, the majority may "dictate how all shall
live." Thus, democracy is perfectly compatible with either
^Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , p. 81 (emphasis
added)
.
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legal moralism (and socialism) or sexual libertarianism (and
laissez-faire capitalism). Those who agree with Hart that
a governmental policy of legal moralism is neither "beyond
criticism" nor "never to be resisted" should realize that
the critical moral principles which prohibit governmental
attempts to control nonpolitical conduct by means of the
criminal law cannot follow from democratic principles alone.
^
Hart is therefore a libertarian as well as a utili-
tarian. That is, besides advocating welfare as the goal of
legislation, he also recommends minimal intrusions by the
democratic state into the lives of its citizens. But
apparently he fails to see that his opposition to Devlin's
legal moralism also requires him to oppose democratic prin-
ciples of a populistic kind to the extent that they permit
and even encourage the adoption of governmental policies to
which he objects— viz., those demanded by moral populism.
But democracy is not compatible with anarchy,
which is anti-government . Eugene V. Ro stow ( "The Enforce-
ment of Morals," The Cambridge Law Journal [November i960],
PP« 175-76, 193) is therefore mistaken in equating opposi-
tion to legal moralism with "anarchy"— as if advocacy of
sexual freedom is tantamount to advocating the destruction
of government! Rostow's view is reminiscent of Devlin's
treason analogy.
^Richard Wollheim ("Crime, Sin, and Mr. Justice
Devlin," Encounter 28 [November 1959]: 3^0) avoids Hart's
error and develops a "liberal" response to legal moralism.
For an account of conflict between two types of democrats,
one committed to the majority principle and the other to a
critical morality, see Wollheim' s "A Paradox in the Theory
of Democracy," in Fhilosophy r Politics , and Society, Second
Series, ed. Peter Laslett and W. G . Runciman (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1962), pp. 71-87.
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Rather than unqualified support for democracy, the explicit
advocacy of a bill of rights for sexual minorities (i.e.,
the imposition of strict limits on the majority principle)
would be more consistent with Hart's libertarian views.
While Hart values freedom both extrinsically and
intrinsically, he recognizes that there are reasons which
justify legal limitations on individual liberty. We turn
now from Hart's arguments against legal moralism to his
views regarding the justification of legal unfreedoms.
3. Principles .justifying legal intervention . Although Hart's
emphasis is on protecting individual freedom, he nonetheless
mentions three principles which justify legal limitations on
liberty: preventing harm to others, preserving public order
and decorum against indecency and nuisances, and protecting
individuals from themselves, i.e., paternalism.
(a) Prevention of harm to others . We have already
seen that Hart subscribes to Mill's principle that an indi-
vidual's liberty may rightfully be restricted by law in
order to prevent him from harming others, and that he
believes this principle to be incompatible with legal moral-
ism respecting the private sexual practices of consenting
adults. To qualify for Hart's exemption from legal control
sexual conduct must therefore fulfill three criteria: it
must (1) take place in private, (2) involve only adults, and
(3) be freely consented to by all participants. Failure to
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meet every requirement could indicate that harm is being
done sufficient to warrant legal intervention. For example,
some nonsexual acts (e.g., mercy killing, suicide pacts,
enslavement, drug taking), though done in private by con-
senting adults, might not qualify. On the other hand, sex-
ual sado-masochism and orgies, if they take place in private
between consenting adults, are presumably protected from
legal interference by Hart's adaptation of Mill's principle.
Thus, either sexual or nonsexual conduct in public may just-
ifiably be interdicted by law if offensive to others or
otherwise productive of harm; and either lack of consent or
participation by one or more minors may disqualify conduct
from protection, even if the remaining criteria are fulfill-
ed.
Hart suggests that whenever conduct fails to meet
one or more of these criteria Mill's principle might not
apply, and recourse might have to be made to some other
principle(s) in order to determine whether the penal law is
warranted in intervening. Contrary to Mill, then, Hart
asserts that, besides harm to ethers, there are other prin-
ciples which may justify legal unfreedoms:
The grounds for interfering with human liberty are more
various than the single criterion of 'harm to others'
suggests: cruelty to animals or organizing prostitution
for gain do not . . . fall easily under the description
of harm to others. Conversely, even where there is
harm to others in the most literal sense, there may
well be other principles limiting the extent to which
harmful activities should be repressed by law. So
there are multiple criteria, not a single criterion,
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determining when human liberty may be restricted.^8
We have seen that Hart is certain that these "multiple cri-
teria" do not include Devlin's sense of "preserving society"
—viz., preventing changes in social institutions and posi-
tive morality. He seems just as certain that they do
include principles justifying laws against cruelty to ani-
mals (to protect all sentient creatures from deliberately
inflicted pain and injury) and organized prostitution (to
prevent exploitation and corruption of minor youths or even
adults in a condition of dependence or mental incapacity).
Of these additional criteria Hart gives special attention to
two in particular: prevention of public offense, and legal
paternalism.
(b) Prevention of public offense . Although there
may be several kinds of public offense which are covered by
this principle, and may therefore be justifiably interdicted
by the criminal law, Hart's discussion of it is limited to
only two types: indecency and nuisance.
(1) Public indecency. Since Hart bases so much of
his utilitarian argument on Mill, it is instructive to
inquire into Mill's own views concerning the use of the law
to prohibit and to punish publicly indecent conduct.
Whether or not Mill considered public indecency sufficiently
offensive to harm unwilling witnesses is controversial.
^Hart, "Immorality and Treason," p. 22^.
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Some think Mill held that it is justifiable on utilitarian
grounds to outlaw such conduct, and they usually cite a pas-
sage from On Liberty to substantiate their position. In a
single reference to public indecency Mill wrote:
i <
Again, there are many acts which, being directlyinjurious only to the agents themselves,
-ought not tobe legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly,
are a violation of good manners and, coming thus withinthe category of offenses against others, may rightly be
prohibited. Of this kind are offenses against decency;
on which it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they
are only connected indirectly with our subject, the
objection to publicity being equally strong in the case
of many actions not in themselves condemnable, nor
supposed to be so. ^9
Others hold that this passage is patently incompatible with
Mill's general normative views respecting individual liberty,
especially since he explicitly contrasted 'offense' with
'harm' in order to reject the view that giving offense to
others is a sufficient ground for prohibiting an action by
law.-^ Hence they consider this excerpt on "offenses
against decency" extraneous to Mill's theory of justifiable
legal unfreedoms.
While Mill's position on the subject of publicly
indecent actions is at least ambivalent if not ambiguous,
Hart's view is clearly in favor of legal prohibition and
punishment. The maintenance of public order and decency
^John Stuart Mill, On Liberty , ed. Currin V.
Shields, Library of Liberal Arts (New York: Liberal Arts
Press, 1956), p. 119.
5
°Ibid., pp. 77, 102.
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requires, according to Hart, legal proscriptions against
offenses such as sexual intercourse in public and the soli-
citations of prostitutes. Yet Hart asserts that it is pos-
sible to distinguish "the punishment of immorality from the
punishment of indecency":
Sexual intercourse between husband and wife is notimmoral, but if it takes place in public it is an
affront to public decency. Homosexual intercourse
between consenting adults in private is immoral accord-ing to conventional morality, but not an affront to
public decency, though it would be both if it took
place in public. But the fact that the same act, if
done in public, could be regarded both as immoral and
as an^ affront to public decency must not blind us to
the difference between these two aspects of conduct
and to the different principles on which the justifica-
tion of their punishment must rest. The recent English
law relating to prostitution attends to this differ-
ence. It has not made prostitution a crime but pun-
ishes its public manifestation [viz., soliciting and
pimping] in order to protect the ordinary citizen, who
is an unwilling witness of it in the streets, from
something offensive . -51
Thus, Hart considers the prevention of "shock," "distress,"
or "offence to feelings" to be a justifiable reason for
. . . ^2the legal proscription of sexual activity m public places.
That is, legal intervention is justified, not because the
conduct is considered "immoral," but because it is shocking
to the innocent bystander.
It seems to me that this distinction is more ingen-
ious than convincing. In the first place, Hart equates the
seemingly nonmoral effects of distress and shock with a
^ 1Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , pp. 44-^5.
52Ibid., p. 47.
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moral category—viz
. , indecency. But, surely, to be inde-
cent is to be immoral: "[a] person's behaviour may be inde-
cent because immoral, because it causes what is construed as
immorality by its beholders, because it offends against
religious sensibilities, and because it is in very bad
53taste." Hence I agree with R. A. Samek 1 s criticism:
.
. .
Professor Hart's example of intercourse between a
married couple shows that some acts which are not im-
moral in private, may be immoral in public. No one
would be offended by a married couple's intercourse in
public if it were not immoral. As regards Professor
Hart's example of homosexual intercourse, all that it
proves is that the immorality is heightened if the act
is done in public, not that we have two independent
elements, immorality and indecency ,5*
Yet Hart makes 'public offense' (conduct which shocks or
distresses witnesses) synonymous with 'public indecency'
(conduct which is considered "immoral" by onlookers). In
this way a (dubious) utilitarian reason becomes confused
with a nonutilitarian one.
What makes publicly indecent conduct "offensive"
such that it causes shock? As Samek and McCloskey suggest,
it is the conventional moral beliefs and feelings of the
witness which make his encounter with sexual activity dis-
tressing. Consider, for instance, Hart's reference to the
"h. J. McCloskey, "Immorality, Indecency, and the
Law," Political Studies 13 (October I965): 367.
-^"R. A. Samek, "The Enforcement of Morals: A Basic
Re-Examination in Its Historical Setting," The Canadian Bar
Review 4-9 (May 1971): 219. But cf. Summers, p. 1208.
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public behavior of the prostitute and the pimp. What is
there about their invitations to commercialized sexual in-
tercourse that causes distress and offends feelings? Norm-
ally we are not offended by the importunings of street mer-
chants who go about, sometimes rather noisily, hawking their
wares. We are not distressed but amused by a child's
request of a quarter for the good humor man. The panhand-
ler's plea for "coffee money" is, at worst, a mere annoyance.
If someone were to express shock at these things we would
probably think that something was "wrong" with him. There-
fore whatever is offensive about soliciting must be associ-
ated with one's knowledge that it is being done for the pur-
pose of engaging in an activity he considers "immoral." As
Samek claims, "Soliciting would not be regarded as suffic-
iently offensive to require the protection of the criminal
law, if prostitution were not regarded as immoral. Cer-
tainly someone would not object, or he would object much
less, to public soliciting if he considered prostitution
morally acceptable. Indeed, the innocent who has no idea
what these people are doing would presumably not be offended
at all. 5°
"ibid. See also Gilbert Geis, Not the Law's Busi-
ness? An Examination of Homosexuality, Abortion, Prostitu-
tion, Narcotics and Gambling in the United States , Crime
and Delinquency Issues, A Monograph Series of the National
Institute of Mental Health (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1972), p. 218.
-^Basil Mitchell, Law, Morality, and Religion in a
Secular Society (London: Oxford University Press, 19 67) , p.
62.
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Second, Hart's implication that his view of public
indecency is an "extension of the utilitarian principle that
coercion may be used to protect men from harm" 57 seems in-
defensible. While it is no doubt true that many are shocked,
distressed, or offended by public manifestations of sexual
conduct, a utilitarian justification of legal interference
requires that it result in more good than evil. Granted,
then, that at least in principle the undesirable consequences
of public offenses could constitute good utilitarian reasons
for bringing in the criminal law either to prevent or to
punish them; that is to say, they would be good utilitarian
reasons if it could be shown that the harm done to one who
is shocked or distressed is greater than the "misery and
suffering" which Hart says legal coercion creates. When it
comes to the issue of public offense, Hart simply ignores
the need to show that the harm done by the law to actual or
potential offenders is warranted. Rather, he makes a pre-
sumption in favor of the witness of a public act and against
the offender: he assumes that sexual activity in public
causes injuries to others which do in fact outweigh the
"prima facie evils" of legal unfreedom.
But what harm to others is caused by acts of public
indecency? Are the offense to feelings and the psychologi-
cal distress of bystanders in any way comparable to the
^Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , p. ^7.
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"misery and suffering" of those arrested or of those made
unfree by the threat of punishment? Apparently Hart thinks
that they are, but then his normative views are inconsistent.
We have seen Hart claim that, while most persons pay lip
service to the idea that unorthodox sexual practices are
"immoral," it is doubtful that they really hold this belief.
Then is it not unreasonable for him to insist on having the
criminal law make everyone unfree merely to protect the
questionable moral sentiments of others from offense? Else-
where Hart has asserted
. that the protection of "religious"
and "unenlightened" moral feelings constitutes only a "negli-
gible benefit" secured for those who disapprove.-58 How,
then, can temporary feelings of shock and embarrassment on
the part of some people possibly be taken as a good reason
—
let alone a better reason than that the conduct in question
is generally considered "immoral"— for permanently limiting
the liberties of all and marring the lives of a few by
making them criminals? If it is true, again as we have seen
Hart hold, that "sexual morals are so obviously determined
by variable tastes and conventions," then is it not incon-
sistent of him to allow legal protection of a public's
feelings about changing sexual morals while asserting the
desirability of legal consistency and predictability?
Surely he does not count any given society's conventional
58Hart, The Concept of Law , p. I78.
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beliefs concerning public sexual conduct among the "univer-
sal values" which, he says, must be secured in every society
for the sake of survival. For what reason, then, should
feelings about them be protected by the penal code? Indeed,
if moral feelings are so often based on "ignorance, super-
stition, and misunderstanding," as Hart claims they are,^9
then why should they be legally protected?
Hart's treatment of "public indecency" therefore
appears to contradict his views opposing legal moralism, and
his reason for legal intervention is based on the positive
morality (the beliefs and feelings about right and wrong
conduct) of a given public.
(2) Public nuisance. Hart gives another example to
show "the need to distinguish between the immorality of a
practice and its aspect as a public offensive act or
nuisance"— viz., the law prohibiting bigamy.^ 0 Devlin holds
that in Western societies bigamous marriages are outlawed to
protect both the public's preference for monogamy and an
^1
"essential" social institution. Rostow adds that "mono-
gamy is so fundamental a theme in the existing common moral-
ity of the United States, that the condemnation of polygamy
as a crime is justified, even though in the end the repug-
-5%art, "Immorality and Treason," p. 226.
6
°Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , p. 43.
6lDevlin, pp. 9-10.
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nance to it rests on 'feeling' and not on 'reason'." 62 Hart
replies that the law against bigamy is warranted, not for
the reason that it enforces positive morality, but "to pro-
tect religious feelings from offence by a public act dese-
crating the [marriage] ceremony":
It is important to see that if
. .
. the law intervenes
hv
Vr
l
teCJ reliSio^ sensibilities from outrageby a public act, the bigamist is punished neither asirreligious nor as immoral but as a nuisance. For thelaw is then concerned with the offensiveness to othersol
_ his public conduct, not with the immorality of hisprivate conduct, which, in most countries, it leaves
altogether unpunished. ©3
Thus, like the "public indecency" of sexual intercourse and
soliciting, the "public nuisance" of bigamy is for Hart
sufficiently offensive to the moral and religious sensibili-
ties of the public to justify its proscription by the crimi-
nal law.
Now, I fail to see how Hart's statement differs from
Rostow's. Hart's attempt to set off "nuisance" from "irre-
ligion" and "immorality" is surely in this context to make a
distinction without a difference. To make the distinction
work he has to show that legal protection of religious and
moral feelings (which to him is acceptable) is different
from the legal enforcement of those same feelings (which he
holds to be undesirable). But is not the protection proffer-
ed by the positive law a form of enforcement? It surely is
Rostow, p. 190.
-'Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
, p. kl.
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whenever protection is secured through legal coercion. And
is not the enforcement of moral feelings or sensibilities
(be they religious or not) tantamount to the enforcement of
positive morality? Since 'positive morality 1 means the
moral beliefs or sentiments of the majority, it seems to me
that it is.
Furthermore, Hart avoids an interesting question
raised in Rostow's discussion of marriage, i.e., whether the
legal proscription of polygamy is justifiable. Hart says
practically nothing about this and deals extensively with
the law of bigamy, perhaps because polygamy is not a live
issue in England as it was in the United States. This is
unfortunate because bigamy, unlike polygamy, is not normally
advocated as an alternative to monogamy. The typical bigam-
ist seeks to evade his obligations to one wife (and some-
times even to both) rather than to assume responsibility for
two; his second marriage usually takes place as the result
of fraud wherein he deceives both wives, neither of whom is
aware of his marriage to the other. For this reason many,
like Packer, consider bigamy an "imaginary crime": its prac-
tice is just as well interdicted by the anti-fraud laws pro-
hibiting deceit in legal contracts. Therefore I agree
with Samek's criticism: "If bigamy without deception were
punished only in order to protect religious sensibilities
^Packer, pp. 312-16. But cf. Hughes (p. 6?k) whose
views on bigamy appear to be as mistaken as Hart's.
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from outrage by a public act, there would be no [nonmoral]
reason to protect these sensibilities." 65
On the other hand, the would-be polygamist desires
to keep all of his wives with their full knowledge and con-
sent. Does entrance without deception into several simulta-
neous marital contracts "desecrate" the ceremony of marriage
in the same way that Hart thinks a (typically fraudulent)
bigamous marriage does? Hart does not reveal whether he
thinks so. In any event, it is less than obvious that his
treatment of bigamy as prohibited by English law is adequate
to account for the laws against polygamy in the United
States. 66
Moreover, as Devlin points out, bigamy is not
strictly speaking a public act; hence it "violates neither
good manners nor decency." 6? Whatever sense of 'public 1
Hart intends in his discussion of bigamy, David Conway says
that "it surely cannot be one which involves 'foisting one's
conduct on the unwilling non-participant
'
, since a quiet
marriage ceremony is certainly no more public in this sense
68than is living out of wedlock with more than one 'wife'."
65Samek, p. 219.
66See the discussion in Mitchell, pp. 26-30.
'Devlin, p. 138. Devlin adds: "When it [bigamy^] is
committed without deception it harms no one." Surely this
admission contradicts his own view that every "immoral" act
is capable of producing harmful consequences.
68
David A. Conway, "Law, Liberty and Indecency,"
Philosophy k9 (April 197*0: 1^1.
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If bigamy is therefore not a public act, then it must be in
the private realm— concerning which Hart strongly denies the
justification of punishing people "simply because others
object to what they do." 69 On his own principles, then,
Hart is bound to advocate the decriminalization of bigamy
rather than to defend the law against it, just as he denies
the justifiability of criminalizing nonmarital cohabitation
with more than one mate.
Ernest Nagel is therefore correct in thinking that
"Hart is begging the question" by assuming that to judge an
activity to be a public nuisance because it offends the moral
beliefs of others "is always independent of any judgment of
its morality." For example, "bigamous marriages and other
kinds of public conduct are crimes in the U.S. because they
are offensive to others in America"; however, "they are in
fact not offensive to members of other cultures in which
Puritanical conceptions of moral behavior are not widespread."
Like Samek and McCloskey, Nagel holds that some kinds of con-
duct are regarded as nuisances to others just because such
people believe them to be "immoral." Hence, "if bigamy is a
crime because it is a nuisance to others, it does not follow
without further argument that the bigamist is not punished
because he is judged by society to be immoral, but for some
other reason.
6%art, Law, Liberty, and Morality , p. ^7.
^°Ernest Nagel, "The Enforcement of Morals," Humanist
28 (May-June 1968): 26
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Hart does not supply this "further argument," and
without it he cannot present a clear alternative to the view
that with respect to bigamy the criminal law is being used
to enforce positive morality. Devlin is therefore correct:
the laws against bigamy without deception are examples of
legal moralism in practice. Therefore Hart's utilitarian
principles require him to seek their repeal. His surprising
defense of them must be regarded as an inconsistency.
Do these conclusions apply as well to Hart's general
category of 'public offense'? Nagel's comments certainly
suggest as much. So do my own earlier criticisms of Hart's
treatment of publicly indecent conduct. Before making a
judgment, let us consider Hart's last published remarks on
the subject:
[T]he use of punishment to protect those made vulnerable
to the public display by their own beliefs leaves the
offender at liberty to do the same thing in private, if
he can. It is not tantamount to punishing men simply
because others object to what they do. 71
First of all, it is not necessarily true that laws against
publicly offensive conduct leave "the offender at liberty to
do the same thing in private"; even Hart's own words of
qualification--"if he can"— suggest that some activities
which cause offense in public cannot be performed privately,
i.e., without witnesses.'
72
The obvious example, with which
? Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , pp. ^7-48.
Feinberg (p. 90) uses a similar argument.
?2See Conway, pp. 139-^0.
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Hart does not deal, is exhibitionism: the exhibitionist's
achievement of sexual gratification depends on the shocked
reaction of an unwilling witness to his act of self-exposure.
Another example that Hart does not mention is public nudity:
going naked in the privacy of one's home is simply not the
same thing as doing so at the seashore or the supermarket or
even in one's own backyard where intolerant neighbors have
the legal right to make a complaint of indecent exposure.
Second, it seems to me that punishing public offense
in Hart's sense is "tantamount to punishing men simply
because others object to what they do." What does it mean
to object to what others do if not that its public display
caused offense? The law punishes in these cases because
others object, and they complain because their moral and
religious feelings have been hurt. While we may grant that
they are entitled to object because offended by an unpleas-
ant experience, we may nonetheless deny that for this reason
they should also be entitled to seek legal punishment of the
offender. As Hart asserts in his utilitarian theory, we
should require more than offense to someone's sensibilities
to warrant legal intervention in the forms of prohibition
and punishment. A consistently utilitarian ethic would
therefore require evidence of more substantial harm than
shock and distress (which arise, after all, from the witness'
own moral beliefs) to justify action on the part of the cri-
minal law. Accordingly, a given public's moral assessment
Ill
of offending acts should not be the- sole determinant of
whether the law is justified in interfering. That is, legal
control of a public offense ought to be independent of its
effects on the moral beliefs and feelings of others.
Third, because of his treatment of public offense,
Hart holds two incompatible views: legal enforcement of
positive morality against offensive private conduct is un-
justifiable, while the same thing is warranted with respect
to offensive public behavior. But, it seems to me, either
alternative amounts to legal moralism. Is there a moral
principle which would justify legal proscriptions of public
offense while preventing the law from interfering with
private conduct to which others object on account of its
offensiveness? If there is, Conway has shown that Hart does
not advance it in support of his view."^ If the law is war-
ranted in interfering with public conduct which offends
moral feelings, then why not with private conduct which does
so as well? Hart's distinction between public and private
morality simply will not do the work demanded of it here.
The fault with Hart's treatment of public indecency
and nuisance lies, not with the public/private distinction,
but with his failure to stay true to his utilitarian prin-
ciples. Hart would do well to heed his own admonition
against advocating laws on the ground of enforcing the
73Ibid., pp. 137-^3.
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public's moral feelings. For instance, he criticizes tho!
who defend laws prohibiting abortion for the reason that the
killing of an embryo or a fetus is morally wrong: »[l]n many
current controversies, as in the case of abortion, the
defenders of the law would not be content to leave the matter
to be decided on an assessment of the balance of harm without
bringing the immorality of the practice into the scale. " 7k
Yet he himself justifies laws against public sexual inter-
course, soliciting for prostitution, and bigamous marriage
on the same grounds. I conclude, with Conway, that Hart's
advocacy of laws against public offense contradicts his
utilitarian views opposing legal moralism.
(c) Legal paternalism
. As with public offense, so
with the issue of legal paternalism, it is useful to begin
with Mill's views on the subject. Mill's central thesis in
On Liberty is that no one, and especially not the state, is
justified in interfering with the voluntary choice of a
mature and rational human being for the person's "own good"
or to protect him from self-inflicted harm. On the other
hand, Mill would permit the state to protect an adult from
the harmful consequences of his own ignorance in circum-
stances which create a presumption that his choice would be
different if he had better information. Moreover, legal
^Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law , p. ^9
•
"^Conway, pp. 1^6-^7.
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interference may be justified to protect a person, not only
from his own ignorance, but also from some other condition
which renders his informed choice substantially less than
voluntary, for instance, he may be "a child, or delirious,
or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible
with the full use of the reflecting faculty." 76 Thus, Mill
accepts legal paternalism to the extent that he thinks the
state justified in preventing nonvoluntary conduct which
results in self-harm. That is, both children and adults
without "the full use of the reflecting faculty" may rightly
be deterred for their "own good." But no sane and sober
(i.e., rational) adult may justifiably be prevented from
injuring himself once it has been determined that his choice
is voluntary. In neither case, Mill insists, ought the law
to punish the actor. 77
Hart's treatment of legal paternalism occurs in a
brief and incomplete response to Devlin's claim that by dis-
allowing the consent of the victim as a defense in criminal
proceedings the law does enforce "morality as such." Hart
agrees with Devlin that consent of the victim "is not a
defence to a charge of murder or a deliberate assault, and
this is why euthanasia or mercy killing terminating a man's
7Slill, p. 117. Here Mill gives the well-known
example of a public officer preventing a person from cross-
ing an unsafe bridge.
77Joel Feinberg, "Legal Paternalism," Canadian Jour-
nal of Philosophy 1 (September 1971): 111-13-
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life at his own request is still murder." But, contrary to
Devlin, Hart holds that this is not an example of the crimi-
nal law enforcing positive morality (i.e., the common belief
in "the sanctity of human life"); rather, he considers it
"a piece of paternalism, designed to protect individuals
against themselves." The same is true, he says, of penal
legislation proscribing "the supply of drugs or narcotics,
even to adults, except under medical prescription." 78 Hart
concludes that the paternalism he advocates is theoretically
distinct from legal moralism:
Certainly a modification of Mill's principles is
required, if they are to accommodate the rule of crimi-
nal law under discussion [viz., disallowance of consent
of the victim as a defense in cases of murder and
assault] or other instances of paternalism. But the
modified principles would not abandon the objection to
the use of the criminal law merely to enforce positive
morality. They would only have to provide that harming
others is something we may seek to prevent by use of
the criminal law, even when the victims consent to or
• assist in the acts which are harmful to them. 79
This view seems to me to be greatly misconceived and
confused. First, Hart misconceives the notion of paternal-
ism. Or, rather, he uses two different concepts of pater-
nalism, one correct and the other not. Paternalistic legis-
lation is "designed to protect individuals against them-
selves," but not to prevent one from nor to punish one for
"harming others." Thus, Hart fails to distinguish Mill's
Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , pp. 30-32.
Ibid.
, p„ 33
•
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harm to others principle from the self-harm principle of
paternalism— even though he explicitly asserts that "a modi-
fication of Mill's principles is required" in order to
accommodate paternalistic legislation. Like the prevention
of public offense, then, Hart apparently considers legal
paternalism another "extension of the utilitarian principle"
warranting legal coercion in order to prevent harm to others.
Second, this misconception leads to a confusing use
of examples—a fault, surprisingly enough, which Hart finds
in Devlin's theory. Are the laws against euthanasia and the
sale of narcotics without prescription correctly interpreted
as instances of paternalism? Laws prohibiting suicide and
the taking of illicit drugs certainly are; but concerning
those in question, it seems to me that here we have illustra-
tions of the law seeking to protect a person, not from him-
self, but from the harmful acts of another. With mercy kill-
ing there is the case of A terminating the life of B (not B
taking his own life) even though B consents; hence A may be
punished under the harm to others principle. If A sells
drugs to B without the required medical prescription, the
law intervenes both to prevent the transaction (i.e., to
restrain A from dealing to B a potentially harmful substance)
and to punish A for making it possible for B to harm his own
health (i„e., for contributing to B's injury). In neither
of Hart's examples is there a clear case of the law being
used to prevent the individual actor from voluntarily doing
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harm to himself. Hence an appeal to the principle of pater-
nalism is not necessary for Hart to justify these laws. Nor
is he required to "modify" Mill's principle. 80
One cannot, therefore, blame Devlin for feeling
"left in genuine doubt about what the modification is." 81
Even so, the views of both Devlin and Hart are mistaken.
Unlike laws which prohibit attempted suicide and possession
of heroin or LSD, laws against mercy killing and drug deal-
ing are (like those which punish murder and deliberate
assault) justifiable neither as an "enforcement of morals"
nor as "a piece of paternalism" but as a protection from
O pharm done by another.
This leaves a further question: Is Hart right to
think legal paternalism (correctly conceived) distinct from
legal moralism, or is Devlin right in holding that laws pro-
tecting a person from himself are an enforcement of society's
positive morality? Several of Hart's critics think that
8 0Hart's error was recently repeated by other-
attempts to justify laws of this kind by an appeal to pater-
nalism. See Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism," in Morality and
the Law , ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1971 ) . pp. 107-26; and C. L. Ten, "Pater-
nalism and Morality," Ratio 13 (June 1971): 56-66. For the
view that both Hart and Dworkin are mistaken in thinking
paternalism relevant to the problem of consent as a defense,
see Michael D. Bayles, "Criminal Paternalism," in The Limits
of Law; Nomos XV , ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman
(New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1974), P- 185-
81Devlin, p. 133-
82A recent analysis (Christine Pierce, "Hart on Pat-
ernalism," Analysis 35 LJune 1975]: 205-07) shows that con-
sidering laws against euthanasia as paternalistic can have
"peculiar consequences."
U7
Devlin is right. But their judgment is based, not on any
explicit statement by Hart about what paternalism does and
does not entail, but on Devlin's attribution of paternalis-
tic views to Hart. Consider Devlin's allegations: Hart
quotes, apparently with approval, the Wolfenden Report's
recommendation that the criminal law "provide sufficient
safeguards against exploitation or corruption of others,
particularly those who are especially vulnerable because
they are young, weak in body or mind or inexperienced." 83
Devlin holds that, if Hart truly is committed to the prin-
ciple of preventing exploitation and corruption by means of
penal legislation, it must then be justified as a paternal-
istic policy. But, says Devlin, laws against exploitation
and corruption are laws against "immorality"; hence Hart's
view is one of moral paternalism which is indistinguishable
Oh
from legal moralism.
Now, Hart says absolutely nothing (outside of quot-
ing the Report) in defense of laws against exploitation and
corruption. Since they are obviously not public offenses,
one would expect that, had Hart dealt with them, they would
fall under his category of 'legal paternalism' since even
O o
^Quoted by Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
, p. 14;
see also Idem, The Morality of the Criminal Law
, p. 2>k.
Actually, Hart misquotes the Report: he substitutes an "or"
for the original "and" separating the words "exploitation"
and "corruption."
8 \>evlin, pp. 105, 133-37. Mitchell (pp. 5^-60)
appropriates Devlin's criticism and develops it further.
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euthanasia and the sale of narcotics appear there. But,
because Hart is silent on these topics, we cannot know how
he would treat them. Indeed, it is not readily apparent
what even the Committee itself meant by preventing "exploita-
tion and corruption."
In any case, Devlin's claim that laws punishing
exploitation are paternalistic seems mistaken. The adult
who exploits a special vulnerability in another can justi-
fiably be punished under Mill's harm to others principle; in
no sense does the youth. (or the weaker party) exploit him-
self. This view is perfectly compatible with Hart's (see
section 3, a above). Corruption is a more difficult case,
however, since it probably means 'corrupting another's
morals' or 'leading another morally astray' . Legislation
proscribing corruption of, say, the morals of minors, if
based on the conventional moral code of a given community,
would indeed constitute an enforcement of positive morality;
but, again, it would not be an instance of paternalism, for
the corrupted youth does not corrupt himself but is corrupt-
ed by an adult. Nor would such a statute necessarily con-
flict with Mill's (and Hart's) harm to others principle
since minors, who cannot give consent, are excluded from it.
Hart would presumably justify the law of statutory rape for
this, and not for a paternalistic, reason.
We are left, then, with Hart's explicit espousal of
a form of legal paternalism which Mill would reject, i.e.,
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protection against voluntary self-harm of an adult. In this
respect Hart goes further than Mill but not so far as Devlin.
But Hart fails to supply even one convincing example of the
law fulfilling this paternalistic function. Laws requiring
the wearing of seat belts in automobiles and of crash helmets
while operating motorcycles, or prohibiting jay-walking,
cigarette smoking, and drug taking might be good examples.
These show that Hart could have attempted to make a case for
paternalism (contrary to Mill) on utilitarian grounds, i.e.,
to protect or to promote the actor's welfare. 8 -5 Even here,
though, Hart's decision to deal only with examples drawn from
the realm of sexual behavior leaves him, it seems to me, with
only one relevant activity— viz
. ,
solitary masturbation.
Would anyone claim today that laws forbidding autoeroticism
are meant to prevent self-harm? Like the Emperor Justinian's
belief that homosexuality causes earthquakes, erstwhile
claims that the (practically universal) practice of "self-
abuse" causes maladies from acne to insanity are no longer
seriously entertained.
I conclude, therefore, that Hart's appeal to legal
paternalism does nothing to help his argument; rather, it
both hinders and confuses it. He could have dealt much more
clearly with the subjects and examples he chose for discus-
sion without it. Moreover, his defense of paternalistic
85Cf. Bayles, p. 18^.
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legislation seems to contradict his own view that laws which
cannot be effectively enforced are undesirable. In my view,
•legal paternalism* is a useless category when debating the
desirability of enforcing conventional sexual morality.
Hence, with respect to the Devlin-Hart controversy, there is
no need to determine whether legal paternalism is distinct
from legal moralism.
Summary
.
We have seen that Hart argues that government
enforcement of "morality as such" is always undesirable and
unjustifiable. The case for this position is made most
effectively by using utilitarian arguments based on Mill's
harm to others principle. Hart concentrates on examples of
"immoral" sexual activity because he thinks that "deviations
from conventional sexual morality such as homosexuality
afford the clearest examples of offences which do not harm
others." Thus, Hart's utilitarian theory holds that with
respect to the private and consensual sexual practices of
adults legal moralism is an unjustifiable governmental
policy.
Hart also uses nonutilitarian arguments against
enforcing positive morality by means of the criminal law.
Of these principles only the argument from justice—that
86Bayles (pp. 178-79) shows that legal paternalism
is "logically distinct" from legal moralism. We shall
return to this question in Chapter VI.
^Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , "Preface," p. v,
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reasonable legal certainty is necessary to achieve equal
treatment of criminal offenders—is clearly and cogently set
forth. His other arguments from justice—that sexual offen-
ders are more likely to receive unequal legal treatment than
others, and that legal punishments are graded to reflect
common estimates of a crime's moral wickedness— are not con-
vincing, as we have seen. The arguments based on the prin-
ciple of liberty fare little better: Hart's intrinsic valua-
tion of freedom establishes only a prima facie right which
may justifiably be infringed for the sake of preventing both
public offense and voluntary self-harm, as well as harm to
others; and the advocated governmental policy of libertar-
ianism is erroneously thought to be implied by the principles
of democratic government. In sum, it is chiefly the argu-
ments derived from the principle of utility that provide an
effective and persuasive alternative to Devlin's views.
When Hart's discussion turns to justifiable reasons
for imposing legal limitations on liberty, serious difficul-
ties arise whenever he either contradicts or abandons Mill's
harm to others principle. His justification of using the
criminal law to prevent and to punish public offense is con-
fusing because it contradicts both Mill's and his own view
that punishing conduct for its mere "immorality" is unjusti-
fiable. Even more confusing is his treatment of legal pat-
ernalism, wherein he first rejects Mill's principle and then
applies it nevertheless in certain cases which are not
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examples of voluntary self-harm of an adult.
Evidently Hart is not sufficiently clear about his
own grounds warranting legal limitations of liberty. Rather,
his uses of these "multiple criteria" are merely piecemeal
efforts to answer the arguments of Devlin and his supporters
that certain criminal enactments and legal practices can be
justified only as instances of government enforcement of
"morality as such." In all cases, Hart counters by holding
that they can be justified in other ways, but not always by
an appeal simply to Mill's single principle.
Although Hart claims that his appeal to "multiple
criteria" necessitates a "modification of Mill's single
principle," he proceeds to deal with public offense and legal
paternalism as if no "modification" were needed after all.
Hart actually remains committed to the harm to others prin-
ciple, but then—apparently without realizing it—advocates
penal legislation which cannot be subsumed under that prin-
ciple .
This inconsistency has made Hart's whole normative
position vulnerable to attack. The legal moralists (and
other critics) have scored heavily against Hart without even
so much as mentioning, let alone criticizing, his rather
formidable utilitarian theory. They have done so by focus-
ing on Hart's parting of ways with Mill, and by interpreting
his justifications of legal unfreedom in such a way that
they appear indistinct from legal moralism. While I, too,
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think that Hart's use of the public offense principle implie
an enforcement of positive morality, his discussion of legal
paternalism does not; hence it is unfair to use the latter
against his general views opposing legal moralism,
I conclude that Hart espouses simultaneously two
quite different views regarding the desirability of using
the criminal law to enforce positive morality. Both views
appear again in his last lecture on the subject. There he
says first that "the use of the criminal law . . . is not
justified by the mere fact that the conduct which [it] is
used to punish is an offence against the accepted moral code
88of the community." Yet on the very next page he endorses
the view that public indecency and offenses which hurt moral
feelings can justifiably be prevented and punished by the
criminal law. But surely such conduct constitutes "an
offence against the accepted moral code of the community,"
and legal protection of that code amounts to an enforcement
of it. Paradoxically, Hart is prepared to use penal legis-
lation to ban indecent public behavior because it offends
—
but not because it is generally considered "immoral"
—
although it is its "immorality" in the eyes of witnesses
which makes it offensive. I *am far from convinced that this
view is consistent with the utilitarian argument against the
legal enforcement of positive morality. Rather, it is the
88Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law , pp. 31-32.
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basis for a separate normative theory which favors govern-
ment enforcement of a public's moral beliefs for reasons
that Hart fails to establish on utilitarian grounds.
E. Comparison of Devlin and Hart
The Devlin-Hart controversy concerns one normative
issue: whether a given society's positive morality ought to
be enforced by the criminal law. Devlin's affirmative
response is based on two reasons: each society's positive
morality is objectively morally right, and democratic gov-
ernments have a moral duty to enforce majoritarian convic-
tions and beliefs regarding how everyone should conduct his
(public and private) life. Devlin also thinks that legal
moralism can be justified for further ends: it is a neces-
sary means to preserving both "essential" social institu-
tions and society itself. But it turns out that this view
is moral populism in disguise, for Devlin makes 'preserving
society' synonymous with 'preserving positive morality* by
means of legal enforcement. Thus, moral populism is the
main principle on which Devlin's advocacy of legal moralism
is founded.
Hart deals more particularly with the question:
Should certain kinds of sexual conduct be prohibited and
punished by the penal code simply because they are widely
believed to be morally wrong? Hart's negative answer is
chiefly utilitarian: a governmental policy of legal moralism
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would have consequences for both particular individuals and
society generally which are more harmful than beneficial.
However, Hart considers legal proscriptions of public sexual
activity justifiable for the sake of protecting the moral
and religious sensibilities of others: the disvaluable con-
sequences of prohibition (unfreedom for all) and punishment
(unfreedom for the offender) do not offset the valuable con-
sequences of preserving public order and decency. Yet this
view appears to be indistinct from legal moralism, and it is
incompatible with Hart's utilitarian theory. Hart's incon-
sistency consists in saying first that legal moralism is
always unjustified, and then in holding that it is justified
to prevent public offense—without saying that this is an
exception.
Devlin and Hart also disagree over the valuation of
freedom. Devlin does not value freedom as good in itself,
while for Hart liberty (together with welfare) is an intrin-
sic value as well as a means to other ends. Devlin values
liberty extrinsically, i.e., as a means to doing only what
is objectively morally right as defined by the positive mor-
ality of one's society. But Hart values freedom as a means
to individual self-realization, want-satisfaction, and moral
diversity—the last being closely similar to Mill's "experi-
ments in living" wherein all might benefit from innovations
in ideas and in social conduct. Lastly, Devlin regards
limitations of freedom as valuable for the sake of "preserv-
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ing society," i.e., preventing changes in social institu-
tions and in society's positive morality itself; but Hart
considers restrictions of liberty necessary to promote
public order and decency and to protect persons from doing
harm to themselves.
One critic has held that there is a paradox in the
normative theories of the controversy—viz., Devlin's
"moralistic" view is based on "non-moralistic utilitarian
grounds," and Hart's "utilitarian" theory is supported by
"moralistic" arguments . y I have shown that there is no
paradox; rather, both Devlin and Hart deploy nonutilitarian
principles in support of their opposing moral views, and
only Hart appeals to utilitarian grounds as well.
F. Conclusion
Although there are several important differences
between the normative theories of the protagonists in this
controversy, they seem not to lead to any radical differ-
ences in practice. For example, Devlin complains that
Hart's view leads to recommendations for legal change which
differ hardly at all from his own:
It is a curious thing that a century after the state-
ment of [Mill's] doctrine it is still not possible to
say what amendments to the criminal law would flow
from it; and that there is only one crime, that of
homosexuality, that is known with certainty to lie
89A. R. Blackshield, "The Hart-Devlin Controversy in
I965," Sydney Law Review 5 (October 19^7) : ^50.
within the private realm. y
However, this is not accurate: Hart holds that, besides
homosexual acts, incest should also be decriminalized, and
more recently he implied that abortion should be legalized
91in certain cases. 7 Yet it is true that Hart's main pre-
occupation seems to be with reforming the law respecting
homosexuality. And Devlin himself recently held that the
"limits of tolerance" had shifted sufficiently in England
to permit that reform even on his own principles; indeed,
he even went so far as to recommend decriminalization in an
92
open letter to the House of Commons.
It appears, then, that practical applications of
Devlin's and of Hart's normative theories would have rather
similar results. Devlin would retain all legislation pro-
hibiting "immorality as such" while Hart goes no further
than recommending that the offense of incest be removed from
the criminal calendar. To this extent both Devlin and Hart
are reluctant to reform the criminal law and are in this
sense conservative. How could it be otherwise when Hart
defines 'offensive conduct' in terms of what is indecent,
9
°Devlin, p. 128; see also p. 139.
^ 1Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law , pp. ^6-49.
92See Henry David Aiken, "There Oughta Be a Law,"
New York Review , 11 November 1965, p. 17; Ronald Dworkin,
"Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals," The Yale Law
Journal 75 (May I966): 987, n. 4; and Jerome H. Skolnick,
"Coercion to Virtue: The Enforcement of Morals, Southern
California Law Review kl (Spring 1968): 616.
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while Devlin defines •immorality' in terms of what is dis-
gusting?
One critic observes that Devlin starts "from a
license issued to the legislature" while Hart commences
"from a prohibition on the law's intervention." That is,
Hart takes the "conservative" (or nineteenth- century liberal)
view that government ought not to interfere; but, while
Devlin appears the conservative because he defends both the
enforcement of morals and resistance to social change, his
advocacy of government intervention is consistent with the
view of modern liberals that the scope of governmental power
should be expanded. "Both parties then proceed to qualify
the license or prohibition until there is little more than
an architectural difference between them."^ Even so, there
is an important theoretical difference as well, as we have
seen. Furthermore, I agree with Hart that, contrary to
Devlin, the private sexual practices of consenting adults
are harmless and therefore ought not to be liable to inter-
ference by the criminal law. Generally speaking, that is, I
think Hart's views are more satisfactory than Devlin's, for
surely some limiting principle on government enforcement of
positive morality is better than none. However, with
respect to both private and public sexual conduct, relying
only on utilitarian arguments would be more consistent than
either Devlin's or Hart's views.
9
^F. W. M. McElrea, "The Legal Enforcement of Non-
Utilitarian Morality , " Otago Law Review 1 (July 1967): 211-
12.
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CHAPTER IV
FACTUAL ASSUMPTIONS
An important part of the Devlin-Hart controversy is
concerned with certain factual theories which are used
either to support or to attack the normative views of the
protagonists. These theories have to do mainly with assump-
tions about the nature of society and about the relationship
between society's positive morality and its positive law.
Some of them also have to do with Devlin's and Hart's views
of human nature. The analysis of these theories will follow
a brief discussion of so-called extrinsic value judgments,
which will serve to relate the present subject of factual
assumptions to the preceding one of normative theories.
We have seen that something may be valued both in-
trinsically and extrinsically . Intrinsic value judgments
are exemplified by Devlin's contention that government
enforcement of positive morality is valuable regardless of
whatever other desirable ends it might achieve, or by Hart's
view that sexual freedom, privately manifested, is desirable
in itself. On the other hand, extrinsic value judgments
assert that something is good, not for itself, but as being
conducive to some other state of affairs which is held to be
intrinsically desirable. Thus, for Devlin legal moralism is
good, not only intrinsically, but also because it is instru-
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mental in preserving society and its existing institutions.
For Hart sexual freedom is good, not only in itself, but
also because it promotes personal happiness and emotional
balance and encourages the development of moral diversity;
but he advocates its restriction (i.e., sexual unfreedom)
for the sake of protecting religious and moral sensibilities
from public affront. This shows that some state of affairs
(either morals legislation or sexual freedom) may be valued
both intrinsically and extrinsically, and that something
(e.g., sexual unfreedom) may be considered intrinsically
disvaluable but extrinsically valuable.
So-called extrinsic value judgments are actually
descriptive statements, hence a part of science rather than
of ethics. For instance, Devlin's claim that restricting
sexual freedom is desirable for the sake of protecting
society from disintegration means the same as: If society is
to be preserved, then freedom to be "immoral" must be
limited by the criminal law. Similarly, Hart's contention
that certain sexual unfreedoms are desirable in order to
prevent public indecency and nuisance means the same as:
Some limitations of sexual freedom are a necessary means to
the end of preserving public order and decency. Extrinsic
value judgments "can be translated without loss of meaning
into 'if-then' or 'means-end' statements which contain no
value words like 'good' or moral terms like 'ought'."
1
1
Felix E. Oppenheim, Moral Principles in Political
Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 10.
Since 'means-end' and 'if-then' statements are descriptive
and ethically neutral, thoce which are found in the Devlin-
Hart controversy belong to empirical science. Hence they
are capable, at least in principle, of being tested in the
same manner as any other proposition of empirical science.
Here I will examine the factual assumptions underlying the
extrinsic value judgments of the controversy.
A. Devlin's Factual Assumptions
We have already seen (Ch. II, c, 1) that the so-
called factual claim of Devlin's disintegration thesis may
be interpreted in a number of different ways, some of which
may be empirical and, thus, testable in principle. Here I
will inquire, first, whether empirical hypotheses can be
established to test the assertion that without government
enforcement of positive morality a society will "disinte-
grate" or be "destroyed," and what kinds of evidence there
might be either to confirm or to disconfirm them. In this
connection the factual assumptions underlying Devlin's
theory of moral populism will also be examined. Finally, I
will draw out the implications of these assumptions for
Devlin's view of human nature.
lv The nature of political nociety . According to Devlin,
the survival of any society is dependent on it individual
members' conformity to its conventional moral code. From
time to time the criminal law may have to be used to insure
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conformity in both actions and beliefs. Indeed, if society
is to survive, then the law must enforce positive morality.
For Devlin, conduct which is generally regarded as
morally wrong is harmful to society in two ways: it causes
"tangible harm" by weakening those members of society who
practice it and thus, when the practice is widely indulged,
by weakening society; and it produces "intangible harm" by
undermining the majority's beliefs in its received moral
code, thus causing injury to society's moral bonds.
(a) Tangible hnrm. On this view, Devlin holds that
It is obvious that an individual may by unrestrictedindulgence m vice so weaken himself that he ceases tobe a useful^ member of society. It is obvious also thatii a sufficient number of individuals so weaken them-
selves, society will thereby be weakened. That is what
I mean by tangible harm to society. If the proportiongrows sufficiently large, society will succumb either
to its own disease or to external pressure. A nation
of debauchees would not in l$bO have responded satis-factorily to Winston Churchill's call to blood and toil
and sweat and tears. 2
Although it is probably true that most of those who respond-
ed to Winston Churchill's call were not "debauchees," there
can be no doubt that many of them were not wholly chaste.
Many of them also gambled and drank. But Devlin insists
that a "nation of debauchees"—like a nation of drunkards
and gamblers, but unlike a nation of celibates--would be so
"weak" as to collapse under "its own disease."-^
2Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 111.
3Ibid., pp. 106, Hl-13.
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What kinds of conduct lead to "tangible harm"? On
the one hand there is "unnatural vice," i.e., homosexuality
and the other so-called "crimes against nature" such as
sodomy and bestiality. On the other hand, "excessive immor-
ality" refers to "natural" acts, both sexual (e.g., fornica-
tion and adultery) and nonsexual (e.g., gambling and drink-
ing), which are not kept "within limits." Devlin does not
specify the "limits" beyond which "immoral" (yet "natural")
conduct becomes "excessive," and precisely in what ways acts
of sexual "immorality"—be they "natural" or "unnatural"--
tend to "weaken" those who practice them. He also offers no
evidence to support the claim that, say, homosexuals are not
"useful members of society," or that their "weakness" will
spread to "infect" the rest of the population.
The habitual practice of certain sexual acts might
well lead to physical or psychological debilitation in much
the same way as does drug addiction or chronic alcoholism.
Conceivably, this or a similar hypothesis could be confirmed
or disconfirmed—if we had factual evidence one way or the
other. But, according to Glanville Williams, "£t]here is no
evidence that sexual immorality is physically debilitating,
or even that so-called sexual 'excess* is debilitating--and,
in any case, we have no legal or illegal institution more
.A
conducive to sexual activity than matrimony." This view is
Glanville Williams, "Authoritarian Morals and the
Criminal Law," Criminal Law Review (March I966), p. 138.
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corroborated by others.^
Devlin's claims regarding "tangible harm" have been
contradicted:
deLre^Sifa^Lr?^61!?1^ «^°ns of sexual
prStfnn III PP
a
J?
lead the vast majority of gen-
ISfiJ2 £ Seneratl°n into the depressingly normal
?he resu?t,
mSr H aSe family reari^' • For ano?^rt l s of departures from this normal pattern donot show unequivocal injury. o ^ a
If "excessive" indulgence in sex "weakens" a man, it presum-
ably does so whether he indulges himself with his wife or
with his mistress, or with another man, or with several
' persons—or only by himself. Like drug taking, drinking,
suicide, and abortion, certain sexual practices (e.g., for-
nication, adultery, and homosexuality) could create serious
social problems if they were widely and frequently indulged.
But so, too, could the practice of having either very large
families or none at all: both overpopulation and universal
contraception (or celibacy) can threaten society's survival.
Contrary to Devlin, activities which can have this effect are
not necessarily those which contravene a given society's
^See, e.g., Ronald Atkinson, Sexual Morality (London:
Hutchinson, I965J, PR. 1 4-0-^5; Gilbert Geis, Not the Law's
Business? An Examination of Homosexuality, Abortion, Prosti-
tution, Narcotics and Gambling in the United States
, Crime
and Delinquency Issues, A Monograph Series of the National
Institute of Mental Health (Washington, D.C.r U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1972), p. 25; and Charles Lister, "The Right
to Control the Use of One's Body," in The Rights of Ameri-
cans: What They Are--What They Should Be
, ed. Norman Dorsen
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), p. 352.
Ai R. Louch, "Sins and Crimes," Philosophy ^3
(January 1968): 47.
positive morality/ Devlin fails to show that conduct which
is generally considered "immoral" is for this reason likely
to result in injury to the individual or to society.
(b) Intangible harm
. Devlin's disintegration thesis
relies most heavily on the argument that society's survival
depends on the maintenance of common beliefs in its shared
moral code:
When considering intangible injury to society it is
moral belief that matters; immoral activity is relevant
only in so far as it promotes disbelief. . . . What is
important is not the quality of the creed but the
strength of the belief in it. The enemy of society is
not error but indifference.
. . . Why then is the lav/
used to guard existing moral beliefs? It is because an
old morality cannot be changed for a new morality as an
old coat for a new one. The old belief must be driven
out by disbelief ,°
Basil Mitchell, too, adopts this argument:
We do not know just how much cohesion is necessary for
a society to exist. Some degree of shared morality is
essential to this minimum of cohesion, and any weaken-
ing of moral belief may reduce it below this minimum;
hence we cannot bind ourselves not to use the law to
safeguard existing moral beliefs, no matter how peri-
pheral they may appear to be.
9
Accordingly, both Devlin and Mitchell must show that there
is a public interest in maintaining a like-thinking, as well
as a like-acting, community with respect to what is regarded
L. Ten, "Enforcing a Shared Morality," Ethics 82
(July 1972): 323.
8Devlin, p. 114.
9Basil Mitchell, Law, Morality,
_
and Religion \r. a
Secular Society (London: Oxford University Press, 196?),
p. 22 (emphasis added).
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as morally right and wrong.
Does conduct which is generally considered "immoral"
oppose the interests, not of individuals, but of the social
collectivity? Devlin appears to hold that there is such a
public interest: "The vast majority of people in this country
still believe that certain practices [viz., abortion, euthan-
asia, and homosexuality] are morally wrong and are content
that they should be forbidden by the law as such." 10 We have
seen (Ch. Ill, F) that Devlin no longer thinks that the
English public morally condemns homosexuality to the degree
necessary to justify its legal proscription. He is not so
certain about abortion, either:
I believe that a great many people nowadays do not
understand why abortion is wrong.
. . . Many people
regard abortion as the next step when by accident
birth-control has failed; and many more people are
deterred from abortion not because they think it sinful
or illegal but because of the difficulty which illegal-
ity puts in the way of obtaining it.il
Then the English public does not consider abortion morally
wrong to the extent that Devlin requires to justify inter-
ference by the criminal law. This is reflected in the
recent liberalization of England's law of abortion.
Regarding sexual conduct in particular, it is diffi-
cult to believe that a "vast majority of people" in England
consider certain practices both "immoral" and contrary to
the collective welfare. If they no longer so believe with
10
Devlin, p. 125.
11
Ibid., pp. 23-2^.
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respect to homosexuality (as Devlin now holds), one wonders
what private sexual practices by consenting adults are
popularly disapproved for these reasons. Since revocation
of the homosexuality statute in I967 virtually no private
sexual activity of consenting adults has been liable to
criminal punishment.
In the United States, however, numerous sexual prac-
tices continue to be legally proscribed. This is especially
true of homosexuality. It appears that here there exists a
deep core of popular feeling against homosexuality and the
abolition of state laws punishing its practice. In I969 the
Harris poll reported that 63 per cent of the American public
considered homosexuality harmful to society, and in the same
year a CBS-TV survey showed that "two out of three Americans
look on homosexuals with disgust, discomfort or fear, and
one out of ten regards them with outright hatred. A major-
ity considers homosexuality more dangerous to society than
12
abortion, adultery, or prostitution." Presumably, Ameri-
cans regard other so-called "crimes against nature" with
considerably less distaste.
Is it in the public interest of America to legislate
in accordance with popular feelings of moral disapprobation
respecting homosexual practices? Devlin's views suggest that
it is, and that therefore the state legislatures are justi-
12Geis, p. 38. Geis gives data for both the Harris
and CBS-TV surveys.
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fied in criminalizing homosexuality. His views also imply
that the legislatures of Illinois, Connecticut, and New York
were unjustified in their recent reforms of homosexuality
statutes. But a given public's feelings, particularly in
such a disputed area as sexual practices, are often based on
their beliefs as to matters of fact about which they are
either ignorant or misinformed. Is the belief of most Amer-
icans that homosexuality is harmful to their collective
welfare a rational one? According to Lister, "the prevail-
ing psychiatric evidence surely precludes any argument that
homosexual acts committed in private by consenting adults
threaten the rights, safety, or interests of others. In
!969 Modern Medicine reported that 67 per cent of nearly
twenty- eight thousand physicians sampled favor decriminali-
zation of homosexuality in light of evidence that the acti-
vity does not threaten either the health of the persons
1/1
directly concerned or the welfare interests of others.
Informed opinion therefore appears to contradict both popular
beliefs about the harmfulness of homosexuality and Devlin's
idea that what a public believes to be harmful actually is
productive of harm.
It is for this reason that Ronald Dworkin criticizes
Devlin for holding that any majoritarian belief, substantiat-
ed or not, can constitute an expression of public interest:
"^Lister, p. 352.
1
^See Geis, p. 39.
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A conscientious legislator who is told a moral con-sensus exists must test the credentials of that consen-
sus.
. . .
The claim that a moral consensus exists . .
,is based on an appeal to the legislator's sense of howhis community reacts to some disfavored practice. Butthis same sense includes an awareness of the grounds on
vmich that reaction is generally supported
. . . . Whatis shocking and wrong is not |_Devlin's| idea that the
community's morality counts, but his idea of what
counts as the community's morality. 1-5
Dworkin thinks that community reactions against homosexuality
are generally supported, not by moral principles, but by
mere prejudice, arbitrary rationalization, and personal
aversion. I agree with him that such grounds should not be
the basis of criminal legislation because they do not pro-
vide a rational assessment of public interest.
More important, in the United States the law does not
recognize (or is not supposed to recognize) unsubstantiated
fears and irrational hatreds as legitimate grounds for gov-
ernmental intervention. Thus, Lister holds that as a "well
established" principle of American constitutional law the
government is prohibited from extending its approval, pro-
tection, or sanction "to any such superstition or prejudice,
however widely held":
Whatever the force or propriety of Lord Devlin's propo-
sition elsewhere, it should be plain here that govern-
ment may not attach blame or deny benefits upon the
basis of arbitrary or irrational classifications. There
are no doubt homosexuals whose conduct warrants punish-
ment, . . . but nothing in the characteristics or con-
sequences of homosexuality itself renders punishable all
those who engage, or who have previously engaged, in
"^Ronald Dworkin, "Lord Devlin and the Enforcement
of Morals," The Yale Law Journal 75 (May I966): 1001 (empha-
sis added).
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homosexual acts. 1 ^
Apparently Lister thinks that criminal laws against homosex-
uality are based on "arbitrary and irrational classifica-
tions," and that as such their constitutionality can be
challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
equal protection of the laws. His authorities for this view
are, however, outside of the criminal law. 17 Because these
cases dealt with indiscriminate and arbitrary actions by
public officials in civil matters, it is by no means clear
that their prohibition of such actions can also be applied
to legislative determinations of what kinds of conduct are
criminal. If they could be, the laws against polygamy would
have been struck down as unconstitutional long ago.
Can the constitutionality of criminal statutes out-
lawing homosexuality be questioned in the judicial arena by
appeal to the principle that governmental officers (in this
case, legislators) are prohibited from depriving a citizen
or a class of citizens of equal protection of the laws by
means of an arbitrary and indiscriminate classification of
criminal conduct? I suppose that they can be, although to
my knowledge they have not been. Recent decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court have applied the principle to state cri-
minal statutes prohibiting inter-racial marriage and distri-
1
^Lister, p. 353*
l7Wieman v. Updegraff, 3^ U.S. 183 (1952); Baxtrom
v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (I966); Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion, 391 u.s. 563 (1968).
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bution of contraceptives to unmarried persons: both Virginia's
miscegenation law18 and Massachusetts 's restriction on trade
in birth control devices 19 were found to violate equal pro-
tection of the laws for their use of "invidious discrimina-
tion" and "arbitrary classification." Such decisions point
to the dubious constitutional status of criminal laws pro-
hibiting homosexuality.
However, let us put these difficulties aside and
consider Devlin's claim that legal moralism is necessary to
preserve conventional moral beliefs. The question whether
failure of the criminal law to proscribe conduct which is
considered morally wrong will lead to the disintegration of
positive morality (and, hence, of society) can be treated as
two propositions which are capable, at least in principle,
of empirical testing.
The first may be rendered as follows: If any parti-
cular precept of a given society's positive morality loses
the support of popular convictions, then the whole of that
moral code will lose popular support or at least will not
be believed in so strongly. This is the view that all con-
ventional moral beliefs are equally important to the integ-
rity of the whole moral code "(and, hence, to the integrity
and cohesion of society), and that therefore a given society's
18Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (I967).
l9Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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positive morality is homogeneous, i.e., an indivisible whole
which stands or falls together. For instance, Stephen
Wexler subscribes to this view:
It should be almost self-evident that Devlin is vindica-ted m his contention that no one can predict whichtolerated immorality will finally break the back of the
old code. Moral codes are not destroyed in great
strokes; they are, rather, "littled away." 20
The truth of this proposition is surely not "self-evident."
Nor is it likely that moral codes are "destroyed" rather than
altered or perhaps replaced by some other. We cannot con-
clude with Wexler and Devlin that every "immoral" act is
equally responsible for "breaking the back" of society's
positive morality.
Devlin's and Wexler' s conclusion is predicated on
two assumptions. The first posits the existence of a single
code of public morality in a given society. It ignores the
possibility of the presence of a plurality of moral codes.
As Robert Summers indicates, here Devlin appeals to the
"entering wedge" argument: repeal of one law proscribing
21
"immoral" conduct implies the repeal of all. Thus, Devlin
claims that if laws against homosexuality were repealed,
then laws proscribing euthanasia, suicide, duelling, abor-
tion, and incest between brother and sister would also have
?0Stephen Wexler, review of Law, Morality, and Reli-
gion in a Secular Society , by Basil Mitchell, in New York
University Law Review ^3 (December 1968): 1290.
2lRobert S. Summers, review of Law, Liberty, and
Morality
,
by H. L. A. Hart, in New York University Law Re-
view 38 (December I963): 1206.
U3
to be repealed, and the combined impact of these repeals on
the moral code would be more than it could bear. 22 Here
also Devlin assumes, according to Hart, that "all morality-
sexual morality together with the morality that forbids acts
injurious to others such as killing, stealing, and dishon-
esty-forms a single seamless web, so that those who deviate
from any part are likely or perhaps bound to deviate from
the whole." 23 Devlin takes up this criticism:
Most men take their morality as a whole and in factaenve it, though this is irrelevant, from some relig-ious doctrine. To destroy the belief in one part of it
will probably result in weakening the belief in the
whole. Professor Hart says that to argue in this wayis to treat morality as if it 'forms a single seamless
web which he finds unconvincing. Seamlessness pressesthe simile rather hard but, apart from that, I should
say that for most people morality is a web. of beliefs
rather than a number of unconnected ones. 2^
Beliefs "connected" how and by what Devlin does not say, but
connected as in a "web" nevertheless—without even so much
as an attempt to give reasons why this view is not "uncon-
vincing." Devlin certainly gives the impression that, as
Mitchell puts it, "all moral beliefs contribute equally to
the stability of society." 2 -^
The second assumption is that, granted the presence
of a single conventional moral code, the precepts of that
^Devlin, pp. 7, 139.
23
-^H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (London:
Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 51.
"^Devlin, p. 115.
2
^Mitchell, p. 25.
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code can be known to reflect a "consensus of opinion on moral
issues
.
. .
without any type of social enqiry." 26 Devlin
seems to think that we can know precisely what moral precepts
are supported by popular beliefs without expending any
special effort to determine which they might be. But today,
it would appear, an attempt to learn by means of social
science research methods the contents of a society's positive
morality would reveal that the first assumption regarding
webs of connected beliefs is unfounded. 27
As Hart puts it, "it would be sociologically naive
to assume that these conditions [of moral consensus] obtain
in contemporary England at least as far as sexual morality
is concerned." Even Mitchell acknowledges this:
In fact most individuals are not wholly consistent in
their^ morality, which they have derived from diverse and
sometimes incompatible sources. Certainly those critics
of Lord Devlin are right who accuse him of exaggerating
the homogeneity of modern British society. 29
One serious problem with Devlin's view is its assumption of
a moral consensus "in a differentiated society composed of
p/
T. G. Ison, "The Enforcement of Morals," University
of British Columbia Law Review 3 (March 1967):268.
27See Julius Cohen, et al., "Ascertaining the Moral
Sense of the Community," Journal of Legal Education 8, no. 2
(1955)5 137-^9; Idem, Parental Authority: The Community and
the Law (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958)
and Edwin M. Schur, Law and Society: A Sociological View
(New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 177-82.
28
Hart, p. 63. See also Ison, p„ 265; and C. L. Ten,
"Crime and Immorality," The Modern Law Review 32 (November
1969): 662.
29Mitchell, p. 108.
1^5
groups having primary identification along ethnic, religious,
racial, educational, occupational, and status lines." 30
These are divisive factors which in modern societies "often
produce widely opposing definitions of goodness, truth, and
moral virtue." 31 Besides, it can be argued that government
efforts to criminalize deviant conduct in general and "immor-
al" practices in particular are least likely to occur when a
moral consensus exists. If social practice reflects positive
morality, legal enforcement is unnecessary; if it does not,
enforcement might be impractical because people no longer
live by and perhaps no longer believe in the old morality.
Contrary to Devlin, a policy of legal moralism is most prob-
able, yet just as unnecessary to social cohesion, when posi-
tive morality is indeterminate or when a moral consensus is
unattainable.
A testable hypothesis consistent with the tenor of
Devlin's disintegration thesis is still possible. Consider
this version: If any precept of a given society's positive
morality undergoes change such that most people no longer
believe in it or no longer believe so strongly, then other
moral standards (both sexual and nonsexual) will undergo
J Jerome H. Skolnick, "Coercion to Virtue: The
Enforcement of Morals," Southern California Law Review kl
(Spring 1968): 606.
3lJoseph R. Gusfield, "On Legislating Morals: The
Symbolic Process of Designating Deviance," California Law
Review 56 (January 1968): 56.
32See Ibid., p. 73; and Louch, p. kk.
146
change as well. That is, moral permissiveness with respect
to sexual practices is supposed to lead to general lapses in
all kinds of moral restraints and to the eventual abandon-
ment and replacement of fundamental social institutions.
Thus, Mitchell holds that "in a society which gave
its blessing equally to every variety of sexual relationship,
marriage as we know it could not survive. As an option it
would be no longer available." 33 He gives no evidence in
support of this claim, and it is defective in at least two
ways. First, "marriage as we know it" is and always has
been an institution in which the rules are either openly or
secretly broken by a substantial number of those who are
supposed to be living by them. Divorce and remarriage rates
suggest that for many today the normal pattern is one of
successive marriages
—
perhaps a new form of "polygamy."
Second, in modern pluralistic societies there exist sub-
cultures in which a great variety of sexual relationships,
including monogamous marriage for those who want it, are
both available and generally acceptable; yet these societies
and the institution of marriage survive.
In my view, evidence in support of this kind of
hypothesis must show that changes in popular beliefs about
sexual morality lead to measurable increases in anti-social
conduct such as serious crime. The breakdown of a common
sexual morality may result either in increased general per-
33Mitchell, p. 101.
Ik7
missiveness or in moral diversity, both of which are supposed
to affect moral beliefs about nonsexual conduct such as
violence, theft, and di qbnnpq+v 34 n„ . .i au a sno esty. Do increases m physical
assault, fraud, and disrespect for property result from
"moral laxity"? Does moral diversity lead to the destruction
of those minimal forms of restraint which are essential for
social cohesion? Since neither alternative is obviously
true factual data are required either to substantiate or to
falsify them. However, social scientists have not supplied
the evidence necessary to affirm the hypothesis that the
minimum requisites of social interaction would be lost in a
community which "gave its blessing equally to every variety
of sexual relationship." In any event, we know so little
about the supposed deterrent effects of the threat of legal
punishment that there are no factual grounds to support
Devlin's and Mitchell's expectation that a governmental pol-
icy of legal moralism will prevent either those activities
which are disapproved or a breakdown of the moral consensus
itself. 35
There is a second hypothesis underlying Devlin's
disintegration thesis: If the precepts of a given society's
positive morality are not enforced by the criminal law, then
34J See H. L. A. Hart, "Social Solidarity and the
Enforcement of Morality," The University of Chicago Law Re-
view 35 (Autumn I967) : 12-13.
-^Johannes Andenaes, "The General Preventive Effects
of Punishment," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 114
(May 1966): 953, 964-66.
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they will lose the support of popular convictions. In
Devlin's words, "relaxation [of the law] is thought to imply
3 6approval." Hart calls this assumption the "condemn or
condone" theory: what the law does not explicitly condemn
by prohibition it implicitly condones by giving the appear-
ance of official approval. 37 It is also called the "declar-
atory" theory because it attributes to the criminal law "the
function of telling members of a society what is regarded as
undesirable conduct, and so of influencing their moral atti-
tudes to certain types of behaviour." 38 On this view, irre-
spective of whether a legal prohibition operates as a deter-
rent to disapproved conduct, "to repeal it would give the
impression that the conduct in question is no longer regard-
ed by society as morally wrong.
"
3^
Evidence in support of this hypothesis must show
that precepts of positive morality which are no longer en-
forced by the criminal law are also no longer believed in
by the general public. But Devlin brings no factual data to
bear on this claim. To Hart it "seems fantastic" that an
3 Devlin, p.. 99. See also Robert F. Drinan, Demo-
cracy, Dissent, and Disorder: The Issues and the Law (New
York: Seabury Press, 1969), p. 14.
37H. L. A. Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law
(Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1964), p. 39.
38Nigel Walker, "Morality and the Criminal Law,"
The Howard Journal 11, no. 3 (1964): 213.
3
^Nigel Walker and Michael Argyle, "Does the Law
Affect Moral Judgments?" British Journal of Criminology 4
(October 1964): 570.
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"overwhelming moral majority would or even could change
heart morally and shed these deep instinctive feelings" if
the penal law did not reflect their moral views. 210 Hart is
surely right in thinking that most people cannot be made to
want a homosexual experience. The absence of laws against
heterosexuality does not induce homosexuals to desire that
condition; so, too, the repeal of laws against homosexuality
is unlikely to result in a flight into the practice-unless
one believes that homosexuality is objectively preferable
but generally avoided only out of fear of legal punishment.^1
Without any evidence it is difficult to accept Devlin's
42
argument
.
In the early 1960s efforts were made by criminolo-
gists at the University of Oxford to test the declaratory
theory of the criminal law. The Suicide Act of 1961 repeal-
ed the offense of attempted suicide, and a sample survey of
public attitudes toward the morality of attempted suicide
revealed no relationship between moral beliefs and knowledge
of change in the law. Among those who knew the law had been
changed there was just as large a majority who thought sui-
40Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
, pp. 67-68.
41
Geis, pp. 49-50. See also Herbert L. Packer, The
Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press, I968), p. 302.
42One study shows that predictions of doom have
always accompanied social reforms, but that the predictions
do not materialize after reform takes place. See E. S.
Turner, Roads to Ruin (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, I966).
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cide to be morally wrong as there was among those who did
not know about the legal reform. The report's summary con-
cludes: "These results cast considerable doubt on the 'de-
claratory* argument that alterations of the criminal law are
likely to weaken moral attitudes."^3 In other words, the
little evidence we do have (concerning a nonsexual act at
that) goes against Devlin's assumption that reforming the
criminal law will make a difference to the moral convictions
of the public. If removal of the criminal sanction with
respect to suicide does- not affect either popular moral
judgments or the number of those who want to kill themselves,
decriminalization of homosexuality is scarcely more likely
to make that sexual disposition more attractive and to con-
vert heterosexuals into homosexuals.
Further research by the Oxford group concludes that
it is not the defining of conduct as legal or illegal but
the consensual moral opinion of one's peer group which is
primarily determinative of a person's own moral views.
^
Once again, mere repeal of a criminal statute is unlikely to
alter the views of many as to the morality of the activity
in question. It is said that it does not pay much of a com-
^Walker and Argyle, p. 579
•
^See Rupert Cross, "Unmaking Criminal Laws," Mel-
bourne University Law Review 3 (November I962): 422.
^Leonard Berkowitz and Nigel Walker, "Laws and
Moral Judgments," Sociometry 30 (December I967) 421. See
also Walker, pp. 213-14.
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pliment to a statute to hold that it is not unconstitutional;
likewise, it does not express much approval of an activity
to say that it is not criminal.^6
The question still remains whether enforcing a posi-
tive morality will do much to preserve it. Devlin apparently
thinks that traditional moral beliefs can he preserved and
strengthened by means of penal legislation and enforcement.
As we shall see, Hart argues convincingly against this view.
Devlin himself seems to be of two minds about this assump-
tion, for much of what he says suggests that "even in his
view the law is carried by the 'public morality 1 in these
matters rather than the 'public morality 1 being buttressed
by the law." But the relationship cannot be reciprocal:
the criminal law punishes deeds rather than thoughts,
beliefs, and convictions. In this sense the legal enforce-
ment of positive morality is impossible.
(c) The delegate role of legislators . A third
factual assumption concerns how the legislator determines a
society's positive morality. Answering the question 'How
does the law-maker ascertain the moral principles that are
accepted by the society to which he belongs?' Devlin says:
He is concerned only with the fundament that is surely
accepted, for legal sanctions are inappropriate for the
enforcement of moral standards that are in dispute. He
^Packer, p. 30k.
^Brian Barry, Political Argument (New York: Humani-
ties Press, 1965). P. 310.
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does not therefore need the assistance of moral philos-
ophers nor does he have to study the arguments uponperipheral questions. He is concerned with what is
acceptable to the ordinary man, the man in the jurybox, who might also be called the reasonable man or the
rightmmded man. 48
Accordingly, moral populism assumes that in their decision
making legislators will act as delegates of the majority
which will make its moral beliefs unequivocally known, and
that judges will defer to the moral convictions of "the man
in the jury box."
This raises grave difficulties: How does the legis-
lator know what moral beliefs are "surely accepted," i.e.,
not in dispute? With respect to sexual morality, is there
any undisputed belief? Suppose that a popular majority no
longer believes in accordance with certain criminal laws:
Is it realistic to suppose that the legislature will perforce
follow the new convictions of the public?
First, it is apparent that there is no item of sex-
ual morality which is not in dispute. Even if those in gov-
ernment were to consider it desirable to enforce such pre-
cepts, they would probably find none which is "surely
accepted" as Devlin requires. Second, there is ample evi-
dence to conclude that in their decision making legislators
49
do not necessarily act as delegates of their constituencies.
Empirical studies by political scientists who have inquired
48Devlin, p. 90; see also pp. 15-16.
^Summers, p. 1212.
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into legislative behavior contradict the view that represen-
tatives always possess an accurate knowledge of their con-
stituents' preferences regarding salient political issues
(let alone their moral beliefs about sexual practices), and
affirm that their policy decisions are for the most part
taken independently of their perceptions of what the consti-
tuents prefer. 50 Third, juries decide the "facts," whereas
judges decide the "law." The moral beliefs of "the man in
the jury box" might affect the outcomes of trials, e.g., by
determining whether defendants are innocent or guilty, but
they have nothing to do with either the framing of criminal
statutes or the determination of which laws apply to a par-
ticular criminal case. It is more likely, however, that
Devlin's "right-minded" and "reasonable" man is, like "the
man in the jury box," merely a projection of the judge's own
morality or that of the social class from which he belongs. 51
Finally, despite recent reforms of England's law of suicide,
homosexuality, and abortion, the repeal or even the modifi-
cation of criminal statutes is most difficult. 52 In any
5
°The literature is too extensive to cite here; see
Heinz Eulau, "Changing Views of Representation," in Contem-
porary Political Science; Toward Empirical Theory
, ed.
Ithiel de Sola Pool (New York: McGraw-Hill, 19 6?) , pp. 53-
85» especially the footnoted works of Eulau et al., and
Miller and Stokes.
^1J Barbara Wootton, Crime and the Criminal Law (Lon-
don: Stevens and Sons, 1963)1 P- ^2. Cf. Gerald Abrahams,
Morality and the Law (London: Calder & Boyars, 1971) 1 p. 83.
52Hart, The Morality of the Criminal Law , pp. 4-2-^9.
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case, it is far from obvious that whatever success reformers
have enjoyed has been due either exclusively or primarily to
the pressures of public opinion.^
At one point Devlin recognizes the possibility that
there may exist "many other factors" besides moral populism
which "give the legislator a wide discretion in determining
how far he will go in the direction of the law as he thinks
it ought to be. Now this is most probably the case, but
it is surely inconsistent with Devlin's claim that the leg-
islator's "mandate" is to enact statutes in accordance with
the majority's moral beliefs and "not to reconstruct them
according to his own ideas. If the law-maker is "right-
minded" and "reasonable" (as he presumably is), then are not
"his own ideas" already in conformity to his society's posi-
tive morality? So it would seem if for even "ordinary men"
a moral consensus is commonplace. But then there is no need
to insist that legislators act as delegates.^
Not only does Devlin acknowledge that legislators
exercise discretion, but he also admits
—
quite realistically
—that democratic methods favor the influence of educated
^Cross, pp. ^15-16.
-^Devlin, p. 95 (emphasis added).
^Ibid., p. 90.
-^F. W. M. McElrea, "The Legal Enforcement of Non-
Utilitarian Morality," Otago Law Review 1 (July I967): 203,
206-07; and Peter Winch, review of The Enforcement of Morals ,
by Patrick Devlin, in The Sociological Review , n.s., 13
(July 1965): 21^.
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persons (as opposed to "ordinary men") on public policies.
Prospects for success in influencing both public opinion and
government officials are greater for those who are better
educated, hence "the educated man is at an advantage in a
democratic society." Thus, Devlin concedes that in a
representative (as opposed to a direct) democracy
. .
well-informed and articulate men can play a partm shaping the law quite disproportionate to their
numbers. Under a system in which no single question is
submitted to the electorate for direct decision, an
ardent minority for or against a particular measure may
often count for more than an apathetic majority. 57
Normally, then, educated opinions will prevail. In my view,
this implies that the realization of a system of criminal
law determined by moral populism is an impracticable goal.
If it is unrealistic and recognized as such, why does Devlin
advocate that penal legislation follow the moral beliefs of
the majority? There appears to be no reason other than a
personal value commitment, ultimately, to the principle of
moral populism.
2. The nature of man . Devlin's theory of moral populism
also assumes that men have equal ability to judge the moral
rightness and wrongness of conduct:
As men of reason are all men equal? If they are, if
every man has equivalent power of reasoning and strength
-^Devlin, pp. 95-96. For a summary of political
science findings which correlate degree of education with
extent of political activity, see Lester W. Milbrath, Poli-
tical Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in
Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).
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lL+\nd t° subdue the baser faculties of feeling and
ma?^er
n
for ?r CMl ? e ™ ^H^n to mo raliiy being att t the popular vote. 58 s
Notice Devlin's ambivalence with respect to "feeling",
earlier he treated the feelings of "intolerance, indignation,
and disgust" as synonymous with the moral beliefs of "reason-
able" men, but here "feeling," like "emotion," is contrasted
with the "reasoning" power and termed a "baser faculty." 59
Devlin dismisses the objections of those (the "intel-
lectual oligarchy") who teach the superiority of critical
morality reached by "trained" (i.e. educated) minds. He
thinks there can be no defensible objection to public moral-
ity being determined by "the popular vote," and he holds that
men are indeed equal in their ability to "reason": "Not that
all men are born with equal brains—we cannot believe that;
but that they have at their command—and that in this they
are all born in the same degree—the faculty of telling
right from wrong." 60 Apparently Devlin thinks that because
men sometimes hold similar views on some moral questions
they are therefore equally endowed with "moral reason." We
shall see (in Ch. V, A, 2) that it is questionable whether
there is such a thing as moral reason.
58Ibid., p. 93.
59His 1965 "Preface" (Ibid., pp. viii-ix) fails to
resolve this discrepancy; rather, he reiterates his view
that "intensity of feeling" justifies the legal enforcement
of collective moral judgments.
60
Ibid., p. 100.
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The mere existence of a positive morality appears to
indicate to Devlin that all men are equal as to their
"reasoned" contributions to it. But the presence of a moral
consensus is no indicator of the equality of each indivi-
dual's reasonings or feelings about what is right or wrong.
For most men, "reason" as it is usually understood may not
be employed at all. The process of socialization is one of
"education"— a learning experience involving the inculcation
and (mostly uncritical) acceptance of a shared moral code.
Devlin himself recognizes this: "The pressure of opinion
that in the end makes and unmakes laws is ... in the
hearts of those who continue without much reflection to
believe most of what they learnt from their fathers and to
teach their children likewise." Then men are equally
endowed, not with reason in the ordinary sense, but with a
capacity to learn from family, church, and peers those moral
convictions which one is expected to uphold. But if the
positive morality which Devlin entitles to legal enforcement
is comprised only of strongly held feelings, it is most dif-
ficult to see what role reason plays in their formation.
Devlin assumes that men are equal in yet another
respect: despite their equal ability to distinguish right
from wrong, men are also equally prone to temptation.
6l
Ibid., p. 126.
Devlin himself once held (Ibid., p. 15) that his
reasonable man "is not expected to reason about anything and
his judgment may be largely a matter of feeling."
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Contrary to Socrates, virtue is not- knowledge: to know what
is morally right and wrong is not necessarily to act accord-
ingly. Thus, Devlin remarks that "All sexual immorality
involves the exploitation of human weaknesses. The prosti-
tute exploits the lust of her customers and the customer the
moral weakness of the prostitute." 63 Like St. Augustine's
dictum that all men are sinful or concupiscent, Devlin
implies that all men are lustful, i.e., are at times incap-
able of controlling their sexual appetites. He also implies
that sexual passion clouds judgment to the extent that a
person cannot, or is unwilling to, foresee the harm he can
cause and the guilt to be endured after succumbing to temp-
xaxion. In my view, Devlin is here describing no more
than the obvious: all men are capable of engaging in sexual
practices which are contrary to society's or to someone's
(even their own) moral standards. But this is in itself
insufficient to make a case for the criminal law having to
protect both the individual and society. Moreover, to speak
in terms of "weakness," "lust," and "exploitation" is surely
to express the argument pejoratively from the standpoint of
one's own value system.
Devlin evidently believes that men are "reasonable"
and "right-minded" enough, and sufficiently conscious of
6
^Ibid., p. 12. See also J. N. D. Anderson, Moral-
ity, Law and Grace (London: Tyndale Press, 1972), p. 72.
6/|
See Louch, pp. kZ-kJ,
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their sexual "weaknesses," to prefer that conventional sex-
ual morality be enacted into criminal law, their motive pre-
sumably being protection from self-harm. Like the alcoholic
who has the bottle locked away, Devlin's "ordinary man" is
presumed to desire morals legislation to protect himself
from his own "weakness." The cynic might reply that such
laws are generally unenforced because people want to continue
their sexual practices, but are unrepealed because they want
to preserve their morals. But, in the United States at
least, most morals legislation goes unenforced precisely
because it lacks popular support. 6 -^
B. Hart's Factual Assumptions
Hart, too, offers theories about the nature of
society and mankind.
1. The nature of political society . Hart rejects Devlin's
claim that "a society is identical with its morality as it
is in any given moment of its history, so that a change in
its morality is tantamount to the destruction of society,"
but he accepts the proposition that " some shared morality
66is essential to the existence of any society." Hart main-
tains that it is important to discriminate between those
^Ralph Slovenko, "Sex Mores and the Enforcement of
the Law on Sex Crimes: A Study of the Status Quo," Univer-
sity of Kansas Law Review 15 (March 1967): 2?0-71. See
also Schur, p. 132.
66
Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , p. 51
.
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parts of a society's positive morality (if there is only one
moral code) which are essential to its existence and those
which are not. 6 ? Hence he holds that there is a minimum set
of consensual moral rules which is necessary for any commun-
ity of men to exist and to survive.
The minimal moral rules of every society are char-
acterized by Hart in terms of "such universal values as
individual freedom, safety of life, and protection from
deliberately inflicted harm." 68 But on a narrow interpreta-
tion of this claim it is surely false: life, liberty, and
security from harm are not universally valued; if they were,
there would be no capital punishment, slavery, or wars of
national liberation. Broadly construed, however, it is true
that everyone wants government to restrict violent acts
against some, but not necessarily all, people. This inter-
pretation is probably closer to Hart's intent, for he claims
that these universal values are provided only "in some
degree" (and presumably only for some persons) by all social
69moralities. But this view also can be criticized, as we
shall see.
Not only are Hart's "universal values" required for
the survival of any society, but also "some measure of these
6
?Hart, "Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of
Morality," p. 8. See also Dworkin, pp. 990-92.
68
Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
, p. 70.
69ibid.
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universal values" can be secured for some individual citizens
only if a social community survives. 70 Political society is
therefore likened to a voluntary association formed to
achieve certain benefits for at least some of its members—
in this case, security of life, liberty, and property. With-
out rules restricting to some degree "the use of violence in
killing or inflicting bodily harm," without some "system of
mutual forbearance and compromise," and without rules requir-
ing respect for "some minimal form of the institution of
property," Hart says that "laws and morals could not forward
the minimum purpose of survival which men have in associat-
ing with each other." 7 Thus, Hart apparently thinks that
those values which are to some degree common to all societies
are also noncontroversial
. That is, they are undisputed and
indisputably universal values.
However, as Mitchell points out, "reliance on non-
controversial 'universal values' is not enough" for two
reasons. First, "whereas such principles as the sanctity of
life are, abstractly considered, not controversial, their
72
application is often controversial." For example, abortion
and euthanasia are disputed issues even among persons who
7
°Ibid.
71H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, I96I), pp. 189-92. Ernest Nagel ("The En-
forcement of Morals," Humanist 28 [May-June I968]: 2*0
presents an argument similar to Hart's.
72Mitchell, pp. 119-20.
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are committed to the protection of human life; moreover, if
the preservation of life were thought to be of overriding
importance, wars to defend national independence would be
abandoned altogether. In these cases people differ over the
extent to which they are prepared to subordinate other goals
(e.g., relief from pain, personal convenience, national
autonomy) to the preservation of life, and the same is true
of liberty and property. Second, "although 'universal
values' are necessary for the existence of any society, they
are not sufficient for the regulation of any particular
i 73society." For example, the precise form of social insti-
tutions (which are to some extent necessary to every society)
is variable from one community to another. Even in those
societies in which, say, monogamy is securely established,
there are many controversial issues about it and the sexual
morality connected with it. The same is true of economic
institutions built on the notion of private property. Thus,
while we might agree with Hart that certain values must be
secured to some degree and for some people in order that a
social community may exist, Mitchell is correct in holding
that controversy attends their implementation and the parti-
cular ways in which they are practiced.
Hart's "viable society" is therefore a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition for insuring the protection of
73Ibid., p. 120.
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life, liberty, and property for some persons, let alone fo
all. Hart himself acknowledges that "though a society to b
viable must offer some of its members a system of mutual
forbearances, it need not, unfortunately, offer them to
rt 7^all." Again, he says:
The diminution of human misery at least for some, themaking of some human lives less nasty, less brutish andless short, is a common concern of all legal systemsana ail moral codes however much they differ in other
respects and however barbarous, unequal and repressivem those other respects they may be. 75
As Oppenheim observes, "there have been stable and enduring
social systems which considered the lives of slaves expend-
able or the survival of the economically weak of no public
76
concern." Hart's "universal values" therefore require
that any society, in order to survive, have rules which pro-
tect the life, liberty, and property of only some of its
members. I agree with Oppenheim* s comment: "This is indeed
a minimum requirement, so minimal that every social system
satisfies it, from the most egalitarian to the most hierarch-
ical. Only anarchy would violate this condition, and anarchy
by definition, does not constitute a social system. "^
This shows that the "universal values" required for
the survival of any social order per se do not tell us any-
7Z1
; Hart, The Concept of Law , p. I96.
7^
r
-^H. L. A. Hart, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal
Law," The Lawyer 8, nos. 2 & 3 (19&5)'- ^9.
77,
' Oppenheim, p. 106.
Ibid., p. 107.
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thing about its particular excellences or deficiencies (e.g.
the peculiarities of its public morality); nor do they pro-
vide information with respect to the policies of its govern-
mental regime (e.g., egalitarian! sm vs. elitism) or its per-
vasive pattern of institutionalized behavior (e.g., monogamy
vs. polygamy, capitalism vs. socialism, demo'cracy vs 0 auto-
cracy). So long as the "universal values" are secured to
insure the maintenance of social order, Hart says that the
community can tolerate controversies over the desirability
of alternative social institutions, governmental policies,
and—of course— sexual practices: "[T]hough these essential
universal values must be secured, society can not only
survive individual divergencies in other fields from its
prevalent morality, but benefit from them."'78 Disputes over
such issues are therefore not only normal and to be expected
but they also bring about social benefits rather than evils.
Contrary to Devlin, Hart holds that "there is again
no evidence to support, and much to refute, the theory that
those who deviate from conventional sexual morality are in
79
other ways hostile to society."' 7 He claims that "we have
ample evidence for believing that people will not abandon
morality, will not think any better of murder, cruelty, and
dishonesty, merely because some private sexual practice
Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , p. 71 •
Ibid., p. 51-
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which they abominate is not punished by the law." 80 Again,
he thinks there is "much evidence from contemporary societies
of Europe and from the past" to falsify the belief that "a
failure to enforce by law a society's accepted sexual moral-
ity is likely to lead to the destruction of all morality and
so jeopardise the existence of society." 81 Unfortunately,
Hart merely asserts that there is evidence which contradicts
Devlin's factual assumptions; nowhere does he cite his refer-
ences on this important point. Presumably he thinks that
the stability and survival of those European countries where
homosexuality is not punishable by law is ample evidence.
As we have seen, however, although Hart himself does not
document it, there is evidence to support his assertions.
Thus, in Nagel's estimation, "neither logic nor history
appears to support the supposition that the violation of any
specific moral standards prescribed by public morality may
threaten the life of a social order." 82
Contrary to Devlin, Hart holds that the breakdown of
a conventional sexual morality could have two consequences:
either permissiveness and widespread tolerance, or moral
diversity in place of a single positive morality. Rather
8 0
H. L. A. Hart, "Immorality and Treason," in The
Law as Literature, ed. Louis Blom-Cooper (London: The Bodley
Head, 1961), p. 225.
81
Hart, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," p.
51.
82Nagel, p. 2k.
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than conclude that either consequence would lead to lapses
of other moral and legal restraints, Hart thinks it just as
plausible that permissiveness in sexual matters would make
it easier for everyone to submit to legal restraints on
violence and other anti-social conduct, and that a multipli-
city of different sexual moralities would coexist in harmony
and mutual tolerance: "[o]ver wide areas of modern life,
sometimes hiding behind lip service to an older common mor-
ality, there actually are divergent moralities living in
peace.'* 83
Like Mill, Hart is convinced that it is not the un-
hindered practice of sexual "perversions" but the free dis-
cussion of sexual morals, informed by the discoveries of
anthropology and psychology, which divides public opinion,
challenges the certainty of popular convictions, and fosters
moral heterogeneity: "The real solvent of social morality
... is not the failure of the law to endorse its restric-
tions with legal punishment, but free critical discussion."
In fact, moral beliefs cannot be enforced by law, for the
law punishes deeds rather than thoughts. The law can proffer
little protection against the ideas which attack orthodox
beliefs. This is why Hart's charge that a governmental pol-
icy of legal moralism would "freeze into immobility the mor-
3Hart, "Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of
Morality," p. 13 . See also Idem, The Morality of the Crimi-
nal Law, pp. 40-41.
84Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality , p. 68.
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ality dominant at a particular time, in a society's existence-
is itself an unpersuasive argument. 85 If 'morality' means
popular moral beliefs about right and wrong, the law itself
cannot effect either a "freeze" or a "thaw."
However homogeneous and generally accepted sexual
moral codes might once have been, Hart suggests that scien-
tific discoveries about sexual conduct and increased candor
in public discussions of sexual morals have in contemporary
times made it possible for diverse moral views to be both
advocated and practiced. Contrary to Devlin, whose concep-
tion of 'society 1 more adequately describes voluntary groups
rather than involuntary political communities, tolerance of
moral diversity is itself a necessary rule for the harmonious
86functioning of society. Indeed, with the advent of a
plurality of sexual moralities, toleration of them becomes
universally valued as a condition of society's survival;
hence some degree of mutual tolerance and peaceful accommoda-
tion of differences is essential to the existence of a
modern pluralistic society.
Devlin's supporters resist this contention: e.g 0
,
Mitchell believes that "the Christian attitude to sex has a
good deal more coherence than is suggested by Professor
8%bid., p. 72.
86
Case Hoogendoorn, "On the Legal Enforcement of
Morals," The Christian Lawyer k (Winter 1972): 17; and
Glenn Negley, Political Authority and Moral Judgment (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965) » p. 64.
esev-
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Hart's expression 'variable tastes and conventions'." He
concludes that "in the present confused situation
. . . there
is no single alternative which commands anything like th
same degree of support [as the Christian view]." 8 ? But
eral Christian organizations, both in England and in th
United States, have called for the decriminalization of homo-
sexuality and prostitution. Catholics and Protestants-and
the various sects of Protestantism itself—are notorious for
their differences over sexual morality, e.g., respecting
artificial insemination, sterilization, contraception, per-
missible coital acts within marriage, and divorce and remar-
riage. Therefore I agree with Hart, against Mitchell, that
an attitude of tolerance toward these conflicting views,
even among Christians, is necessary to the maintenance of
orderly social relations in pluralistic societies. And
against both Mitchell and Devlin, I agree with Hart's basic
point: the cohesion of society does not require morals
legislation.
2. The nature of man . Hart, too, thinks that mankind is
characterized by a basic equality, but not in Devlin's sense
of equal "reason." Rather, Hart holds that, while men differ
in several respects (e.g., physical strength, agility, and
intellectual capacity), these differences are insignificant.
Hart's view of human nature is reminiscent of Thomas Hobbes's:
87Mitchell, p. 114.
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mind then eiK>th^
able HTJ6 bGtween man « and is not s^consTder-
any benef?? t°
n\ma^ ° an th^eupon claim to nimseSe
u he?§§ an°ther may not Pretend, as well
For both Hobbes and Hart, the significant characteristics of
mankind are that all men are equally vulnerable (to disease
and to bodily assault) and that all usually seek to go on
living, i.e., their goal is survival. Therefore Hart thinks
that "this fact of approximate equality, more than any other,
makes obvious the necessity for a system of mutual forbear-
ance and compromise." 89 This view of human nature is, of
course, the basis for Hart's contention that some minimal
rules or "universal values" are necessary for any community
of men to exist.
Men are also approximately equal, according to Hart,
in their capacity to feel pleasure and pain; they generally
seek the former (in pursuit of happiness and survival) and
avoid the latter (misery, suffering, and death). But depri-
vation of freedom can cause pain to the individuals whose
desires are thereby thwarted. This is why Hart holds that
criminal laws which prohibit and punish sexual practices
merely because they are generally considered morally wrong
88
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
, Everyman's Edition (New
York: E. P. Dutton, 1950), p. 101 (Ch. XIII).
89
'Hart, The Concept of Law
, p. 191.
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cause
"widespread misery and suffering." The individual's
sexual disposition (toward hetero-, homo-, or bisexuality)
is largely beyond his control, and continual frustration of
his "recurrent and insistent" sexual impulses can lead to a
life of unhappiness. In the absence of any evidence that
his sexual practices produce injury either to himself or to
others, there is no nonmoral reason for the criminal law to
interfere with them. 90
Mitchell disagrees with Hart's view that deprivation
of liberty causes pain:
It may be possible so to indoctrinate or conditionpeople that they do not find deprivation of libertypainful ^ but rather find it painful to be requiredto exercise choice. ... The horror of Brave New
world is that the people enjoy their degradation. 91
The burden of free choice has, no doubt, been felt by every-
one; and it is true that many may desire to forego responsi-
bility for a personal decision by leaving the choice to
another. But it is difficult to see how this constitutes a
meaningful objection to Hart's argument: a person's sexual
proclivity is hardly determined by personal choice. The
success rate for "cures" (through indoctrination or condi-
tioning?) of homosexuality, even for those who wish to be
heterosexual, is strikingly low. 92 One does not typically
90Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality
, pp. 20-22, 57-
60; and Idem, "The Use and Abuse of the Criminal Law," pp.
91Mitchell, p. 93.
92Bernard C. Glueck, Jr., "An Evaluation of the
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decide to be homosexual (or hetero- or bisexual); but it can
be a matter of choice whether a person indulges his sexual
inclinations
.
Mitchell's criticism is also unconvincing with
respect to the practice of (as opposed to the proclivity to)
sexual aberrance. Deciding whether or not to engage in "im-
moral" sexual conduct may be affected by the existence of
a law prohibiting it. A person may calculate that the risk
of detection and punishment is too great, and thus be deter-
red. But if the act is private and consensual, the risk will
be low and—given the recurrence and insistence of the sex-
ual impulse—the act will probably be undeterred. However,
few sexual practices are likely to be embarked upon, or
deterred, through such simple rational choice processes.^
Hence the irrelevance of the threat of punishment:
Homosexuality involves not so much a choice to act
wickedly as the seeking of normal sexual fulfillment
in abnormal ways (though not abnormal to the indivi-
dual) preferred by the individual for reasons deeply
rooted in his development as a personality. 94
Although a person may be legally unfree to engage in homo-
sexual relations, if he is disposed to do so and has the
Homosexual Offender," Minnesota Law Review kl (January 1957):
209; and Slovenko, p. 278. C. A. Tripp's new book ( The
Homosexual Matrix [New York: MacGraw-Hill
, 1975], p. 251)
states categorically: "There are no known 'cures' for homo-
sexuality, nor are any likely, since the phenomena which
comprise it are not illnesses in the first place."
93Schur, p. 131.
^Sanford H. Kadish, "The Crisis of Overcriminaliza-
tion," The Annals 37^ (November I967): 160-61.
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opportunity, he probably will indulge himself despite the
risk. Morals legislation seems peculiarly incapable of in-
hibiting the proscribed behavior while making everyone
officially unfree to practice it. Hart's point is that the
many who go undetected and unpunished are placed in fear of
the law for no justifiable purpose, and that-like the homo-
sexual who is deterred by fear-those who are not deterred
are nonetheless undergoing "misery and suffering" as a result
of their being officially unfree.
Again, I am in agreement with Hart's basic argument:
human survival and happiness, like the existence of a social
community, do not require a governmental policy of legal
moralism.
C. Conclusion
Contrasting Devlin's and Hart's factual assumptions,
Mitchell says that Hart thinks "there are certain moral
principles (which could, in principle, be listed) such that
any society, in order to survive, must recognize them,"
whereas Devlin holds "that any society, in order to exist,
i.e. in order to be a society at all, must have some shared
moral principles (though not any particular ones). "9-5 This
is, I think, correct with respect to Hart but only partly so
with respect to Devlin. The "particular" moral principles
which a society must share "in order to be a society at all"
chell, p. 22.
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are, according to Devlin, specifiable (not indeterminate, as
Mitchell seems to imply): they are the strongly held moral
convictions of the majority. This view makes 'society 1
synonymous with its positive morality, or at least with that
part of its moral consensus which is deeply felt. By defi-
nition, then, if these moral beliefs change, society "disin-
tegrates." But this necessary truth is not a factual claim.
On any reasonable interpretation of Devlin's disin-
tegration thesis as an empirical hypothesis, I have argued
that there is no reason to believe, and there are some
reasons not to believe, that a society's existence is threat-
ened by the failure of the penal law to enforce all of its
strong feelings of moral disapprobation. If and until
social science can provide evidence which substantiates
Devlin's factual assumptions, "supporters of the enforcement
of morality would do better to rest their case candidly on
the conservative rather than on the disintegration thesis.
That is, rather than relying on faulty factual assumptions,
Devlin could have made a more plausible argument for legal
moralism as a means to preserving traditional social insti-
tutions and the morality which accompanies them.
Yet even this view must face the question whether
the criminal law is both the effective and the appropriate
instrumentality by which to forestall change in social organ-
^Hart, "Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of
Morality," p 0 13-
1?4
ization and morality. In my view, it is not—and for the
same reasons as those given by Hart: (1) free critical dis-
cussion, not disuse of the criminal law, leads to change in
both beliefs and actions; (2) legal protection of social
institutions and positive morality for their own sakes can
create unwarranted deprivations of personal freedom and
welfare; and (3) mutual tolerance of differing points of
view and of change in the pattern of communal organization
is essential to the survival of pluralistic societies.
While penal legislation is a means to preserving a
social order, it does not follow that criminalization of
certain sexual (or gambling and drinking) practices is
necessary to insure society's survival. Moreover, it is
far from plain that a policy of legal moralism would success-
fully achieve the conservative goal of protecting existing
institutions and moral beliefs from alteration.
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CHAPTER V
METAETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The controversy between Devlin and Hart is concerned
primarily with normative issues and, secondarily, with fact-
ual assumptions, as we have seen. In contrast, metaethical
issues do not occupy a prominent place in the debate.
Rather, these philosophical issues are raised explicitly
only be Devlin, while Hart's views regarding them are merely
implicit. In order to determine the metaethical position of
each protagonist it is necessary to apply the categories
developed in recent analytic philosophy.
Analytic philosophy generally is concerned with the
critical analysis of descriptive and normative discourse.
Thus, philosophy of science has the goal of determining the
most fruitful means to reliable factual knowledge. This it
does, in part, not by making new factual discoveries, but
through explication of the central concepts and analysis of
the paradigms and theories used in science. Philosophy of
ethics is related to ethics as philosophy of science is to
science. It is concerned with the meaning of value words
(e.go, 'good 1 ) and moral terms (e.g., 'right 1 ) and with the
logic of normative discourse. This part of analytic philos-
ophy, which is also called metaethics to distinguish it from
normative ethics, does not propound moral principles but
,
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rather, develops theories about them— about their meaning,
function, and logical status.
Political metaethics consists of analytic theories
about the normative theories of politics. One important
issue of political metaethics, and of ethical philosophy in
general, concerns the possibility of justifying ultimate
principles of political ethics. These involve intrinsic
moral judgments (to the effect that some specified state of
affairs is desirable for its own sake), as distinguished
from extrinsic moral judgments (to the effect that some
course of action should be taken as a means to some given
end). The philosophical questions of whether and how intrin-
sic moral principles can be shown objectively to be true or
false, independently of anyone* s subjective preferences or
personal value commitments, make up the issue which will be
i
dealt with here.
Whether or not basic moral principles are objectively
valid depends on one's metaethical view. Is it possible to
demonstrate that certain fundamental principles of political
ethics are objectively true or false, valid or invalid?
Profound disagreements in metaethics are based on the answer.
An affirmative answer is supplied by the metaethical theory
of value-cognitivism; the negative answer, by value-noncog-
nitivi sm.
i
The analytic categories used m this chapter are
drawn from Felix E. Oppenheim, Moral Principles in Political
Philosophy (New York: Random House, I968).
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Value-noncognitivism is the metaethical theory which
holds that
Basic ethical principles have no cognitive status; they
cannot be known to be true or false because they are
not true or false; and they are neither true nor falsebecause they do not affirm or deny that something is
the case.^
Truth or falsity can be attributed only to statements which
are either analytic or empirically verifiable. Ethical
judgments are neither, and hence are not cognitive state-
ments; rather, they perform a different ("expressive,"
"directive," "prescriptive") function.
Against this view, value-cognitivism affirms the
cognitive status of basic ethical principles and holds that
their objective truth or falsity can be demonstrated:
The philosophy of value-cognitivism in politics
holds that certain political institutions and policies
have the objective quality of being either good or bad,
right or wrong; that there are objective criteria by
which to determine whether a given political system is
or is not good or right; that such normative principles
of political ethics can be known, just as one can know
descriptive laws of political behavior.
3
However, value- cognitivists differ in their replies to the
question: How does one go about the demonstration? On the
one hand, metaethical naturalism claims either that true
ethical principles can be derived (by inference) from true
descriptive generalizations, or that key ethical terms can
be defined by nonmoral descriptive expressions. On the
^Ibid., p. 2k.
^Ibid., pp. 21-22.
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other hand, metaethical intuition! sm holds that key ethical
terms (e.g., "good 1 ) refer to objective characteristics,
that such properties are "primitive," "simple," and "non-
natural" and cannot be defined any further, and that intrin-
sic moral judgments are true a priori, i.e., independently
of sense experience.
A. Devlin's Metaethical Views
We have seen that Devlin holds that a given society's
positive morality is objectively morally right, and that for
this reason (among others) it ought to be enforced by the
criminal law. For instance, Devlin says that "Real crimes
are sins with legal definitions. The criminal law is at its
best when it sticks closely to the content of the sin."^
That is, 'activity x is sinful' does not refer to Devlin's
subjective preferences; rather, there is an objective way of
determining that x is sinful, i.e., morally wrong. Thus,
the criminal law ought to punish conduct which is objectively
morally wrong. Similarly, Devlin asserts that "the law is
concerned with immorality as such. "-5 That is, penal legis-
lation proscribes conduct not merely because it is generally
thought to be immoral but also because it is objectively
wrong. As Basil Mitchell avers, both he and Devlin believe
k ,Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 27.
^Ibid., p. 11.
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that, with respect to sexual morality at least, "there is an
objective right and wrong." 6 In Devlin's lectures this argu-
ment makes use of value-cognitivist theories belonging to
both naturalism and intuitionism.
la Naturalism. According to Hart's report, some critical
responses to Devlin's first lecture held that he was guilty
of "fallacious reasoning" by appearing to argue from an 'is*
to an 'ought'.' Devlin had listed a number of crimes whose
"function," he claimed, "is simply to enforce a moral prin-
ciple and nothing else." Some critics think that Devlin
meant to suggest not only that some criminal laws prohibit
and punish conduct merely because it is generally regarded
as "immoral" but also that they ought to because they do so.
For instance, A. R. Blackshield holds that Devlin's view
"steers close to the dangerous argument that what the law is
can somehow be taken as a guide to what it should be.^ For
some, then, Devlin appeared to derive the desirability of a
governmental policy of legal moralism from the fact that
there is, to a limited extent, such a policy in effect.
6Basil Mitchell, Law, Morality, and Religion in a
Secular Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1967)1 p.
99.
'H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (London:
Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 28.
gDevlin, p. 7«
^A. R. Blackshield, "The Hart-Devlin Controversy in
I965," Sydney Law Review 5 (October I967): W*.
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In my view, Devlin is not guilty of this form of the
naturalistic fallacy, because he clearly states his intent
of comparing Mill's harm to others principle (as advanced by
the Wolfenden Committee's recommendations) with the practice
of contemporary English law in order "to see how the argu-
ment fares under the existing law." 10 As Hart suggests,
Devlin here merely expresses the conservative view that long-
standing policies and legal practices are likely to have a
worth not readily apparent to the rationalist social critic. 11
Rather, Devlin subscribes to a more sophisticated
type of metaethical naturalism which derives the truth of
ethical principles, not from descriptive generalizations
alone, but from descriptive generalizations together with
descriptive definitions of moral terms. This definist theory
typically follows a schematic pattern:
(1) That x is good means that x has the property P.
(2) x has the property P. (3) Hence, x is good. Here,
(1; is a definition of 'good 1 in descriptive terms;
(2) is an empirical statement; (3) is a valuational
principle. 1 ^
Naturalism based on descriptive definitions makes moral terms
synonymous with descriptive terms, and then translates moral
principles into descriptive generalizations; by verifying
the latter, the truth of the 'former is allegedly established.
10
Devlin, pp. 5-6.
^art, p. 29.
12Oppenheim, p. 126.
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While Devlin sometimes defines moral terms norma-
tively (e.g., »x is immoral 1 means x is "unnatural" or
"excessive"), he gives descriptive definitions of moral
Tightness and wrongness in his central argument. In the
Maccabaean Lecture his definition of objectively true moral-
ity is the morality taught by the dominant religion of a
given society. In so far as a society's positive morality
corresponds to the morality of its dominant religion, it too
is the objectively valid morality. Moreover, the positive
morality is itself objectively valid if, and only if, it is
derived from some religion:
Morals and religion are inextricably joined—the
moral standards generally accepted in Western civiliza-
tion being those belonging to Christianity. Outside
Christendom other standards derive from other religions.
None of these moral codes can claim any validity except
by virtue of the religion on which it is based. 13
In Western societies 'x is immoral 1 means that x is forbid-
den by the Christian religion; in Moslem societies 'x is
immoral 1 means that x is contrary to the Islamic religion;
and so on. In such societies the standards of positive mor-
ality which conform to the moral teachings of the dominant
religion are objectively true even if specific doctrines of,
say, Christianity and Islam are incompatible. What is good
and right may vary from one society to another according to
the varying moral doctrines of the dominant religion. In
any given society, however, objective goodness and rightness
"^Devlin, p. 4.
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correspond to the prevailing religious dogmas: the moral
code taught by the religion espoused by most is in each
society the true morality.
Whether because this view implies that the positive
morality of an atheistic (e.g., a Communist) society is not
"valid" (and hence that legal moralism should not be adopted
in all societies), or because of a need to secularize the
objective desirability of legal moralism, Devlin 1 s later
lectures redefined moral terms according to the feelings of
the "ordinary man" rather than the teachings of an organized
religion. On this view, 'x is immoral' means that x is dis-
approved by most members of a given society. This is what
Devlin means by holding that "morality is a question of fact"
JjVQorality in England means what twelve men and women
think it means—in other words, it is to be ascertained
as a question of fact. I am not repelled by that
phrase nor do I resent in such a matter submission to
the mentality of the common man.l^
At any given point in time, therefore, affirmations about
the prevailing preferences and moral convictions of a given
social community are empirical statements which can be test-
ed by such devices as sample surveys--although Devlin denies
that it is necessary to "count heads" in answers to moral
. . 15questions given in public opinion polls.
According to Oppenheim, modern democratic theory and
practice are associated not only with the normative view
l2|
Ibid., p. 100. 15Ibid., p. 9^.
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that governmental policies should implement the preferences
of the majority but sometimes also with the metaethical
theory of naturalism that "this normative principle is true
because 'x is intrinsically desirable* is synonymous with
•x is preferred by the majority 9 ." 16 This is precisely
Devlin's metaethical view: that some activity is disapproved
strongly by the majority means that such conduct is objec-
tively wrong (e.g., homosexuality is condemned by most;
hence it is morally wrong). Saying that he has "found no
satisfactory alternative" to this thesis, Devlin remarks
that his opponents "would think it surprising" if "absolute
truth" concerning morality were to be found "at the bottom
of the popular vote. I do not think it is as far from this
as some learned people suppose and I have known them to
search for it in what seem to me to be odder places." 1 ^
Evidently, here Devlin's naturalistic view is meta-
ethical relativism. According to Oppenheim 1 s analysis,
Metaethical relativism holds that ethical truth is
"relative"—relative to social conditions and cultural
features. Under this assumption, there are at least
some conflicting basic moral principles which are
"equally true," that is, one of them is true in one
society but not in another, and vice versa. 18
l6 18Oppenheim, p. I38. Oppenheim, p. 176.
17
'Devlin, pp. 93~9^» His next sentence reads: "But
that is a subject outside the scope of this lecture which is
not concerned with absolute truth. . . . What the law-maker
has to ascertain is not the true belief but the common
belief." In context, however, it is apparent that Devlin i_s
' concerned with "absolute truth" and that, in his view, the
"common belief" is the "true belief."
18^
Just bo—whether as in his early view that moral truth is
relative to the prevailing religion of a given society, or
as in his later view that it is relative to majority prefer-
ences—Devlin subscribes to the relativistic variant of
metaethical naturalism. 19 It would then follow that, if
homosexuality is condoned in society A and condemned by
society B, not only is practicing homosexuality morally
right or at least permissible in A and wrong in B, but also
the statements 'practicing homosexuality is right in A 1 and
•practicing homosexuality is wrong in B' are both true.
There are some indications that Devlin is uneasy
with these implications of his metaethical position. We
have seen that he tends to regard certain practices (e.g.,
homosexuality and abortion) as objectively morally wrong
regardless of whether they are condoned or condemned by
either a dominant religion or a popular majority. Even in
the lecture in which he most clearly establishes his rela-
tivistic views, he sometimes appears to deny them. For
instance, although he says "No one need be shocked by the
idea that the law-maker is concerned with morality as it is"
19
'Metaethical relativism is not to be confused with
value-noncognitivism. "Oppenheim (p. 177) explains:
"Noncognitivism claims that neither of any two conflicting
basic moral or political principles is either true or false.
The relativist thesis that there are conflicting principles
both of which are true presupposes, on the contrary, a cog-
nitivist metaethics, namely, the definist theory that the
expression: 'it is morally right for A to do x 1 means the
same as: 'doing x is generally approved in A '
s
society'."
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(i.e., the moral preferences of the majority), he claims
next that these public moralities (or majoritarian prefer-
ences) are not necessarily good:
There are, have been, and will be bad laws, bad moralsand bad societies. Probably no law-maker believes till
make it true. Unfortunately bad societies can live onbad morals just as well as good societies on good ones. 20
There are, then, objectively good morals and societies, and
there are objectively bad ones. But this is a contradiction,
for it would imply that laws which correspond to a society's
positive morality may nevertheless be bad—viz., if these
moral principles are bad. What, then, makes a morality
objectively true? Probably its conformity to Devlin's per-
sonal religious beliefs, in which case he returns to the
view that an activity is immoral if it is contrary to the
Christian religion. This is, however, clearly irrelevant to
Devlin's argument, for he explicitly states that in today's
secular societies, characterized as they are by separation
of church and state, it is necessary to justify public moral
standards independently of religious doctrines. 21
We are left, then, with the conclusion that Devlin's
metaethical position is relativism—a type of naturalism
based on descriptive definitions of moral terms. Now, it is
true that, given the definition 'x is desirable = x is gen-
erally preferred', and given the fact that the majority
Devlin, p. 9^. Ibid., pp. 61-62, 86-87.
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approves of x, it follows that x is desirable and ought to
be realized. Thus, if 'legal moralism is desirable 1 means
that legal moralism is approved by the majority, and if the
majority does in fact prefer this policy, then it is true
that legal moralism should be adopted. Similarly, given the
definition 'x is immoral = x is disapproved by most', and
given evidence that the majority views x with "intolerance,
indignation, and disgust," it follows that x is immoral and
ought to be prevented or punished.
But is it adequate to define moral terms by descrip-
tive terms such as 'generally preferred* or 'disapproved by
a majority'? If such definitions were adequate, it would be
self-contradictory to hold that something which is not
approved by the majority is good, or that something which
has the majority's approval is bad. Someone who claims,
like Hart, that legal moralism is morally wrong is surely
not merely giving a factual report about someone's valua-
tions, whether his own or someone else's or the majority's.
If he maintains that legal moralism is wrong even though the
majority of his society considers it right, he surely does
not contradict himself as he would if moral wrongness meant
popular disapproval. As Oppenheim points out, "Whenever the
concept of goodness or rightness is defined in terms of some
property, it is possible, without self-contradiction, to
affirm that something does have that property, and to deny
18?
that it is good or right." 22 Thus, in a society which
prefers a governmental polioy of legal moralism it is not
self-contradictory for someone to maintain that morals legis
lation is morally wrong or unjust. So, too, it is not incon
sistent for someone to assert both that in the United States
homosexuality is generally abominated and that homosexuality
is not morally wrong, and- even if wrong-should not be out-
lawed.
2
, Intuitionism
. Together with this type of metaethical
naturalism, Devlin's value-cognitivism also takes the form
of metaethical intuitionism. It might at first appear odd
that the s^rne political theory contains both kinds of cogni-
tive arguments, but this phenomenon is not unusual. 23 In
this instance, Devlin appeals first to intuitionism based on
religious insight, and later to intuitionism based on non-
religious moral insight.
In the Maccabaean Lecture, Devlin not only defined
true morality in terms of the moral teachings of a society's
dominant religion but also held that true morality can be
intuited from divine revelation: "I suppose that moral stan-
dards do not shift; so far as they come from divine revela-
tion they do not, and I am willing to assume that the moral
judgements made by a society always remain good for that
22Oppenheim, p. 130; see also p. 139.
23See Ibid., pp. 63, 71-78, 108, 120-21.
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society." Thus, a moral judgment is valid if it is a pro-
duct of divine revelation, and in so far as a society's posi-
tive morality comes from divine revelation it is itself un-
alterably valid. Accordingly, the moral principles emanat-
ing from God are objectively true and, for this reason,
should be followed by both the citizenry and the criminal
law.
But even if this were so, knowledge of what is per-
mitted and prohibited by the will of God would be limited to
those who are endowed with religious insight; then atheists
and agnostics could not know which moral principles are
objectively valid. Although Devlin thinks that "the free-
thinker and the non-Christian can accept, without offence to
his convictions, the fact that Christian morals are the basis
OK
of the criminal law," J the argument that a moral principle
is true because it was commanded by God is not acceptable to
to the disbeliever. As Oppenheim says,
To consider a statement—whether factual or moral—true
on the basis of religious belief in a personal God is
to preclude the possibility of rational argument with
those who do not hold the same or any religious convic-
tions. . . . Religious faith, feeling, and insight are
a profoundly subjective experience and therefore cannot
provide an objective ground for moral principles of
politics. 26
Perhaps for this reason Devlin later turned to a nonreligious
^Devlin, ,p. 18.
2
^Ibid., p. 23
26Oppenheim, p. 71 •
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form of moral insight, as we shall now see.
Devlin asserts, as we have seen (Ch. IV, A, 2) that
men have equal ability to tell right from wrong, and that
this capacity is attributable to a special "faculty" which
he calls "reason" or "common sense." 2 '
7
Contrary to St.
Augustine, Devlin holds that correct moral intuitions are
not based on religious insight, because the moral sense is
available to more than just the Christian faithful. Contrary
to St. Thomas Aquinas, he denies that true morality is based
on rational insight, because rationality and intellectual
reasoning have little to do with ascertaining right moral
principles. Rather, like Plato and Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
Devlin holds that moral right and wrong are ascertainable by
means of nonrational and nonreligious insights into objective
moral goodness. But, contrary to Plato, this moral sense is
not limited to philosophers; indeed, it is quite the reverse.
Devlin says that the educated are more likely than "ordinary
men" to disagree about what is morally right; in other words,
education tends to blur the moral sense. Rather, like
Rousseau, Devlin claims that all "ordinary men" (if they are
"reasonable" and "right-minded"—as he presumes most men to
be) can apprehend correct moral principles, and he agrees
with Rousseau's view that the average man's feelings are the
indicators of true morality.
Devlin, pp. 93. 100. !?•
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Both Rousseau and Devlin use the term 'reason 1 when
referring to the moral sense, but the emphasis in both "is
on the heart, the seat of 'natural feeling 1 ." 28 For Devlin,
as for Rousseau, the moral sense of "natural feeling" is
found throughout the social community:
I have said that the morals which underly the law
must be derived from the sense of right and wrong which
resides in the community as a whole; it does not matter
whence the community of thought comes, whether from onebody of doctrine or another or from the knowledge of
good and evil which no man is without. If the reason-
able man believes that a practice is immoral and
believes also
. . . that no right-minded member of his
society could think otherwise, then for the purpose of
the law it is immoral. 29
Devlin holds, as we have seen, that the ordinary man's
"deliberate judgement" that certain conduct is sufficiently
"immoral" to justify its criminalization is the product of
both "an equivalent power of reasoning" and "strong feelings
of reprobation." He suggests that "moral reasoning" is
therefore synonymous with the common reactions of moral
disapprobation of a given public: "It is the power of common
sense and not the power of reason that is behind the judge-
30
ments of society."-^ If that is the case, then men are
indeed possessed of an equivalent power—but one which
belongs, Devlin acknowledges, to the "baser faculties of
feeling and emotion." 31 Moral "reasoning" is therefore the
28Oppenheim, p. 59 » characterizing Rousseau's view.
29Devlin, pp. 22-23.
3 °Ibid., p. 17.
31Ibid., p. 93-
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same as popular feelings about moral beliefs, and by "reason"
or "common sense" Devlin can mean only direct intuitive
insight of that which is objectively good and right. Hence
I agree with Blackshield' s view that Devlin's "insistence on
•equal 1 moral faculties available to all men would suggest
both that public morality is 'true* morality, and that moral
judgments do not differ."^2
If Devlin's intuitionism is correct, there must be
an objective method by which anyone could determine whose
moral insight is true and valid. But what is Devlin's cri-
terion? Since 'ordinary man' means most men, the criterion
is agreement among the majority. Here Devlin's approach is
not to argue that legal moralism is morally right because it
is held to be desirable by the majority; this is the natural-
istic position discussed earlier. According to the intuition-
istic position of the present argument, Devlin does not claim
that legal moralism is good because the majority thinks that
it is but, on the contrary, that the majority intuits its
goodness because it is: good, just as it intuits the evil of
homosexuality and abortion because they are evil.
But if the majority rejects legal moralism and tol-
erates homosexuality and abortion, then Devlin must conclude
that the "ordinary man" is not "reasonable" and "right-
minded" (hence, is not endowed with a moral sense) after all.
•Blackshield, p.
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He at least comes close to admitting that a given public
does not necessarily correctly intuit the true morality when
he complains that too many people nowadays do not understand
why abortion is wrong (see Ch. IV, A, 1), or when he concedes
that the English public no longer considers homosexuality
sufficiently evil to justify its continued criminalization
(see Ch. Ill, F)
.
How does the majority know what kind of governmental
policies and penal laws correspond to true moral principles?
Devlin, like Rousseau, has nothing to fall back on but a
public's "strong feelings of reprobation" and the "intoler-
ance, indignation, and disgust" elicited by the mere thought
that others behave in ways the majority abominates. But
what if these criteria should lead a public in opposite
directions? What objective criterion is there by which to
determine whose stong feelings of disgust and intolerance
are correct? I agree with Oppenheim's answer:
[T]ake a situation in which the majority and the minor-
ity in a given society disagree as to what is intrin-
sically valuable or morally good. There is no way of
deciding whether the former experienced the objective
value entity and the latter was deceived by its value .
experience, or whether, on the contrary, the majority
happened to be value-blind and the "deviant" value
judgment based on true moral insight. 33
Intuitionism fails to provide an objective standard by which
to assess the validity of ultimate ethical principles in
general and political ethics in particular, be it the
33Oppenheim, p. 64; see also pp. 57-59i 62.
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desirability of legal moralism or the moral wrongness of
homosexuality and abortion. Therefore, Devlin's "moral
reason" and "common sense" do not demonstrate the objective
validity of the moral principles to which he happens to
subscribe
B. Hart's Metaethi cal Vi ews
Unlike Devlin, Hart does not deal explicitly with
metaethical issues. He fails to criticize Devlin's advocacy
of legal moralism based on the claim that any society's
positive morality is objectively true and, hence, worthy of
legal enforcement. Indeed, he seems unaware that a signi-
ficant part of Devlin's normative theory depends on the
truth of his cognitivistic metaethical views. On his own
side of the controversy, Hart makes no claims for the cog-
nitive status of the basic moral principles (welfare,
justice, freedom, and libertarianism) which he espouses, and
he does not hold that legal moralism is objectively undesir-
able. One could conclude that Hart's metaethical position
is value-noncognitivistic , but one consideration prevents
such a facile judgment.
In The Concept of Law Hart presents an argument con-
cerning the survival goals of human activity which, accord-
3 In his 1965 "Preface," Devlin (p. x) demurs: "I
should not care, any more than my critics would, to have my
personal morality equated with that which gains the highest
measure of popular approval." Even so, I cannot see how his
metaethical intuitionism can lead to any other conclusion.
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ing to Oppenheim, is metaethical naturalism based on empiri-
cal generalizations: "Man ought to aim at survival (his own?
everyone's?) because man does aim at survival." 35 Thus,
Hart appears to adopt the naturalistic thesis that a norm
can be derived from a fact. Although the work in which this
argument appears is not technically a part of Hart's contro-
versy with Devlin, to the extent that it is relevant to
Hart's views concerning the nature of political society as
elaborated in the controversy (see Ch. IV, B, 1) it counts
against deciding that his metaethical position is that of
value-noncognitivi sm.
.
In connection with the controversy itself, Hart does
not hold that his normative views are objectively valid or
that Devlin's are objectively wrong. Interestingly, even
where there is agreement (albeit in only two limited areas)
between Devlin and Hart on normative questions, they appear
to differ on the metaethical status of their common response
Both are agreed, as we have seen, that certain activities
done in public should be prohibited and punished by the law
when they offend the moral feelings of others; they also
agree that popular estimates of a crime's moral wickedness
ought to determine the severity of punishment meted out to
convicted offenders. However, while Hart merely advances a
-^Oppenheim, pp. 106-07. Cf. Alan Wertheimer, review
of Moral Principles in Political Philosophy
,
by Felix E.
Oppenheim, in The American Political Science Review 65
(March 1971): 205.
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normative view, Devlin makes the metaethical claim that the
same normative theory is objectively justified. Furthermore,
it is significant that in the controversy itself Hart does
not claim objective validity for his argument from The Con-
c ept of Law about the survival goals of men and society.
For these reasons I conclude that Hart's metaethical position
in the controversy with Devlin is noncognitivistic
.
C. Conclusion
Devlin's metaethical views are cognitivistic, and
are of the naturalist and intuitionist types. He both
defines moral terms by descriptive expressions (thereby
deriving an 'ought 1 from an 'is') and holds that true moral
principles can be perceived, through moral insight, by most
men. I have criticized both views, and believe with the
value-noncognitivists that intrinsic moral judgments express
personal preferences.
In contrast, Hart does not claim objective validity
for his normative views opposing legal moralism. However,
his theory of the viability and survival of societies con-
tains a value- cognitivist argument in which normative conclu-
sions are drawn from factual premises. Nevertheless, this
naturalistic metaethical position is not evident, even
implicitly, in Hart's controversy with Devlin. On the
contrary, Hart's metaethical views in the debate appear to
be noncognitivistic.
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CHAPTER VI
PRESENT STATE OF THE CONTROVERSY
The Devlin-Hart controversy is not extinct, for the
normative issues it generated remain subjects of disputation.
I have sided with Hart's view, against Devlin's, that the
use of the criminal law to interdict activity merely because
it is generally considered "immoral" is unjustifiable. I
• have also pointed out that Hart is opposed to legal moralism
except in one area: he defends criminal laws against public
offense ("indecency" and "nuisance") for the sake of protect-
ing the public's moral and religious sensibilities. He also
justifies the enactment of penal legislation meant to
achieve paternalistic results on broad utilitarian (if not
on strict Millian) grounds.
Here I will examine recent contributions to the
Devlin-Hart controversy regarding the justifiability of
criminalizing conduct for the sake of protecting both the
public from offenses to moral feelings and the individual
actor from voluntary self-harm. I will also criticize the
concept of 'victimless crimes' which some of Hart's support-
ers use to designate the kinds of conduct which, the hold,
should be decriminalized. I will conclude by outlining the
kinds of criteria which should be taken into account in
decisions whether to enact or repeal such criminal statutes.
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A. Public Offpn^o
Like Hart, Joel Feinberg recently held that, while
it is not justifiable to punish "private immoralities," the
criminal proscription of "offensive nuisances" in public is
justifiable for the sake of protecting moral, religious,
ethnic, and patriotic feelings. 1 Unlike Hart, however,
Feinberg does not justify this view as an "extension" of
Mill's harm to others principle; rather, he appeals to an
offense principle which, he says, "would not only justify
prohibition of public conduct and publicly pictured conduct
that is in its inherent character repellent (e.g., buggery,
bestiality, sexual sado-masochism), but also conduct and
pictured conduct that is inoffensive in itself but offensive
only when it occurs in inappropriate circumstances [e.g.,
going naked in public]." 2 Some other examples of the latter
category, according to Feinberg, are public activities such
as sexual intercourse, defecation, desecration of the flag
and of religious icons and relics, and public speech acts
such as derisive ethnic taunts, "obscene remarks over a loud-
speaker,, homosexual billboards in Times Square, [and] porno-
1Joel Feinberg, "'Harmless Immoralities* and Offen-
sive Nuisances," in Issues in Law and Morality
, ed. Norman
S. Care and Thomas K. Trelogan (Cleveland: The Press of Case
Western Reserve University, 1973). pp. 83-110. Feinberg
(p. 107, n. 12) approvingly quotes Hart's distinction between
immorality and indecency (see above Ch. Ill, D, 3, a). See
also Feinberg's Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), pp.
2Ibid., pp. 100-01.
198
graphic handbills thrust into the hands of passing pedestri-
ans. ,,jJ
Apparently Feinberg thinks that Mill's harm to others
principle is incapable of justifying criminal laws against
some kinds of public conduct which he desires to see sup-
pressed, for he says that he is "driven, however reluctantly,
to the offense principle" by his "particular intuitions"
about the types of conduct which should not be permitted in
public. His notion of 'offense' is that of "offended mental
states": "Offensive behavior is such in virtue of its capa-
city to induce in others any of a large miscellany of mental
states that have little in common except that they are un-
pleasant, uncomfortable, or disliked." Chief among the "un-
pleasant states cause by offensiveness" are "irritating
sensations," "unaffected disgust and acute repugnance,"
"shocked moral, religious, or patriotic sensibilities,"
"unsettling anger or irritation," and "shameful embarrass-
ment or invaded privacy."^
Thus, while Hart justified criminal laws against
public offense by relying on intuitionistic judgments con-
cerning the greater harm done by publicly indecent acts
("shock and distress" to the unwilling witness) as opposed
to the harm done by the law in prohibiting and punishing
3Ibid., p. 103. 5Ibid., pp. 85-86.
^Ibid., p. 100.
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them, Feinberg relies on intuition to decide which activities
should be outlawed for their offensiveness rather than for
their harmfulness. Feinberg thinks, contrary to Hart, that
an offense to someone's "mental state" is not harmful; hence
his need to appeal to a justificatory standard different
from the harm to others principle for the sake of interdict-
ing public conduct which his intuition tells him should not
be permitted. The offense principle therefore justifies the
legal proscription of activities which, Feinberg concedes,
harm no one.
Since the use of the offense principle can "open the
door to wholesale and intuitively unwarranted repression,"
Feinberg suggests that its justifiable implementation meet
certain criteria. The first is a "standard of universality"
requiring that an offense elicit reactions "that could
reasonably be expected from almost any person chosen at
random," rather than those of persons belonging to "some
faction, clique, or party." But, while no special respect
is owed to "abnormal susceptibilities," he permits an excep-
tion in the case of "abusive, mocking, insulting behavior"
(including derisive speech) against members of some minority
group, e.g., Jews and Negroes. According to Feinberg 1 s
second norm, the "standard of reasonable avoidability, " the
offense principle should not be used to justify legal
restrictions on activity which can without difficulty be
avoided by those whom it might offend. The third condition
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is that persons whose liberty is restricted by application
of the offense principle "be granted an allowable alterna-
tive outlet or mode of expression." 6
Michael Bayles has made some valid criticisms of
Feinberg »s offense principle. 7 First, since Feinberg permit:
shocked moral sensibilities to constitute a form of "offen-
sive nuisance," his offense principle (like Hart's treatment
of public indecency) "gives a reason for limited enforcement
of positive morality
. . . [by] prohibiting public conduct
contrary to positive morality." Thus, various legal prohi-
bitions are possible because Feinberg "only requires that
conduct, shock the sensibilities of accepted morality, reli-
gion, or politics":
In a Mormon society, drinking tea or coffee in a public
restaurant might be prohibited as shocking religious or
moral sensibilities. In an excessively war-oriented
society, a peace symbol or picture of a dove might be
prohibited. Indeed, a hundred years ago a racially
mixed couple could have been prohibited from strolling
along streets in the United States. Further, it cer-
tainly justifies the laws against blasphemy in earlier
days .o
Here Bayles notes that, although Feinberg eschews legal mor-
alism, his defense of the offense principle places him
closer to the Devlin camp than he may think. Bayles might
6
Ibid., pp. 102-06.
7 .
'Michael D. Bayles, "Comments: Offensive Conduct and
the Law," in Issues in Law and Morality
, ed. Norman S. Care
and Thomas K. Trelogan (Cleveland: The Press of Case Western
Reserve University, 1973), pp. 111-26.
8Ibid., pp. 11^-15.
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also have added that Feinberg goes further than Hart in
justifying laws against public offense, for Hart never allow-
ed ethnic and political feelings legal protection, nor did
he hold that this principle justifies legal restrictions on
offensive public speech.
Second,- Bayles holds, correctly, that Feinberg "does
not provide any general argument to show that protection
from offense justifies overriding the presumption against
criminal legislation
. . . [such] that the evil of offensive
conduct outweighs that involved in punishment." 9 As we have
seen, Hart supplies such an argument but fails to give evi-
dence that "shock and distress" to witnesses are sufficiently
harmful to offset the evil of criminal penalties. Feinberg'
s
failure even to pay lip service to this argument is attribut-
able to his abandonment of the harm to others principle in
favor of the separate offense principle. If an "offensive
nuisance" does not cause appreciable injury to anyone, then
there simply is no harmful effect of a public activity to
override the presumption against enacting a criminal statute
to proscribe it. Like Bayles, I wonder whether the evil of
being offended, no matter what its cause (and considering
that it is not construed as harm), is greater than even a
10light punishment such as a few weeks in jail.
o
'Ibid., p. 115; also see p. 112 for a concise state-
ment of the presumptions against penal legislation.
10
Ibid., p. 116.
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ons
Third, noting that Feinberg gives three examples
"which drive him to the offense principle: obscene bill-
boards, speech abusive of minorities, and public nudity,"
Bayles challenges the attempt to reach normative conclusi
from intuitions in particular cases:
^ S QUnSe:I:tled in moral Phil°sophy whether argumentsfrom examples can ever justify adopting normative prin-ciples. Accounting for strong intuitions in particularcases is probably a necessary but not sufficient condi-tion for adopting them. Hence, accounting for intui-tions is a relevant but not conclusive consideration. 11
Therefore, Feinberg* s examples do not necessarily "drive"
him to the offense principle, for it is not obvious that
such a principle can account for his intuitions concerning
them.
Fourth, although Feinberg gives two examples which
involve freedom of speech or expression, Bayles notes that
"he never brings into the discussion of these cases the gen-
erally recognized principle that restrictions on speech are
harder to justify than restrictions on actions." Hence, on
Feinberg* s offense principle "there is a good reason for
prohibiting everything which is obscene in the ordinary
sense provided that [witnessing] it be unavoidable and an
alternative mode of expression allowed." But this, of
course, does not imply use of the usual legal tests of
obscenity which are stricter than the common standards of a
given community.
nibid. l2Ibid., pp. II6-I7.
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Fifth, Bayles holds that the offense principle is
(like Devlin's legal moralism) dependent on "cultural stan-
dards which constantly and rapidly change. As we have seen,
this is one of Hart's criticisms of Devlin's views. Thus,
twenty years ago so-called short-shorts (today's "hot pants")
were generally considered indecent and were also illegal
(Bayles thinks they still may be) in New York City. "Public
nudity is an especially puzzling case because other cultures
have accepted it, and it might be beneficial. It might help
people overcome psychological neuroses about sex." 13
Finally, Bayles reviews Feinberg's examples to show
that they do not necessarily lead anyone to adopt the offense
principle; rather, "it might be preferable simply to expand
the private harm principle, if need be, by admitting specific
interests as worthy of consideration." Violations of such
interests might be treated as "minor harms" which are eval-
uated individually as to whether they provide a good reason
for legal interference. "This technique does not commit one
in advance to the wholesale protection of the sensibilities
of a large majority without examining the merits of the par-
ticular sensibilities and their objects." 1 ^
If this course is taken, Bayles thinks that "the
minor harm involved in offensive conduct may only justify a
lesser sanction than punishment":
l3
Ibid., pp. 118-19. ^Ibid., p. 119.
20^
The choice is not between punishing offensive conductand doing nothing. It may be regulated, that is,
restricted to certain times or places. ... Of course,
regulation is usually backed up by punishment for fail-
ure to comply with the regulation. But punishment need
not be invoked immediately. People may be given an
opportunity to comply after it is pointed out thattheir conduct violates a regulation. 15
On the harm to others principle alone, then, Bayles suggests
that it is possible both to control publicly offensive
behavior and yet to avoid criminal penalties for the offen-
der, or at least to reduce sanctions to nominal fines.
Indeed, he thinks "the most reasonable solution" is perhaps
simply to enact a statute permitting officials to remove
persons who offend the general populace from public places;
thus, "only a persistent offender or one violating an auth-
oritative order would be punished."
Replying to Bayles' s criticisms, Feinberg has argued
in defense of his offense principle while accepting some of
17his critic's objections. ' Although he claims that "punish-
ment would not be inflicted for offending others so much as
for defying authority by persisting in prohibited conduct"
and that he "would never permit the state to restrict or
punish the expression of opinion on the grounds of mere
offensiveness, " his examples of both conduct and speech
15Ibid., p. 122.
l6Ibid., p. 12^.
1
7
'Joel Feinberg, "Reply," in Issues in Law and Moral-
ity , ed. Norman S. Care and Thomas K. Trelogan (Cleveland:
The Press of Case Western Reserve University, 1973)».PP» 127-
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which are justifiably interdicted on the cffense principle
show that he does "want the coercive arm of the state to
protect passers-by (by the most economical and humane means)
from being unwilling audiences for such [offensive] perform-
ances."
18
Feinberg agrees with Bayles that the offense prin-
ciple is dependent on society's positive morality, and
especially on its standards of public conduct which constant
ly and rapidly change. Hence some offenders, he says, "will
be punished for what may be done a year later with impunity-
and on my principle, rightly so":
Thus, I am in the uncomfortable position of justi-fying the punishment of, say, anti-war demonstrators in
1965 for parading a Viet-Cong flag (shocking!) while
denouncing the punishment of other protesters in 1970for doing the same thing (yawn). ... My discomfort
in this position is at least mitigated by the thought
that martyrs to the cause of cultural change, on my
view, should never be subject to more than very minor
penalties or coercive pressure. 19
Even if others take unreasonable offense at someone* s public
behavior, they may still make a justifiable claim to legal
protection:
Providing that very real and intense offense is taken
predictably by virtually everyone, and the offending
conduct has hardly any countervailing personal or
social value of its own, .prohibition seems reasonable
even where the protected interests themselves are not. 20
Feinberg's offense principle is therefore another case of
18
Ibid., pp. 130-34. 20Ibid., p. 138
l9
Ibid., p. I36.
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legal moralism with respect to public activity.
David Conway recently held that with respect to the
issue of public offense "we have two basic alternatives":
either we follow Devlin in accepting legal moralism complete-
ly so that all offensive (or "indecent" or "immoral" or "sin-
ful") conduct—both in public and in private--is justifiably
proscribed by the criminal law, or we take the view of the
"extreme libertarian" that neither private nor public behav-
ior and speech may justifiably be criminalized for the sake
of preventing offense to others. 21 For Conway, the views of
Hart, Feinberg, and Bayles are inconsistent: If publicly
offensive practices are justifiably punished or even merely
regulated by the law, then why not private activities which
others find offensive as well?
We have already seen that Hart's views on public
offense are inconsistent with his views opposing legal moral-
ism. Feinberg* s and Bayles 1 s, however, are not: Feinberg
treats the legal punishment of "offensive nuisance" as an
exception (by means of a separate offense principle) to his
views opposing legal moralism; on the other hand, Bayles
prefers to judge each case of public offense individually as
a "minor harm" done to others balanced against the harm of
legal prohibition and punishment. Contrary to Conway, there-
fore, there are available more than just two alternatives to
21David A. Conway, "Law, Liberty and Indecency,"
Philosophy 49 (April 197*0 x 1^6.
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the handling of publicly offensive behavior and expression.
While I personally prefer Conway's second alternative of the
"extreme libertarian," I am also inclined to agree with
Bayles that in dealing with "hard cases" of public offense
there is usually no clear, easily applicable moral principle
"The search for such principles in hard cases seems a hope-
less task. Such cases are hard simply because there is no
obvious solution." 22
The assessment of harm done to others by an offen-
sive public action or expression as opposed to the harm done
by legal prohibitions and punishments may sometimes be dif-
ficult to make, but this should not drive us either to
Feinberg's offense principle or to Conway's either/or solu-
tion. Like Hugo Bedau, I agree with Gilbert Geis that "the
most efficacious method of dealing with deviancy is to
ignore, to the furthest point of our tolerance, those items
which we find offensive." 2^ Only those activities which
actually do harm to others, beyond merely offending their
moral and religious (or even ethnic and patriotic) sentiment
^Bayles, p. '12k.
23 .
^Gilbert Geis, Not the Law's Business? An Examina-
tion of Homosexuality, Abortion, Prostitution, Narcotics and
Gambling; in the United States
, Crime and Delinquency Issues,
A Monograph Series of the National Institute of Mental
Health (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1972), p. 261. Quoted approvingly by Hugo Adam Bedau, "Are
There Really Crimes Without Victims?" in Victimless Crimes:
Two Sides of a Controversy
,
by Edwin M. Schur and Hugo Adam
Bedau (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 197^),
p. 99.
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should be considered fit candidates for proscription by the
criminal law.
B. Legal Paternalism
As we have seen (Ch. Ill, D, 3, c), Devlin thinks
that Hart's commitment to even a limited form of legal pater-
nalism implies an advocacy of legal moralism:
*ft5°SS law ». that a > public morality, is a necessitylor^ paternalism, otherwise it would be impossible toarrive at a common judgement about what would be for aman s moral good. If then society compels a man to actlor his own moral good, society is enforcing the morallaw; and it is a distinction without a difference to
say that society is acting for a man's own good and notfor the enforcement of the law. Does the avoidance oflegal moralism mean no more than that a judge ought not,
when passing sentence, to mention that he is enforcing ,
the law but only that he is acting for a man's own good? 2^
For Devlin, then, legal paternalism enforces a society's
positive morality respecting common judgments about what is,
and what is not, in the moral interest of the individual
actor: "Paternalism, unless it is limited in some way as yet
unstated, must
. . . make all morality the law's business." 2^
However, recent writers tend to agree with Hart that
legal paternalism is distinguishable from legal moralism,
so that advocacy of the former does not entail the latter.
2kPatrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London:
Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 136.
2
^Ibid., p. I37.
26
Bedau, pp. 89-90; Joel Feinberg, "Legal Paternal-
ism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (September 1971): 105-
2k\ Rolf E. Sartorius, "The Enforcement of Morality," The
Yale Law Journal 81 (April 1972): 906, esp. n. 3^; and C. L.
Ten, "Paternalism and Morality," Ratio 13 (June 1971): 56-66.
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Most emphasize that paternalism restricts a person's fre
in order to protect or promote his own welfare (against th
possibility of self-inflicted injury), whereas legal moral-
ism interdicts an activity merely because it is generally
thought to be morally wrong. As Michael Bayles points out,
paternalism is logically distinct from moralism in two
respects, even if it is defined to include prevention of
moral self-harm to the actor: (1) the moral injury to an
actor need not be defined by society's positive morality,
and (2) even if it is, paternalism does not proscribe all
activities which are forbidden by moralism, for the latter
requires only that a practice violate positive morality, not
that the actor be morally harmed by it. 2? Contrary to
Devlin, then, paternalism and moralism are not synonymous,
nor does the former imply the latter.
A more interesting issue is whether legal paternal-
ism is a justifiable governmental policy. Most of the recent
views agree with Hart and Devlin that it is, and assume that
penal legislation is an appropriate means to securing pro-
tection .from self-harm for an individual. The analysis of
these views is based on two distinctions. First, legal
paternalism may be achieved through either the criminal law
or noncriminal legal agencies, e.g 0
,
by regulatory means.
Second, both criminal and noncriminal paternalism may be
27
'Michael D. Bayles, "Criminal Paternalism," in The
Limits of Law; Nomos XV
, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W.
Chapman (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 197^), p. I78.
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either strong or weak: the weak version restricts a person'
actions only if they are both nonvoluntary and injurious,
whereas strong paternalism interferes with a person's actio
even when they are voluntary. John Stuart Mill accepted the
weak version of noncriminal paternalism, as we have seen
(Ch. Ill, D, 3, c). Most contemporary opinions favor crimi-
nal paternalism of either the weak or the strong varieties.
Hart and Gerald Dworkin advocate that criminal laws
be used to prevent and punish the voluntary acts of an adult
which result in self-injury, hence they argue for the strong
version of criminal paternalism. The voluntariness standard
of Mill"s weak paternalism, Hart holds, generally has been
and should be abandoned. His reasons are a decline in the
belief that a person knows his own interests best and a
greater awareness of the factors which prevent actions from
pO
being fully voluntary. But the burden of this argument,
as Bayles points out, is that frequently men do not choose
and act voluntarily on account of clouded judgment, subtle
pressures, or psychological compulsion. Hence "the only
conditions possibly compatible with voluntary choice and
action in which Hart wishes to restrict liberty are when a
person (1) does not adequately reflect or (2) pursues transi-
29tory desires." 7 Dworkin argues that liberty may justifi-
pO
H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (London:
Oxford University Press, 1963)1 PP» 32-33*
^Bayles, "Criminal Paternalism," p. 180.
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ably be restricted in similar situations, e.g., cigarette
smoking and fastening seat belts. 3° By pursuing a transitory
desire, the smoker sacrifices his long-range to an immediate
interest because he lacks the will power to act on his
belief that he ought to stop smoking; similarly, someone who
desires to avoid injury may risk serious harm by choosing,
without adequate reflection, to forego the inconvenience of
using a seat belt. In both cases a person may be injured by
his own voluntary, and apparently irrational, actions.
But the difficulty with restricting voluntary actions
in these situations is that it assumes everyone has the same
values; for instance, each person is presumed to prefer a
greater chance of living a long life to the minor inconven-
ience of wearing seat belts or to the indulgence of a slight-
ly pleasurable smoking habit. Bayles thinks that this
assumes too much:
In a pluralistic society with persons committed to
various value schemes, many such persons may not be
choosing irrationally [by refusing to fasten seat belts
or to give up smoking]. They may simply have different
values. Hence, restricting such actions may involve
coercing large numbers of persons who have not chosen
irrationally. That is, fully rational persons with
these different values would not think the consequences
of the actions injurious or consent to the restrictions.
Thus, strong paternalism would prohibit (and, if criminal
Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism," in Morality and the
Law, ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 107-26.
Bayles, "Criminal Paternalism," p. 181.
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paternalism, punish) the voluntary practices of rational,
strong-willed persons with uncommon values for the sake of
compelling those with ordinary values to behave as they
would voluntarily if they were not weak-willed or irrat-
lonal
.
Joel Feinberg and C. L. Ten are proponents of the
view that criminal prohibitions and punishments may justi-
fiably be used to prevent nonvoluntary self-harm of an
33adult. I agree, however, with Bayles that not even this
weak version of paternalism is acceptable for criminal
legislation:
First, it is not obvious that the use of criminal laws
is an effective method for preventing such actions.
The actions will not be voluntary, so threats of punish-
ment may not influence the actors. But the effective-
ness of criminal laws as a deterrence is a complex
topic. For the purposes of argument it may be assumed
they will deter . But even so, they will not always
do so. Then sanctions will have to be imposed on those
who violate laws. Of course many offenders may escape
punishment if mens rea is required, for they will be in
excusing conditions. But some offenders will have to
be punished or the laws will cease to deter. 3^
When the law reaches the point of applying punishments, how-
ever, even weak paternalism is unacceptable, for implement-
ing criminal paternalism of either type is inconsistent with
promoting the actor's welfare:
32Ibid., p. 182.
-^Feinberg, "Legal Paternalism," pp. 120-2^; Idem,
Social Philosophy
, pp. 55-52; and Ten, pp. 6^-66.
-^Bayles, "Criminal Paternalism," p. 183
.
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injury on them. 35
Answering those who claim that the motive of crimi-
patemalism is reformation of offenders and that hence
harm inflicted by punishment is the lesser of two evils,
that the injury inflicted by threat and actual imposition
of punishment on offenders is less than that avoided by
reform and deterrence," and, second, that "there must not be
any less injurious method of preventing actors from injuring
themselves.*0 Even if the first requirement were fulfilled
this utilitarian justification of criminal paternalism would
fail, according to Bayles, because less injurious means of
achieving the same goals are almost always available, e.g.,
propaganda in the public schools and in TV commercials.
In my view, noncriminal legal paternalism may, in
some situations and respecting certain kinds of self-ham,
be a justifiable governmental policy. But surely Bayles is
correct in thinking that criminal paternalism is not justi-
fiable. Indeed, given its inconsistency respecting the pro-
tection of an actor's welfare by means of punishing him,
Bayles holds, first, that "such a justification must show
35Ibid., pp. 183-84.
36Ibid., p. 184.
criminal paternalism seems a contradiction in terms. Hence
I agree with Bedau's view (which implicitly corroborates
Bayles) that "so long as they harm only those adults who
knowingly and willingly choose to engage in such practices
and are harmless to others, it is hard to see why the crimi-
nal justice system should be used to try to prevent and to
punish those who want to do them":
Let the hospitals take care of the sick, whether drunksor addicts or victims of automobile accidents or cancer.
.
Let the police concentrate on protecting us from theinjuries and violence which would be inflicted on us bv
a small minority. As for the rest, let us leave it tothe control and guidance of education and persuasion,free of coercive criminal sanctions altogether .37
C. 'Victimless Crimes'
Because it is doubtful that some public offenses
create harm and that voluntary self-harm of an adult is a
proper concern of the criminal law, many who advocate the
repeal of certain penal laws rely on the claim that punish-
ing "crimes without victims" is unjustifiable. During the
last decade some scholarly authorities in philosophy as well
as in the social sciences have emphasized that at the core
of the concept of 'crime 1 is the notion of victimization:
in order for an activity to be criminalized -justifiably,
there must be a victim who is injured as a result of it.-^
-^Bedau, pp. 99-100.
J The seminal work on the concept of 'victimless
crime' is Edwin M. Schur, Crimes Without Victims (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., I965); see also Idem,
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Thus, grouped under the rubric of 'victimless crimes' are
all of the illegal activities which contemporary penal
reformers desire to see decriminalized.
The recent debate between the sociologist Edwin
Schur and the philosopher Hugo Bedau illustrates the separ-
ate issues of decriminalization and victimless crime. 39
Schur defends the use of the concept of 'victimless crimes'
to designate criminal statutes which ought to be altered or
repealed on grounds that they create "crimes without victims,
"
while Bedau challenges the usefulness of the concept as it
presently stands. I will not rehearse the arguments both
pro and con, for I think Bedau is correct in holding that
Schur and others have been using a confused concept whose
"definition seems to rely on several distinct and non-
coextensive criteria":
As a consequence, it is very difficult to draw up alist in any definite or uniform way of all and only
those crimes which are victimless, and to distinguish
them from the crimes which do have victims. Likewise,
until the concept of victimless crimes is further
analysed, it is impossible to go through the penal
L_aw and Society; A Sociological View (New York: Random House,
1968), passim.; and Idem, Our Criminal Society: The Social
and Legal Sources of Crime in America (Englewood Cliffs. N.J. :
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), passim. See also, e.g., Jeffrie
G, Murphy, "Another Look at Legal Moralism," Ethics 77 (Oct-
ober I966): 50-56; Jerome H. Skolnick, "Coercion to Virtue:
The Enforcement of Morals," Southern California Law Review
41 (Spring I968): 588-641 ; and Alexander B. Smith and Harriet
Pollack, "Crimes Without Victims," Saturday Review , k Decem-
ber 1971, PP. 27-29.
^ 7Edwin M. Schur and Hugo Adam Bedau, Victimless
Crimes: Two Sides of a Controversy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 197*0.
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code of any jurisdiction and pick out all and onlythose criminal laws which should be revised or repealedbecause they create victimless crimes and authorizepunishment for them>0 M dUuaou
Thus, the concept of 'victimless crimes', as it is presently
used, "has theoretically unsatisfactory features which make
it a less than perfect analytical category in terms of which
to assess a variety of political, scientific, and moral
questions related to the issue of decriminalization."^1
Like Bayles, Bedau thinks that both legal moralism
and criminal paternalism are unjustifiable—but not neces-
sarily because these governmental policies would create
"crimes without victims." Rather, Bedau holds that because
of the concept's imprecision "it is important to keep dis-
tinct the class of victimless crimes and the class of offen-
ses thought to deserve decriminalization." While it is true
that the chief use of and the major interest in the concept
of 'victimless crimes' derives from its connection with
decriminalization proposals, Bedau' s analysis shows that the
two concepts ('crimes without victims' and 'offenses deserv-
ing decriminalization') merely intersect: neither coincides
with or includes the other.
Bedau concludes that -Mill's harm to others principle
^Bedau, p. 58*
^Ibid., p. 101.
Ibid., p. 60. See also Madeline S. Caughey, "The
Principle of Harm and Its Application to Laws Criminalizing
Prostitution," Denver Law Journal 51. no. 2 (197*0: 235-62.
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gives "a much sounder basis [than the concept of 'victimless
crimes'] for understanding what is wrong with trying to
enforce morality through the criminal law." 43 Like Mill and
Hart, Bedau considers individual freedom an intrinsic good.
For him, then, it is theoretically sounder to rest one's
opposition to legal moralism and criminal paternalism on the
notion of human rights rather than victimless crimes: "We
can avoid moralism altogether and paternalism where it is
inappropriate by relying on a conception of human beings
which accords to each of us an inviolable privacy, a freedom
from legitimate state interference."44 Thus, only those
activities resulting in harm to others which is grave enough
to outweigh the harm and costs of legal prevention and pun-
ishment ought to be considered apt candidates for proscrip-
tion by the criminal law.
D. Conclusion
We have seen that Devlin is an advocate of legal
moralism and criminal paternalism. According to legal mor-
alism, both public and private activities which offend the
moral feelings of a given community may justifiably be made
criminal offenses. Devlin justifies this view by an appeal
to moral populism, the doctrine that the moral preferences
of the majority should be enacted into criminal statutes,
and by holding the metaethical position that a given society's
43Ibid., p. 101.
44Ibid., pp. 101-02.
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positive morality is objectively valid, hence demonstrably
worthy of legal enforcement. Starting out by valuing legal
moralism as a means (to preserving society's "existence" and
traditional institutions), Devlin ends up by valuing morals
legislation either for its own sake or to preserve the
public's moral beliefs from change. According to his crimi-
nal paternalism, activities which result in self-harm (espec-
ially moral "injury" or corruption) may rightfully be pro-
scribed by penal legislation. Devlin therefore advocates
"complete" paternalism for the sake of protecting the actor
from self-inflicted physical and moral harm.
On the other hand, Hart opposes legal moralism, he
says, in all of its forms. The chief reason he gives is
utilitarian: morals legislation would do more harm than good.
Other reasons are that the application of laws which punish
"mere immorality" would lead to certain injustices, unjusti-
fiably deprive individuals of freedom, and overextend the
powers of a limited democratic government. However, it turns
out that there is only one situation in which Hart considers
legal moralism unjustifiable—viz., with respect to the con-
sensual sexual practices of adults in private when these are
offensive to the moral feelings of others. Publicly offen-
sive activities, be they sexual or not, are justifiably pro-
scribed by the criminal law, Hart holds, for the sake of
protecting the moral and religious sentiments of unwilling
witnesses. To this extent, then, Hart agrees with Devlin's
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view that a public's moral convictions should be legally
protected. However, this view is inconsistent with Hart's
utilitarian theory which is incompatible with legal moralism
even in its most limited form.
According to Hart, criminal laws are necessary, not
only to prevent- and punish public offenses, but also in some
instances to protect the individual from himself. Thus, he
holds that it is morally right to criminalize conduct which
produces voluntary self-harm of an adult. But Hart's treat-
ment of paternalism is both misconceived and confused, for
the examples he gives do not fit the principle he advocates.
While Devlin defends "complete" paternalism, then, Hart
espouses a form of legal paternalism which is unclear--
although he presumably would reject Devlin's idea of using
the criminal law to protect an actor from self-inflicted
moral harm.
A closer study of Devlin's and Hart's normative
theories reveals, therefore, that they are not so different
after all. Hart supports a limited form of legal moralism
respecting publicly "indecent" conduct, and he agrees with
Devlin that even the voluntary activities of an adult may
justifiably be interdicted by penal legislation in order to
protect him from self-harm. Thus, the disagreements between
Devlin and Hart are much smaller than would at first appear.
Recent contributions to the Devlin-Hart controversy
have dealt with the issues of public offense, legal pater-
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nalism, and victimless crimes. I agree with Bayles and
Bedau, against Devlin, Hart, and Feinberg, that public con-
duct should not be prohibited and punished by the criminal
law merely because it offends others. I also agree with
Bayles and Bedau, against Devlin, Hart, G. Dworkin, Feinberg,
and Ten, that criminal paternalism (but not necessarily non-
criminal legal paternalism) is both inconsistent and unjus-
tifiable. Finally, I agree with Bedau, against Schur and
some others, that the concept of Victimless crimes 1 is both
unnecessary to and sometimes incapable of justifying propos-
als to decriminalize activities which are not shown to be
sufficiently harmful either to the actor himself or to others
whom they affect. Rather, Mill's principle remains a more
adequate basis for the evaluation of existing and proposed
criminal statutes.
Justifying a criminal statute on Mill's principle,
we should inquire whether there is a welfare interest which
can only or more effectively be secured through such legis-
lation. Is there a less costly or more effective means than
the criminal law to obtaining compliance? Is criminaliza-
tion of the conduct in question practical? Can the law be
effectively enforced? Generally, we should ' inquire whether
a criminal law would do more good than harm. Given the
dangers of restricting individual liberty, and taking into
account the potential for abuse of governmental power, we
should insist on adequate justification of recourse to penal
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proscriptions. Thus, the onus of justification is on the
proponents of criminalization: they must demonstrate that
criminal statutes will do more good than harm. This the
legal moralists most certainly have not done. The same is
true, it seems to me, of those who advocate criminal pater-
nalism.
I think, then, that Mill is more right than Devlin,
or even than Kart. That an activity results in harm to
others should be a necessary condition of its being made a
crime. No action which is harmless to others should be cri-
minalized, and those which are criminally proscribed should
be decriminalized. This does not imply that all actions
which harm others should be crimes: the harm caused may be
negligible or less than that caused by the law in prohibit-
ing and punishing the action. Moreover, even where there is
harm to others sufficient to justify intervention by the
law, penal legislation may be inappropriate because it would
be ineffective or prohibitively costly when compared to the
available alternatives. Thus, harm to others is a necessary
but by no means sufficient, reason for criminalizing the
conduct which causes it.
Subscription to a moral principle means accepting
its consequences. Do I really believe that no activity
which does not appreciably harm others should be made crim-
inal? There could be certain cases where I might argue that
activities which give public offense or cause self-harm may
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justifiably be regulated by the positive law (and in this
sense be made illegal), but not be made criminal. Examples
of these might be exhibitionism and drug addiction. Thus,
adherence to Mill's principle in justifying uses of the cri-
minal law does not mean that society is defenseless in the
face of public offenses or that self-inflicted injuries must
be ignored. Rather, it enjoins the legislature to enact
penal codes with care to justifying them as necessary means
to the promotion of a public's well-being against deliber-
ately inflicted harms. Too often a society's first response
to a social problem is recourse to the positive law, and—
more often than not—to the criminal sanction, in situations
which are either irremediable (such as prostitution—which
even St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas thought to be
intractable) or better dealt with through nonlegal means
(such as incest and polygamy). Upholding a moral principle
which delimits the scope of governmental power and imposes
restrictions on the uses of penal legislation implies that
the government and its policies ought to conform to that
principle. Only in this sense should the positive law
enforce morality.
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